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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three papers that make a distinctive contribution to the study 
of decentralization in the areas of fiscal policy, legislative behavior and government 
responsiveness. 
The first paper revisits theories of substate tax policy that usually draw on evidence 
from stable federations. Investigating fiscal decentralization reforms in four European 
countries subject to intense center-periphery territorial competition, I find that 
incentives operating in such systems generate a paradox whereby prominent 
autonomist regions are among the least likely to make proactive changes after 
decentralization. I theorize this as the best response to central government attempts 
at blame-shifting by locking regions into making controversial policy changes. The 
frequent alignment of autonomist parties as ‘catch-all’ parties buttresses incentives to 
avoid tax innovation. 
The second paper picks up these themes of institutional constraints and electoral 
incentives faced by political actors. Addressing a frequently confounding question in 
the field, I exploit the unusual treatment of dual candidacy in the UK’s devolved 
legislatures to examine whether mixed-member electoral systems influence the 
legislative behavior of reelection-seeking politicians and uncover a split finding. 
Although there is some evidence that status as a list or constituency member 
influences members’ assignments, other connections to members’ presumed re-
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election interests are not found. I contend that the influence of electoral rules is 
conditioned by contextual factors including re-selection procedures, chamber size and 
strong parties. 
Building on insights from the first paper, the third paper empirically scrutinizes 
expectations from fiscal federalism theory that lower tiers of government should be 
more responsive to citizens. Using the responses from two waves of FOI requests 
emailed to 812 public bodies, I develop objective measures of timeliness and quality 
which identify significant variations in responsiveness across the tiers and territories 
of the UK. I argue that the theoretical foundations of traditional fiscal federalism 
theory are inadequate because they ignore institutions’ cultural underpinnings, 
capacity constraints and principal-agent relationships shaping public officials’ 
behavior.
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The past four decades have witnessed a “global federalizing tendency” (Russell 
2005: 13) that has rivalled transitions to democracy as one of the most important 
global political trends (Rodden 2006). Bolstered by theoretical expectations that 
decentralization should be a positive force for more satisfied citizens, better 
democracy and freer markets (Beramendi 2007), states have decentralized central 
government authority in response to bottom-up pressures for recognition and self-
government from vocal autonomist movements and top-down advocacy in 
developing countries by donor governments and international financial organizations 
(for example, World Bank 1999, DfID 2002). Decentralization became a prominent 
policy objective not only in developed countries undertaking democratic reforms, but 
in post-communist states undergoing transition from centralized authoritarianism and 
developing countries attempting to reduce corruption or stem domestic conflict. 
Western Europe is the “epicenter” of this global trend (Russell 2005: 13). In at 
least four major states in this region, Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, 
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politics has been shaped - and on occasion entirely structured - by intense center-
periphery competition over resources, power, and prestige. Given the scale and 
consequences of this transformation, the three papers that constitute this thesis each 
provide an original theoretical and empirical contribution to understanding 
decentralization with a particular focus on this region. 
Pressures on the traditional axes of political competition in these countries 
have been nation-reshaping. In Belgium, successive government formation crises have 
been forestalled only by way of six state constitutional reforms that completely 
restructured the state from a unitary to a federal constitution. In Spain, where 
decentralization was conceived in the 1978 constitution as a buttress against any 
return to assimilationist Francoism (Swenden 2006), successive reforms have 
unleashed turbulent center-periphery dynamics, not only in Catalonia where the 
major regionalist party now leads an outright independentist coalition, but also in less 
prominent regions where political leaders have attempted to construct distinctive 
identities to substantiate claims for additional powers (Moreno 1997). In Italy, 
longstanding grievances over interregional transfers for southern Italy and 
preferential financial treatment for special autonomy regions such as South Tyrol 
prompted the two northern regions of Veneto and Lombardy to legislate for 
referendums on greater autonomy to be held in October 2017. And in the United 
Kingdom, which along with France was considered a quintessential centralist state 
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before 1999,1 decentralization has been prescribed to treat two separate ailments. For 
Scotland and Wales, the UK government undertook “the most radical constitutional 
change [the] country has ever seen” (Bogdanor 2001: 1), responding to demands for 
political autonomy by successively devolving authority to the Scottish Parliament and 
National Assembly for Wales. And reflecting the widespread use of federal or 
decentralized structures to manage ethnic or religious conflict in countries as diverse 
as Bosnia & Herzegovina, Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines, the Northern 
Ireland peace process turned to executive powersharing between the province’s two 
dominant religious communities to contain chronic political violence (Carmichael 
1999).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a “voluminous academic literature” (Shaw, 
MacKinnon & Docherty 2009: 546) of empirical and theoretical research has 
accompanied these developments, such that the field of federalism and 
decentralization has been characterized as a “growth industry” (Erk & Swenden 2010: 
1). Contributions in this field have traced the antecedents of autonomist movements 
and devolved institutions formed in multi-level systems (Conversi 1997, Wyn Jones 
& Scully 2012), analyzed how voting behavior varies between central and regional 
elections (Hough & Jeffery 2006, León 2012), evaluated the interactions between 
                                                          
1 Although a substantial literature has disputed this conventional orthodoxy, particularly with 
regards to Scotland. These contributions have instead characterized the United Kingdom as a 
“union state” (Rokkan & Urwin 1983) or a “State of Unions” (Mitchell 2006) 
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regional and national identities and their consequences for politics (Keating 1996, 
Henderson 2007, Kymlicka 2001), investigated whether and how public policy or 
public finance outcomes vary in decentralized systems (Rodden 2006, Mazzoleni 
2009, Detterbeck & Jeffery 2009),  and considered how state-wide parties’ adapt their 
electoral or organizational strategies and considered how political parties modify their 
strategies to a multi-tiered political game (Pallarés & Keating 2003, Chhibber & 
Kollman 2004, Swenden & Maddens 2008, Hopkin 2009). This expansive field has 
significantly advanced scholarly understanding of the causes and consequences of 
decentralization. While early postwar theoretical approaches were broadly optimistic 
in their expectations for decentralized political and fiscal systems on outcomes, more 
recent ‘second generation’ (Qian & Weingast 1997) research is differentiated by its 
positivist approach and its unwillingness to assume the correctness of the universalist 
prescriptions of the earlier contributions (Erk & Swenden 2010). 
Particularly since the emergence of this second generation in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, scholars have studied a vast range of research questions in hundreds 
of academic articles and thousands of policy reports (Faguet 2014). Drawing from – 
and making a significant contribution to – this research field, the papers constituting 
chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis focus on three topics of particular interest: fiscal policy 
in states characterized by intense center-periphery political competition; the 
influence of electoral rules on members’ behavior in two devolved legislatures; and 
whether and how government responsiveness varies between the central, regional 
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and local tiers of a state. In each chapter, I use a political economy perspective 
incorporating a diverse set of empirical methods to test outcomes, anticipating that 
the consequences of decentralized governance are ambiguous and dependent on the 
institutional configurations and incentives faced by political actors operating in the 
system (Bartley et al. 2008).  
All three papers find that the behaviors of actors in political environments are 
influenced by the operation of institutions. First, and in the decentralizing states of 
western Europe, central government decisions to devolve tax create a paradox 
whereby prominent regions that once led demands for greater autonomy are among 
the least likely to make use of such powers. I theorize this not only as the region’s best 
response to blame-shifting attempts by the center, but that avoiding tax innovation is 
a vote maximizing strategy by office-seeking autonomist parties that compete on both 
the economic left-right and the center-periphery axes. Second, in considering 
behavior in regional legislatures to shed light on a question of longstanding interest 
in the broader discipline, I consider how the operation of two different electoral rules 
influences members in the mixed-member legislatures of Wales and Scotland. While 
List members take on more committee assignments than their constituency 
counterparts, other connections to members’ presumed re-election interests suggested 
in the literature are not found. I surmise that any influence of electoral rules may be 
limited by context-specific factors such as re-selection procedures, the small size of 
both legislature, and strong party discipline. Third, in testing expectations that local 
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governments should be more responsive to their citizens, I find significant variations 
in responsiveness to Freedom of Information requests not only between the tiers of 
government but across the territories of the UK. I theorize that expectations from 
decentralization theory are countered by intergovernmental accountability 
mechanisms, variations in institutions’ inclinations towards openness and 
transparency, and administrative capacity constraints that vary across the territories 
and units of government. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. First, I 
outline the theoretical claims from economics and political science with respect to 
decentralization, claims that have performed inconsistently in the face of recent 
empirical testing. Second, and in reference to the political economy and 
institutionalist perspectives informing this thesis, I discuss the various themes that 
unite the three core chapters. I then outline the methodological and data 
contributions made by this thesis and argue that the cases selected for study – the 
decentralizing states of Western Europe – offer an ideal venue for testing longstanding 
claims that have been ascribed to decentralization. Finally, I provide a road map for 
the themes and chapters constituting the rest of this thesis. 
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1.1 A ‘DECENTRALIZATION DIVIDEND’? CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS 
FROM DECENTRALIZATION THEORY 
1.1.1 Definitional Challenges 
Decentralization is an exceptionally broad concept that incorporates various processes 
that can derive from different sources. It can result from ‘bottom-up’ demands for 
improved governance, local accountability, and recognition of territorially-based 
linguistic, religious or ethnic cleavages; ‘top-down’ elite interests in obliging lower-
tier governments to contribute to national allocative goals or to accept a share of 
national deficits (Bird & Vaillancourt 1998, 3-4); or advocacy in developing countries 
by donor governments and international financial organizations. Scholars working in 
this field have used the term to describe both a static state of being and a dynamic 
process of repeated transfers of power (e.g. Leon-Alfonso 2007: 23; Prud'homme 
1995). It can also be stratified into its administrative, fiscal and political forms (e.g. 
Falleti 2005) or into three classifications demarcating a decentralized body’s degree of 
autonomy: Deconcentration, where administrative responsibly remains with the 
central government but is shifted to staff and offices outside the national capital; 
Delegation, in which responsibility for specific functions is assigned to organizations 
outside the central bureaucracy but for which ultimate responsibility remains with 
the delegating body; and Devolution, in which newly created (or strengthened) 
subnational units of government with clear territorial boundaries exercise exclusive 
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authority to perform conferred or reserved policy functions (e.g. Rondinelli et al. 
1983; Klugman 1994; McGregor & Swales 2005).  
Beyond these overlapping taxonomies, the concept of ‘authority’ is also 
notoriously difficult to measure; for example, a central government may transfer 
policy responsibilities to local governments without providing additional funding 
(Rodden 2006). As a result, as Bird notes, there is a tendency in the literature that 
“decentralization seems often to mean whatever the person using the term wants it to 
mean” (1993, p. 208). Indeed, decentralization is far from the straightforward and 
unidirectional story of repeated transfers of authority to lower-tier governments that 
is often assumed. Not only does the nature of fiscal, political and administrative 
decentralization vary dramatically both within and between countries, but the 
demands of modern government mean that policy, taxation and regulation are in 
practice frequently intertwined between the tiers (Rodden 2006).  
Given this complexity both between- and within the four decentralizing 
states that are the subject of this thesis, and rather than focusing on the narrower (and 
somewhat UK-centric) term ‘devolution’, I take advantage of the broader definitional 
scope of ‘decentralization’ to analyze incentives and outcomes in these case countries 
in different ways. Chapter 2 in particular is rooted in the dynamic conception on the 
term, understanding decentralization “not as a particular distribution of authority 
between governments, but rather a process – structured by a set of institutions – 
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through which authority is distributed and redistributed” (Rodden 2006: 32). Here, I 
consider whether new (and evolving) institutions encourage political actors at the 
central and regional to respond to institutional incentives and center-periphery 
political competition in particular ways. In the latter two empirical chapters I use the 
term in a more static sense. Chapter 3 considers whether the mixed-member electoral 
systems chosen for the newly-established legislatures in Scotland and Wales might 
incentivize legislators to behave in a manner that has been theorized for more 
established legislatures elected by such systems, in particular the German Bundestag. 
Chapter 4 draws from variation in the foundational underpinnings of the devolved 
government bodies in the United Kingdom to consider whether citizen 
responsiveness might vary both between- and within -the tiers of a multi-level state.  
 
1.1.2 Decentralization in Theory and Practice 
Why would central governments divest power to regional and local governments of 
their state? It is a research question that embraces approaches from politics, 
economics, geography and philosophy and has antecedents at least as early as 
Montesquieu and The Federalist Papers. In the postwar academic literature, the 
‘promise of decentralization’ (Rodden 2006) is a straightforward one that emerges 
from theoretical claims from economists and political scientists in what has 
subsequently been described as the ‘first generation’ in the field (Qian & Weingast 
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1997). Economists extol a reputed “economic dividend” of decentralization 
(Rodriguez-Pose & Gill 2005: 405) deriving from more favorable circumstances for 
economic growth and a more accountable government that is conducive to policy 
innovation and experimentation. Decentralization should result in efficiency gains 
(Oates 1972) because localized decision-making over local public goods and services 
provision would be expected to more closely match local preferences than would 
uniform provision by a central authority. Decentralized decision-making should also 
increase choice by enabling citizens to ‘vote with their feet' and select tax- and public 
service offers in other jurisdictions that best suit their preferences (Tiebout 1956).  
Political scientists also find merit in decentralization in the division of power 
between multiple governments as a check on excessive central government power, as 
a means to enhancing democracy and the local accountability, and in accommodating 
demands for democratic representation or mitigating social or economic 
marginalization of territorially-concentrated minority communities (Keating 1998), 
particularly where religious, ethnic, cultural & linguistic cleavages threaten inter-
territorial conflict. But both approaches can perhaps be distilled into a foundational 
claim that decentralized government improves responsiveness and accountability: 
“Decentralized, multitiered systems of government are likely to give citizens more of 
what they want from government at lower cost than more centralized alternatives” 
(Rodden 2006: 5).  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
24 
More recent research has, however, severely tested the unidirectional and 
positive claims previously ascribed to decentralization.  This ‘second generation’ is 
differentiated by its positivist and methodological approach and its unwillingness to 
assume the correctness of the universalist claims of earlier contributions (Erk & 
Swenden 2010).  Empirical work in the recent literature has found neither conclusive 
nor unambiguous support for earlier universal notions; indeed, studies have found 
that decentralization and federalism can be associated with higher levels of perceived 
corruption (Treisman 2000), and under certain conditions, macroeconomic instability 
(Rodden 2006). 
The insights of the latest empirical work imply that anticipating the 
consequences of decentralized governance on policy, political and fiscal outcomes is 
a particular challenge: “When it comes to the political and economic consequences of 
federalism [and decentralization], the devil is in the details” (Beramendi 2007: 759-
760). This paradigm shift in the literature recast the scope of new contributions in this 
field. Recent progress has been necessarily incremental and alert to case-specific 
institutional configurations that may condition the impact of decentralization on 
outcomes. Equally however, scholarship has been eager to expand to new cases and 
exploit new methodologies to shed light on persistent empirical questions.  
Firmly rooted in the second, more skeptical generation in this research field, 
the papers constituting this thesis are motivated to test the optimistic expectations for 
decentralizations from the ‘first generation’ literature and some of the equally 
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unidirectional claims from more recent work (e.g. Worthy 2013, Hong 2017 in 
chapter 4). Reflecting insights from a large political economy research program, this 
thesis contends that institutional context matters: The consequences of decentralized 
governance are ambiguous and dependent on the institutional incentives faced by 
political actors operating in the various tiers of government. But this context 
specificity should not be an impediment to advancing knowledge in this field, and this 
thesis uses new empirical methodologies to confidently engage with complexities 
arising from case specificities.  
The following section addresses how political economy perspectives have 
been associated with significant progress in understanding decentralization and how 
this thesis learns from – and contributes additional insights to – scholarly 
understanding by focusing on political actors’ interactions within the institutions of 
multi-tiered states. 
 
1.2 POLITICAL ECONOMY AND NEW INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES IN 
THE STUDY OF DECENTRALIZATION 
“Political economy” is a term with an exceptionally broad reach. In the first paragraph 
of the thousand-page Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Weingast & Wittman 
(2006) list the diverse and frequently contradictory usages for the term, from Adam 
Smith’s science of managing a nation’s resources to generate wealth, to the Marxist 
application of the term to refer to the influence of historical processes over the 
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exploitation of labor by capital, and from the twentieth-century study of linkages 
between economic policy and politics to scientific methodologies influenced by both 
economics and sociology. Reflecting the utility of recent contributions that analyze 
the role played by individual agency within the constraints and opportunities 
provided by institutions in understanding state transformation, this thesis adopts the 
methodological definition of the term; namely that “political economy is the 
methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and 
institutions” (Weingast & Wittman 2006: 3). 
This “grand synthesis” (Weingast & Wittman 2006: 3) of modern political 
economy approaches is tied together by the use of methodologies from economics to 
explain social and political phenomena. The unit of analysis underpinning these 
approaches are individuals who are assumed to act rationally in accordance with their 
exogenously-determined goals. In other words, actors behave in accordance with 
their preferences for final outcomes and their beliefs about the likely effectiveness of 
the actions, or instruments, available to achieve these outcomes (Shepsle 2010). I use 
these standard assumptions to empirically test political outcomes. In chapter 3 for 
example, I assume that members of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly 
for Wales are motivated by their goal of winning re-election. Positing that certain 
committee assignments might be a useful instrument in achieving this goal, I 
investigate whether legislators act in accordance with expectations from this 
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presumed individual calculus by statistically testing patterns of committee 
assignment.  
But in any political system, and particularly in the complex multi-tiered states 
that feature in this thesis, theoretical approaches that only consider individual actors 
are insufficient because they ignore the institutions that incentivize particular actions 
and constrain others. Indeed, far from becoming the manifestation of a kind of 
economic imperialism in the realm of political science, political economists adapted 
to the failures of early positive models to yield the simple equilibrium result found in 
economic models of perfectly competitive markets (Ordeshook 1990) by emphasizing 
the interactions of “both ‘economic’ behavior in the political process and ‘political’ 
behavior in the marketplace” (Alt & Alesina 1998: 645) Continuing to exploit 
techniques and rational maximization assumptions from microeconomics, 
contributions from modern political economy explicitly incorporate institutions that 
bind actors’ strategic options and divert outcomes from the equilibrium result that 
would have been achieved in their absence. For example, with the Downsian model 
of electoral competition routinely failing to produce its famous convergence result in 
real world political environments (Grofman 2004), the spatial model of elections 
began to integrate various humanly-devised constraints that may prevent 
convergence on the median voter, including strategic manipulation (Gibbard 1973, 
Satterthwaite 1975), agenda-setters (Tsebelis 2002), or actor-determined procedural 
rules in committees that divert outcomes away from the median voter (Shepsle & 
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Weingast 1995, Ordeshook 1990). As a consequence, and in addition to explaining 
collective outcomes such as resource allocation and public policy in reference to the 
“political and economic institutions constrain, direct and reflect individual behavior”, 
scholarship in this area investigates how and why institutions “evolve in response to 
individual incentives, strategies and choices” (Alt & Alesina 1996: 645). 
This process of adaptation and learning in political economy paralleled the 
rediscovery of institutions elsewhere in the discipline that galvanized the emerging 
opposition to behavioralism in the study of politics after the 1960s. This rediscovery 
contributed to the rise of an approach that became loosely grouped together as the 
‘new institutionalism’ (Ordeshook 1990, Hall & Taylor 1996). But despite this well-
documented re-emergence of institutions in political science, in the field of 
decentralization and comparative federalism at least, it is not clear that institutions 
ever truly went away. Studies of federalism and decentralization continued to draw 
from the ‘old institutionalism’ long after its displacement by behavioralism in the 
wider discipline (Erk & Koning 2009). The enduring applicability of institutions for 
research in this field originates from the prominence of government bodies and 
constitutions in any study of the sharing or dispersal of political authority between 
two or more tiers of government (Erk & Koning 2009). For example, well before new 
institutionalism entered the mainstream in the discipline, Canada’s foremost scholar 
of federalism and the constitution, Richard Simeon argued: 
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Institutions are not simply the outgrowth or products of the environment and 
they are not just dependent variables in the political system. They can be seen 
as independent forces, which have some effects of their own: once established 
they themselves come to shape and influence the environment. (1977: 297) 
Simeon’s characterization of the importance of institutional configurations in 
delimiting political outcomes would fit comfortably within mainstream new 
institutionalism approaches in contemporary political science many decades later.  
In a contribution that still shapes the characterization of this approach in 
political studies two decades later, Hall & Taylor (1996) disaggregate the ‘new 
institutionalism’ into three distinct perspectives: Rational choice institutionalism that 
considers how individuals are incentivized and constrained by institutions in pursuing 
their own goals; Historical institutionalism that views institutions as relatively 
persistent features of the historical landscape where path dependencies from previous 
decisions influence future actions and power relations; and Sociological 
institutionalism that understands not only the behavior of individuals but their self-
images, identities and basic preferences to be bounded by shared values and world-
views constructed from common experiences, routines or familiar behavioral norms. 
These conceptualizations have been adapted and built upon, such as Guy Peters’ six 
analytically separate versions of the new institutionalism (2000). But despite this 
apparent disaggregation, the framework has instead been subject to growing 
rapprochement between the branches, and particularly between historical and 
rational choice institutionalism (Katznelson & Weingast 2005), such that the 
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perspectives “complement rather than correct each other” (Keating, Loughlin & 
Deshouwer 2003). Embracing this rapprochement, the following section specifies how 
the papers in this thesis use political economy techniques and draw from both rational 
choice and historical institutionalism to theorize and explain outcomes under 
decentralization.  
 
1.3 UNIFYING THEMES ARISING IN THIS THESIS 
This thesis brings together three papers that typify the skeptical detachment and 
alertness to context specificity characteristic of recent literature in this field (Erk & 
Swenden 2010). Although each chapter deliberately exploits different methodologies 
and three separate datasets (see section 1.4), they are structured around several 
unifying themes, namely the ‘calculus approach’ in understanding outcomes; 
exploiting context differences between the regions of a state; and attentiveness to 
democratic representation, responsiveness, and accountability. 
 
1.3.1 THE ‘CALCULUS APPROACH’ IN UNDERSTANDING OUTCOMES UNDER 
DECENTRALIZATION 
Political economy approaches in the new institutionalism, termed the ‘calculus 
approach’ by Hall & Taylor (1996), expect political actors to pursue their goals within 
the constraints of institutions. Here, institutions provide actors with information 
pertaining to the likely present and future strategies of others and shape actors’ 
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strategic calculations by bounding the range of possible alternatives (Hall & Taylor 
1996). This characterization provides a useful foundational basis for this thesis, and all 
three papers draw insights from across the boundaries of Rational Choice and 
Historical Institutionalism (e.g. Katznelson & Weingast 2005). For example, Chapter 
2 draws from both the Rational Choice and Historical approaches to investigate 
territorial competition in Western Europe, positing that recent widespread tax 
devolution is an instrument – or a means to an end – for central and regional political 
elites rather than an end in itself. From Rational Choice institutionalism, I posit that 
institutional design has emerged from the preferences of political actors over policy 
outcomes (Hix 2007). Both the interests of central tier politicians in blame avoidance 
and prominent autonomist regions’ longer-term objective of incremental accretion of 
‘national’ institutions are served by fiscal decentralization. And from Historical 
Institutionalism, this chapter incorporates two useful elements: the dynamics of 
power (Lecours 2005) and the likelihood that historical path dependencies bound the 
future possibilities for individual agency. I draw from insights from the literature that 
the creation of regional institutions may have acted as a lightning-rod for territorial 
identities to be molded by entrepreneurial regional elites, first in the most prominent 
autonomist regions of a state and subsequently in more ‘centralist’ regions where 
political elites construct distinctive identities to substantiate claims for comparable 
powers, a process Luis Moreno terms “ethnoterritorial mimesis” (Moreno 1997, also 
Lecours 2004). This chapter finds that central government decisions over which taxes 
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to devolve to lower tier governments appear to create future path dependencies over 
which neither central nor regional actors can control.  
Chapter 3 picks up these themes by analyzing the institutional constraints and 
electoral incentives faced by political actors. Here, I consider the operation of the 
mixed-member electoral systems used to elect members to the Scottish Parliament 
and the National Assembly for Wales, and investigate whether different electoral 
rules impact the behavior of re-election seeking legislators. Addressing a frequently 
confounding question in the field, I exploit the unusual prohibition of dual candidacy 
(candidates standing on jointly on constituency and list ballots) in Welsh elections 
between 2007 and 2016 and compare this with the absence of any such prohibition in 
Scotland. I posit that re-election incentives operating on members, such as 
constituency members’ interests in personal vote cultivation, might be observed 
through assignments to legislative committees. Although there is some evidence that 
a legislator’s status as a list or constituency member influences committee 
assignments, other connections to members’ presumed re-election interests are not 
found. Reflecting the finding throughout this thesis that case specificity matters, I 
surmise that the influence of electoral rules is conditioned by further contextual 
factors including re-selection procedures, chamber size and strong parties. 
Building on these insights into the role that institutional constraints and 
incentives play in shaping actors’ behavior, Chapter 4 empirically scrutinizes 
expectations from fiscal federalism theory that lower tiers of government should be 
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more responsive to citizens than the central tier. Using responses from two waves of 
FOI requests emailed to 812 public bodies, I develop objective measures of timeliness 
and quality which identify significant variations in responsiveness across the tiers and 
territories of the UK. I posit that top-down intergovernmental principal-agent 
dynamics – the institutional constraints that incentivize actors to behave in a certain 
manner – overwhelm the traditional electoral and exit-and-voice mechanisms in 
government accountability to citizens assumed in earlier theory. The theoretical 
foundations of fiscal federalism theory also ignore institutions’ cultural underpinnings 
and administrative capacity constraints. Here again, this chapter draws from insights 
from both Rational Choice institutionalism and Historical institutionalism: the latter 
addressed through a hypothesis that institutions established in the modern 
government era will be more receptive to transparency demands than bodies with 
long histories of operating in closed systems.  
 
1.3.2 EXPLOITING CONTEXT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE REGIONS OF A STATE 
Further developing the observation that context specificity matters, the papers in this 
thesis join a rich seam of academic research in the ‘new regionalism’ (Keating 1998) 
that rejects ‘methodological nationalism’ (Jeffrey & Wincott 2010): the state as the 
sole unit of interest in political science. But if institutional configurations influence 
both actors’ strategies and outcomes in politics, not only is the regional tier an 
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important focus of scholarly inquiry, but research must be cognizant of the potential 
for significant variation between the various regions of a nation state. Simply put, not 
all regions are created equal. Even where decentralization has been largely symmetric, 
citizens in certain parts of the state might be more oriented towards a regional identity 
than those in more ‘statist’ regions. The strategies pursued by regional and central 
political elites will therefore depend on their respective abilities to orient citizens’ 
towards the pursuit of collective goals at the regional or central level (Jeffrey 2012).  
This basic observation is often missed in the usual point of departure in studies 
of decentralization that distinguish regions according to their relative levels of 
authority in the two domains of Self Rule and Shared Rule. In this approach, regional 
authority is considered an additive function of the political, administrative and fiscal 
powers a subnational government exercises in its own territory (self-rule) and co-
exercises in the country as a whole (shared rule) (Elazar 1987, Marks, Hooghe & 
Schakel 2008, Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010, 2016). But this resulting indicator, 
the Regional Autonomy Index (RAI) (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2016), is not 
designed to distinguish those regions which may be more ‘autonomist’ from those that 
may have a more ‘centralist’ orientation. For example, the RAI score for all Spanish 
regions other than the Basque Country and Navarre is a comparatively high 23.5, 
including Catalonia and Galicia, where regional claims are constructed around 
centuries of linguistic, ethnic, cultural and geographic difference, along with Castile 
and León, a 1983 administrative creation from the Old Castilian core of the central 
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Spanish state. Yet more recent research emphasizes that a region’s relative 
prominence derives from contextual factors such as the strength of regional identities, 
the region’s ‘self-rule’ institutional authority, and the strength of its economy 
(Henderson, Jeffrey, Wincott & Wyn Jones 2013). In Western Europe at least, 
‘regionalist’ attributes are most recognizable in the ‘strongest’ of regions – high 
autonomy ‘self-rule’ regions buttressed by strong economies and historical 
foundations (2013: 305). 
The papers in this thesis regard the likelihood that ‘autonomist’ and ‘centralist’ 
attributes are distributed irregularly within a nation-state as a useful source of 
variation for empirical analysis. Chapter 2 uses this within-state variation between 
‘autonomist’ and more ‘centralist’ regions as a basis for positing that regional and 
central political actors will behave differently depending on the salience of the center-
periphery axis of competition in the region in question. Such a dynamic would 
significantly limit the applicability of theories of substate tax policy that usually draw 
on evidence from stable federations such as the United States. Investigating fiscal 
decentralization reforms in Spain, Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom – four 
countries that are subject to intense center-periphery territorial competition –  I find 
that incentives operating in such systems generate a paradox whereby prominent 
autonomist regions are among the least likely to make proactive changes after 
decentralization. I theorize this as the best response to central government attempts 
at blame-shifting by locking regions into making controversial policy changes.  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
36 
Chapter 3 exploits a further source of regional variation between the two 
substate legislatures analyzed; namely the divergent treatment of dual candidacy 
between Scotland and Wales. I anticipate that incentives to either cultivate a personal 
vote for constituency members or appeal to a party membership ‘selectorate’ for List 
members would be stronger in Wales where it was not possible for candidates to 
‘hedge their bets’ and stand for election on both the constituency and regional 
components of the election. 
Finally, chapter 4 finds the divergent historical and institutional 
underpinnings of the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
of significant value in testing whether responsiveness should vary between the tiers 
of government. In contrast to Scotland and Wales, where “devolution is an exercise 
in decentralizing power in response to a demand from people there for more control 
over their own affairs” (Carmichael 1999: 141), responsiveness and public 
administration concerns in Northern Ireland were subsumed within a macro 
architecture in which conflict resolution through political accommodation was the 
primary imperative (Carmichael 1999, Greer 2012). Moreover, while Scotland and 
Wales’ institutions were established as an integral part of an open government 
constitutional reform program characterized by contemporary commentators as the 
“New Politics” (e.g. Cairney 2012, Mitchell 2000, Osmond 1998), Northern Ireland’s 
devolved institutions were a legacy of the 1921-1972 Stormont Parliament and the 
Direct Rule Northern Ireland Office, a body which was itself “the lineal descendant 
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of the old Stormont Cabinet Office” (Bell 1987: 212). I use this intra-state variation in 
contexts to test whether and how the foundational underpinnings of institutions 
affect outcomes, finding Scotland’s devolved institutions more responsive to FOI 
requests than their Northern Ireland counterparts. 
 
1.3.3. DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION, RESPONSIVENESS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
The third unifying theme focuses on theoretical perspectives on decentralization that 
emphasize the oft-claimed virtues of accountability and proximity in reconnecting 
citizens with their governments. Here, the papers constituting this thesis consider the 
extent to which expectations that local and regional governments should be more 
responsive to their citizens than central governments are evident in practice. 
Traditional fiscal federalism theory supposes that decentralizing income tax 
powers would allow regions to better tailor tax policies to the distinct preferences of 
citizens in localities and regions. Although rarely addressed directly in the literature, 
there are theoretical grounds to anticipate that where differences in citizen 
preferences across territories are large (especially for regions most likely to articulate 
regional distinctiveness), we might expect greater differentiation in tax rates and 
public goods provision. But Chapter 2 argues that far from becoming prominent tax 
innovators, regions that most emphasize their distinctiveness are among the least 
likely to vary rates from the national fiscal policy trajectory after powers are 
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transferred. I argue that in overlooking the strategic interests of regional actors 
pursing a “champion of the region against the center strategy”, and central actors’ 
interests in countering this by shifting the blame for controversial tax policy decisions, 
the efficiency gains anticipated by fiscal federalism are over-estimated.  
This chapter further contends that expectations from fiscal federalism theory 
ignore insights from the Downsian model of electoral competition. In prominent 
autonomist regions, parties compete not only on the traditional left-right economic 
spectrum but also on a national identity/center-periphery dimension. If autonomist 
parties adopt a policy-seeking, polarised position on the center-periphery dimension 
(their very raison d'être, after all), Downsian electoral dynamics would encourage 
office-seeking autonomist parties to converge on the position of the regional median 
voter on the economic spectrum for office-seeking purposes, maximizing the 
likelihood of attracting a sufficient number of voters to gain office. Autonomist parties 
would therefore be expected to adopt a ‘catch-all’ strategy on the traditional economic 
axis of competition by downplaying polarizing income tax policies that would 
otherwise split their pro-autonomy core vote.  
Finally, as outlined elsewhere in this introduction, Chapter 3 considers how 
electoral systems affect legislator behavior, namely constituency members’ assumed 
incentives to cultivate a constituency-based personal vote (and List members’ 
incentives to cultivate a party-reelection vote) in the devolved legislatures of the 
United Kingdom, and Chapter 4 empirically tests expectations that lower-tier 
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governments would be more responsive to their citizens by coding and analyzing the 
quality and timeliness of UK public bodies’ responses to Freedom of Information Act 
requests. 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGICAL AND DATA CONTRIBUTIONS 
The three papers constituting this thesis adopt a variety of methodologies as well as 
generating new data in order to explore the theoretical arguments introduced in this 
chapter. Rather than adhering to a single methodological approach, each paper 
employs different methods to engage with both the theoretical underpinnings for 
decentralization introduced in this chapter and practical empirical problems in multi-
tiered states.  
Given the previous absence of existing large datasets to inform the research 
questions addressed in this thesis, I employ multiple methods to expand the potential 
of comparative research (Poteete et al. 2010). The objective for each paper is to select 
techniques that can circumvent previous challenges of measurement, using 
innovative methods to test theories and hypotheses that have previously been difficult 
to empirically investigate. Chapters 3 and 4 employ quantitative statistical analyses 
for subjects that had not been studied in this manner before, trialing recent techniques 
developed in the literature such as Hanmer & Kalkan’s (2013) Observed Values 
method for calculating marginal effects from a probit regression. But because the 
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newness of tax decentralization in the four western European countries limits the 
potential for large-N statistical analysis, Chapter 2 uses cross-case comparisons to 
work around the limited number of years and observations. I exploit the annexes of 
detailed annual reports from the EUROMOD project – a European tax-benefit 
microsimulation model managed at the University of Essex – to catalogue tax changes 
in every Spanish and Italian region over the past decade.  
Taking advantage of a far larger number of observations, Chapter 3 uses two 
separate innovative methods. First, I use a self-constructed database cataloguing the 
biographies, educational histories, and committee assignments of every member of the 
Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales between 1999 and 2016 
constituting 1,942 and 900 member-year observations respectively. Second, I 
undertake a detailed search of LexisNexis citations of committee activity in the Welsh 
and Scottish print media since 2000 to assess expectations that certain committee 
assignments might offer more scope for personal vote cultivation by members of the 
two legislatures.  
Chapter 4 also employs quantitative methodologies made possible by a large 
self-constructed database. Attempting to overcome the lack of empirical evidence for 
assertions that decentralization is associated with improved responsiveness, I use 
public agency responses to Freedom of Information Act requests to facilitate the type 
of data collection that had previously been beyond reach for single researchers 
working outside of large-scale projects (Savage & Hyde 2014). From these responses I 
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construct two composite variables of response quality and timeliness for 811 public 
organizations across the United Kingdom, and analyze this data using statistical 
modelling.  
1.5 WESTERN EUROPE AS A VENUE FOR EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THEORIES OF 
DECENTRALIZATION 
As the “epicenter” of the worldwide decentralizing tendency, the four case countries 
featured in this thesis harbor significant variation in the historic and cultural bases for 
their regional institutions, from “historic nationalities” such as Catalonia and Veneto 
to regions without strong regionalist sentiment or self-rule traditions such as Brussels-
Capital, Castile and León, and Lazio.  
Chapter 2 considers all of these country cases. In Spain, although historic 
charter rights have afforded the Basque Country and Navarre longstanding and 
significant fiscal powers, successive fiscal decentralization programs have replaced the 
previous grants-based financing system for the rest of the State with a semi-
autonomous system in which regional governments share revenues from most major 
taxes. In Italy, several regions have been forced to use their limited (but increasing) 
tax-raising powers to fund deficits incurred by their primary spending obligation, the 
regionally-administered National Health Service (SSN). Grievances over perceived 
unfairness of Italy’s territorial financing system prompted two Lega Nord regional 
presidents to call constitutional reform referendums for late 2017, first on outright 
independence and subsequently on greater autonomy after an intervention by the 
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Italian constitutional court. Belgium’s transition from unitary state to federation has 
been accompanied by successive reforms to the territorial financing system from a 
largely-grants funded equalization system to one in which Belgium’s three regional 
governments are responsible for raising a large proportion of the their own budgets 
from at least a dozen different taxes. And fiscal decentralization has accompanied the 
UK’s incremental legislative decentralization, albeit dormant in Scotland between 
1999 and 2016 but now constituting a major part of the Scottish Government budget.   
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the United Kingdom. The British political system 
had been long regarded as a pre-eminent example of concentrated executive power in 
a national government that had resisted the global decentralizing trend (Paun & 
Hazell 2008; Shaw, MacKinnon & Docherty 2009). But the UK’s rapidly-transitioning 
institutional arrangements provide several major sources of variation for empirical 
analysis that is of broader interest both in the subfield and the wider discipline. That 
the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales were newly established in 
1999 means that the operation of mixed-member electoral systems are less likely to 
be effected by institutional hangover effects (Crisp 2007) that may operate from the 
memory of prior electoral rules continuing to influence the behavior of elected 
members. And that legislation prohibited Welsh candidates from standing on both 
the constituency and list components of the two-ballot election between 2007 and 
2015 provides a unique source of cross-case variation between the two systems.  
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Chapter 4 finds that two features of the UK are of particular use in empirical 
testing theories of government responsiveness. First, the UK is a venue for 
comprehensive FOI legislation covering a sufficiently large number of organizations 
at central, regional and local tiers to facilitate data collection and quantitative 
statistical analysis. And second, significant differentiation in the foundational 
underpinnings of the new regional tier allows researchers to test whether institutions 
inclined towards openness and transparency will be more responsive than 
consociational institutions designed to resolve conflict. While devolution to Scotland 
and Wales aimed to give institutional expression to national identities and to craft 
more transparent and accessible government structures, conflict resolution through 
political accommodation was the foundational imperative for Northern Ireland’s new 
powersharing institutions. The UK case is therefore instructive in understanding not 
only the dynamics of decentralization but also how context-specific incentives 
operating on actors affect outcomes. 
 
1.6 OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapters 2, 3 and 4 present each 
of the three papers introduced above in turn. In Chapter 5, I summarize the 
substantive and methodological contributions of these papers, discuss how this work 
advances knowledge in the field, and consider possibilities for future research using 
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the methods and insights advanced in this thesis. I also explore the implications of my 
thesis for contemporary policy debates, arguing that closer attention should be paid 
to incentive structures operating on actors in multi-tiered systems as the regional 
dimension of politics continues to shape competition and outcomes across the globe. 
  
 
2 
 
The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization: 
Why autonomist regions don’t make 
more use of devolved tax powers 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Existing theories of substate tax usually draw on evidence from stable federations and 
therefore overlook the incentives generated by center-periphery competition in 
rapidly decentralizing states. This chapter explains the apparent paradox that 
prominent autonomist regions are among the least likely to vary tax rates after income 
tax decentralization. Challenged by a ‘champions of the region against the center’ 
strategy, central elites seek to lock regions into blame-sharing for controversial policy 
changes. Autonomy-maximizing regional elites accept fiscal decentralization but are 
alert to electoral and budgetary risks. Avoiding proactive rate changes means voters 
are unlikely to perceive any change from tax decentralization, weakening the 
effectiveness of the center’s strategy and allowing the region to maintain a ‘regional 
champion’ strategy. These incentives are buttressed by the frequent arrangement of 
autonomist parties as ‘catch-all’ parties, and by their longer-term objective of 
incremental accretion of proto-state institutions that overrides any short-term 
advantages from tax innovation. 
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It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on 
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of 
pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with 
so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public 
opinion is left in suspense about the real author.  
 
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, n. 70. 
 
 
 
Don’t ever put up income tax, mate. Take it off them anyhow you please, but 
do that and they’ll rip your fucking guts out.  
Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating to UK Opposition Leader Tony 
Blair, 1995. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains an apparent paradox at the heart of the rapidly-developing 
process of fiscal decentralization in multinational states of Western Europe. 
Traditional fiscal federalism theory supposes that decentralizing income tax powers 
would allow regions to better tailor tax policies to the distinct preferences of 
autonomist regions. But far from becoming prominent tax innovators, regions that 
most emphasize their distinctiveness are among the least likely to vary rates from the 
national fiscal policy trajectory after powers are transferred. Scotland has never used 
rate-varying powers, Flanders has not varied surcharges in the first three years of 
operations, northern Italian regions are among the most infrequent users of tax 
powers, and Catalonia has made use of rate-varying powers only once, during a 
coalition led by (non-autonomist) Catalan Socialists. 
Prevailing expectations have overlooked the incentives operating on central 
and autonomist regional elites competing intensely over power, recognition, status 
and resources. While existing literature frequently assumes a simple story of 
decentralization being demanded and won by regionalist parties applying pressure on 
statewide parties (e.g. Obydenkova and Swenden 2013), passing the buck for 
politically-costly income tax decisions can be a ’blame avoidance’ strategy by central 
elites (Weaver 1984), locking the region into blame-sharing and fiscal retrenchment. 
Autonomist elites accept fiscal decentralization because it allows them to retain a 
greater share of own-sourced revenues and is accompanied by tax agencies and 
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treasuries, contributing to a longer-term objective of incremental accretion of 
national institutions. However, they also recognize that assertive use of rate-varying 
powers carries short-term economic and political risks that may jeopardize this long-
term objective. Aligning the region’s ‘fiscal trajectory’ with that of the central 
government means voters perceive little or no change from tax devolution, weakening 
the effectiveness of the center’s ‘pass the buck’ strategy and allowing regional actors 
to continue an electorally-successful strategy that champions the region’s interest and 
projects blame for detrimental outcomes onto the center. The frequent arrangement 
of non-statewide parties as ‘catch-all’ parties spanning the left-right ideological 
spectrum buttresses incentives to avoid tax innovation in autonomist regions. The best 
response to central blame shifting is therefore to accept tax powers but avoid their 
proactive use. In rational choice institutionalism terms, this equilibrium is an efficient 
institution because it is mutually beneficial to central and regional elites.  
In the deeply-competitive environment characterizing territorial politics in 
the multinational states of Europe, such an equilibrium does not preclude change. If 
a coterie of political elites determines constitutional arrangements, individuals within 
that set will attempt to gain a greater share of the system’s resources (or prestige, or 
authority, or recognition) (Bednar 2016). The resulting ‘federal bargain’ can be 
understood as an incomplete contract that affords both sides with considerable 
opportunities for political opportunism (Rodden 2006), albeit bounded by 
institutional structures.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, I assess the 
foundations for differentiated use of decentralized fiscal powers drawn from stable 
federations, arguing that such underpinnings only have partial applicability to the 
deeply-competitive environment of territorial politics in the decentralizing states of 
Western Europe (Spain, Italy, Belgium, and the UK). In the final sections I evaluate 
regional income tax policy changes in these countries, finding that party competition 
and incentives operating on political elites have created an institution-in-equilibrium 
with respect to income tax decentralization. 
 
2.2 STABLE FEDERATIONS AS AN UNSTABLE FOUNDATION IN 
UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENTIATED USE OF TAX POWERS 
As regions have assumed an increasing number of policy responsibilities in recent 
decades (Hooghe, Marks & Schakel 2010), attention has shifted to the large gaps 
between expenditure responsibilities and the usually-far more limited revenue-
raising competences of regional governments. Traditional fiscal federalism theory has 
recommended a limited scope for tax decentralization (Bird 1999), and the literature 
has generally assumed that senior central government politicians and civil servants 
would be reluctant to divest themselves of their monopoly revenue-raising power 
(Brennan & Buchanan 1980).  
This literature provides important underpinnings in understanding tax 
assignment and the regional governments’ use of devolved taxes. But much of this 
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evidence is drawn from long-established and stable federations, notably the US states 
where the economic left-right spectrum primarily structures political competition. 
Consequently, this work risks overlooking a ‘national identity’ dimension that 
structures electoral competition in the autonomist regions of decentralizing nation-
states (Rico 2012).  
Simply put, not all regions are created equal. Recognizing the potential that 
“regionalist” or “centralist” attributes would be irregularly distributed within a 
nation-state, Henderson et al. (2013) find broad diversity, from “historic regions” such 
as Wales and Catalonia to “administrative conveniences” such as Lower Saxony; from 
high-autonomy “self-rule” regions such as Scotland to the administratively-weak 
French regions; and from strong regional economies such as Bavaria to economically 
weaker areas such as Galicia. Strongest evidence of ‘centralist’ attributes is found in 
the most “feeble” regions – those that are institutionally or economically weak and 
lack historic foundations (2013: 305).  
Should territories that most articulate their distinctiveness make more 
assertive use of income tax powers than more ‘centralist’ regions? Although rarely 
directly addressed in the literature, it is a question with broad underpinnings. 
Responding to differentiated preferences is fundamental to the derivation of the 
normative decentralization prescriptions of ‘first generation’ fiscal federalism theory 
that assumed that governments would seek to maximize social welfare (Rodden 2006). 
Wallace Oates’ decentralization theorem (1972) hypothesized that localized 
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governance optimizes allocative efficiency by accounting for variations in 
preferences: Where differences in citizen preferences across territories are large 
(especially for regions most likely to articulate regional distinctiveness), we might 
expect differentiated provision of taxes and public goods. Similarly, and assuming a 
large number of small jurisdictions competing for mobile consumer-voters who locate 
according to their ideal balance of taxation and public services, ‘Tiebout sorting’ (from 
Tiebout 1956) suggests that tax-and-service packages differing between localities will 
more closely match individual preferences than standardized national provision. 
Finally, if elections can be understood as policy selection or preference revelation 
mechanisms (Shepsle 1991), party control should matter for tax policy because left-
wing governments’ predisposition towards state intervention and a larger public 
sector requires additional revenue. Since income tax is easily understood it is well 
suited for ideological positioning such as proposals for tax cuts or redistribution 
(Blom‐Hansen et al. 2006). 
In contrast to the early fiscal federalism literature that viewed the center as a 
benevolent, welfare-maximizing social planner, a ‘second generation’ is more 
skeptical of universalist accounts and focuses instead on the incentives created in the 
operation of political institutions and the behaviors they induce from actors (Oates 
2005). For example, evidence from the US states (Berry & Berry 1992, 1994) suggests 
the validity of a ‘regional diffusion hypothesis’ (Walker 1969) that derives from 
incentives operating on risk-averse state politicians. States are more likely to increase 
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rates or introduce new taxes if neighboring states have already done so, because of 
greater certainty about policy consequences, reduced fears that businesses may 
relocate to neighboring jurisdictions, and the opportunity for politicians to draw 
attention to the neighboring state’s tax policies in rebuffing criticism that the tax is 
unfair (Berry & Berry 1992: 722). An incentives-based account also informs the large 
electoral cycles literature that considers electoral proximity a key determinant of tax 
changes (e.g. Nordhaus 1975). Introducing politically-costly policies early gives the 
“public the maximum amount of time to forget the government's unpopular action 
before the next election” (Berry & Berry 1992:719).  
But preference- and incentives-based accounts of tax changes can be derailed 
by the immediacy of economic crises. Fiscal decentralization in Western Europe 
coincided with deep fiscal retrenchment following the 2007-08 financial crisis, a 
global recession and the Eurozone banking crisis. Regional budgets faced severe 
contraction as receipts from own-sources and intergovernmental transfers reduced 
significantly. Budget shocks might overwhelm divergence and trigger a tax-raising 
response. As Hansen argues in relation to the US states, this response might result not 
only from fiscal necessity but because "the existence of an economic crisis . . . may 
reduce the political risks of tax innovation, particularly if a state is legally required to 
show a balanced budget" (1983: 150).  
These approaches in explaining substate tax policy have made progress in 
understanding incentives operating on regional political actors. However, because the 
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subject for such work is often stable federations – in particular the United States – this 
research frequently neglects the center-periphery axis that is essential in explaining 
electoral competition in the strongest historical regions. In particular, existing 
political economy approaches overlook incentives operating on autonomist parties 
that derive from the Downsian model of electoral competition. Where competition is 
structured both along the economic left-right and the center-periphery dimensions, 
these two axes organize political orientations and voting behavior differently and give 
rise to distinctive plains of competition between statewide and autonomist parties 
(Pallarés & Keating 2003). The best response for office-seeking, vote-maximizing 
parties in such systems is to develop a broad appeal on both axes. In a two-dimensional 
ideological space, pro-autonomy parties may be inclined to converge on the regional 
median voter by creating a ‘broad-church’ or ‘catch all’ platform that attracts 
autonomy-inclined voters from both wings of the economic left-right spectrum 
(Massetti 2009: 524-525). Reflecting such incentives, autonomist parties tend to be 
located in the mainstream of political competition on the centrist/liberal right or 
conservative right in ‘bourgeois’ regions such as Flanders, Veneto and South Tyrol; 
and on the center-left in ‘working class’ regions such as Wales and Wallonia (Massetti 
2009). As a result, historic regions governed by ‘catch-all’ autonomist parties (or 
adaptive statewide parties) might be especially averse to using devolved tax powers. 
The central proposition of this chapter is that decentralized income taxes 
should be subject to very little change, especially in the prominent autonomous 
Chapter 2: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization  
54 
regions or historical nations of a state. But a number of factors might explain the 
(albeit limited) use of such powers. Particularly among parties that do not compete on 
the national identity/center-periphery dimension, party ideology should have some 
explanatory power, with center-left parties more likely to raise taxes and center-right 
parties more likely to reduce them. By extension, non-autonomist parties operating 
in prominent autonomist regions should be more likely to use tax powers than pro-
autonomy parties that may be attempting a ‘catch-all’ strategy on the economic left-
right dimension. Contemporary political parties such as the Ciutadans (Citizens) or 
the Socialists’ Party in Catalonia might therefore be more active in modifying tax rates 
than Convergence and Union, Junts pel Sí or the Republican Left; the sp.a (Socialist 
Party Differently) or Christian Democratic & Flemish in Flanders more willing to alter 
income tax than the nationalist New Flemish Alliance, and Scottish Labour and the 
Scottish Conservatives more active in rate changes than the Scottish National Party. 
Budget shortfalls may also force the hand of some administrations, 
particularly where regions are required to raise revenues to close budget deficits (as 
in Italy). ‘First-mover’ regions may also reduce the political costs of increasing rates 
in later-moving, neighboring regions (i.e. ‘regional diffusion’). Finally, the nature of 
the region’s financial settlement should also play a major role in tax policy. Regions 
such as South Tyrol and the Basque Country should be relatively more flexible in 
using devolved tax powers because of a much more generous financial settlement than 
regions participating in ‘ordinary’ funding regimes. 
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But any explanations for the use (or non-use) of tax powers focusing solely on 
the regional tier will have limited purchase because this approach entirely ignores the 
interests of a second player in inter-territorial competition. In contrast to early 
approaches that assumed the Center to be a benevolent welfare maximizer, ‘second 
generation’ theory considers senior central government politicians and civil servants 
to be equally self-interested as regional actors. Not only are political elites in 
autonomist regions engaged in ‘nation-building’, for which “the possession of formal 
authority is instrumental to the fulfilment of the goals of individual and collective 
actors” (Christensen 2000: 390), but central actors have an interest in defending 
against this strategy by appealing to the integrity of the nation-state (Lecours 2004) 
or engaging in the ‘politics of blame avoidance’ (Weaver 1984) by passing the buck 
for politically-costly decisions. This dynamic between central and regional actors, and 
in particular each party’s best response to each other’s strategy, is of fundamental 
importance in explaining tax policy outcomes in the decentralizing states of Western 
Europe.  
 
2.3 ADDING THE CENTER BACK: COMPETITION AND DECENTRALIZED 
INCOME TAX 
The previous section began by asking whether pro-autonomy territories of a state 
should be expected to make more assertive use of income tax powers than more 
‘centralist’ regions. Although preferences-based theoretical underpinnings of the 
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early literature might assume this to be the case, existing explanations have frequently 
overlooked the center’s interests in resisting decentralization, and the region’s best 
response to the center’s strategy. In extending a concept that fiscal decentralization 
can be understood an ‘incomplete contract’, this chapter argues that incentive 
structures operating on central and regional elites create an “institutional equilibrium” 
(Shepsle 1986, Calvert 1995) at a point where income taxes are devolved but 
autonomist regions are not inclined to use them. This position might be alternatively 
conceived as a Mexican standoff in which an uneasy stalemate persists because neither 
party can advance or retreat without being exposed to jeopardy.   
The equilibrium rests on four ‘pillars’ deriving from electoral competition, 
blame-shifting and the authority-maximizing objectives of central and regional elites: 
1. Regional elites in autonomist regions adopt a ‘champion of the region against 
the center’ strategy, harnessing differentiated identities and instrumental 
economic grievances to mobilize support and project blame for detrimental 
outcomes onto the center. 
2. Strategic central government actors resist this strategy by engaging in the 
politics of blame avoidance, using fiscal decentralization legitimized through 
negotiated settlements to lock regions into sharing or assuming blame for 
controversial or costly policy changes, particularly during periods of spending 
restraint. 
3. Although they are alert to the potential loss of an electorally successful 
‘regional champion’ strategy, autonomist regional politicians are engaged in a 
nation-building project and therefore accept fiscal decentralization as it grants 
status and prestige on the region and is supplemented with institutions such as 
Treasuries and tax agencies that mirror or substitute those of the center. 
4. While regional actors are willing to assume risks associated with fiscal 
autonomy, the likely success of the center’s blame-shifting strategy is minimized 
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(and the continued success of a continued ‘champion of the region’ strategy 
maximized) where the regions tether regional tax rates and thresholds broadly to 
the national tax policy trajectory.  
 
Although opportunities exist for continued competition and bargaining, these 
incentives give rise to a condition where income taxes are partially decentralized but 
tax divergence between regions is significantly smaller than anticipated in the fiscal 
federalism literature. 
 
PILLAR 1: ‘CHAMPIONS OF THE REGION AGAINST THE CENTER’ AND INSTRUMENTAL 
ECONOMIC GRIEVANCE  
Particularly in the strongest historic regions, political elites may be able to reorient 
the regional populace to pursue collective goals at the regional level not simply via 
affective identity claims but also by instrumental economic interests crystallized by 
grievances over territorial financing and resource distribution (Jeffrey 2012). 
Instrumental grievances are frequently the most prominent contentions in federal and 
multi-national states. In Canada, Western Alienation has been fomented by Alberta 
and British Columbia’s net contribution to equalization and the perception that 
federal spending is directed at central Canadian interests (Lecours 2004). Net 
contributor states to Australia’s extensive fiscal equalization are frequent and vocal 
critics of the method used to determine distributions from the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST), the major source of state and territory revenue.  
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In Spain, the imbalance between Catalonia’s contributions to tax revenue and 
public funds received from the state “has been a permanent cause of struggle” (Castells 
2014: 284) that “has become one of the main arguments used by Catalan political elites 
to advocate for greater autonomy or straight secession” (Rico 2012: 222). Mobilization 
of economic grievances has contributed to the growth of regionalist parties not only 
in ‘bourgeois’ regions such as Bavaria, Flanders and Northern Italy, but also in 
‘working class’ regions such as Sardinia and Wales, where mobilization draws from 
perceptions that existing redistribution does not adequately address economic 
inequalities (Jeffrey 2012).  
Articulation of grievance by prominent regions can also encourage elites 
elsewhere to construct distinctive identities to substantiate claims for comparable 
powers or financial settlements to those ceded to the historical regions, a process 
Moreno terms ethnoterritorial mimesis (Moreno 1997). In Canada, the salience of 
regional grievances first mobilized in Québec and Western Canada give provincial 
leaders elsewhere an electoral incentive “to be aggressive when they deal with the 
federal government on issues they can frame as affecting their interests and/or 
identities” (Lecours & Béland 2010: 582). In the case countries, regions without a 
strong tradition of independent identities such as Wallonia, Brussels, Valencia and the 
Canary Islands have attempted to “stimulate feelings of distinctiveness in their own 
federate entity” (Lecours 2004: 81).  
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PILLAR 2: RESISTANCE FROM THE CENTER: SOLIDARITY, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS AND 
BLAME-SHIFTING 
Notwithstanding the benevolent assumptions of early literature, adopting a 
competitive strategy in inter-territorial relations is not the sole prerogative of regional 
actors. As in Canada after the 1995 Québec referendum and the UK after the 2014 
Scottish referendum, central actors can be expected to resist the ‘slippery slope’ of 
decentralization by appealing to notions of interterritorial solidarity and the integrity 
of the nation-state (Lecours 2004). 
In addition to inertia and appeals to solidarity, one response to an autonomist 
‘champion of the region against the center’ strategy is to engage in “the politics of 
blame avoidance” (Weaver 1986) by locking regional governments into sharing or 
assuming blame for controversial policy changes (Béland & Myles 2012). Far from 
being a simple story of devolution being demanded and won by regionalist parties 
applying pressure on statewide parties (e.g. Obydenkova & Swenden 2013), 
decentralization can be a vital instrument for central actors to ‘pass the buck’ (Weaver 
1986). Because of voters’ negativity bias – “their tendency to be more sensitive to real 
or potential losses than they are to gains” – Weaver observes that office-seeking 
politicians are more motivated to avoid blame than they are to seek credit (1986: 370). 
They therefore have a strong incentive to force other actors in the system to make 
politically costly choices. In particular, where a policy change is likely to bring 
benefits to one part of the electorate but negatively affect another broad group (such 
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as welfare reform or tax rises), transferring responsibilities to other tiers of 
government can circumvent institutional paralysis that may delay or stymie such 
reforms (Costa-i-Font 2010). 
Particularly in parliamentary systems where executives are drawn from the 
legislature, it is more difficult for central government actors to deflect blame to other 
branches of the center. Decentralization to other tiers is therefore a means to avoid 
blame in the event of a reform backfiring (Costa-i-Font 2010: 483). Indeed, because 
blame shifting usually represents a useful long-term strategy to both incumbent and 
future governments, central tier parties may “collude” to approve such transfers 
(Costa-i-Font 2010: 483). Such decentralization reforms can be legitimized and locked 
in by ‘negotiated settlements’ between central and regional governments. Myles and 
Pierson (2001) note that all major pension reform events in Canada in the 1990s were 
the products of such center-periphery settlements, which might include all-party 
agreements, tripartite agreements with ‘social partners’, or approval by national 
referendums. 
A short-lived Australian fiscal decentralization proposal in 2016 is illustrative 
of a central blame-shifting strategy using income tax. Facing an $80bn cut in projected 
commonwealth spending on hospitals and schools, and “the inevitable blame from 
state premiers for not stumping up the cash” (Guardian Australia, 3 April 2016), the 
Turnbull Government proposed ‘tax room’ for state income taxes by reducing the 
federal tax: the same mechanism used in Spain, Belgium and Scotland. After state 
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premiers rejected the plan the Prime Minister warned: “Don’t come to the 
commonwealth asking for more money when you weren’t prepared to even think 
about putting taxes up yourselves… Now the ball is back in your court” (News.com.au, 
4 April 2016). Yet as reported at the time, although Turnbull’s tactic “was couched in 
the language of ‘ending the blame game’… [it] was actually calculated to give him a 
means of shifting, or at least sharing, the blame” (Guardian Australia, 3 April 2016). 
Turnbull’s strategy echoed legislation passed by the Fraser Government in 1978 
permitting the states to establish an income tax surcharge or rebate, an offer which 
was not taken up by the states and was consequently repealed in 1989 (Madden 2006). 
Rather than welcoming the powers, state premiers speculated that the surcharge 
“might help the commonwealth escape from some of the odium for a high level of 
personal income taxes, and aid its attempts to wind back its financial commitments to 
the states” (Sharman 1993: 228 in Madden 2006), with Queensland premier Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen remarking that “the only good tax is a Commonwealth tax” (in Craig 
1997: 193). 
 
PILLAR 3: AUTHORITY MAXIMIZATION AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF AN EMERGENT NATION 
STATE 
If central actors consider decentralization a means to shift blame or overcome logjams, 
regions’ complicity in such schema is puzzling. In a settled federation where premiers 
have little incentive to ‘nation-build’, the Australian states twice rejected a fiscal 
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decentralization plan that barely concealed the center’s blame-shifting intentions. Yet 
from the perspective of authority-maximizing regional actors in decentralizing states, 
tax powers and treasuries are important institutions of an emergent nation state. 
This expansive treasury model has been echoed in Scotland, Catalonia and 
Flanders. Despite tax collection being primarily a provincial function in Spain, the 
Catalan government explicitly prioritized the creation of an “embryo” Catalan 
Treasury, Tributs de Catalunya, which merges the small existing AC tax agency with 
the far larger provincial bodies, creating an intergovernmental agency of 1,421 staff 
members distributed across 150 branches (Catalan News Agency, 20 September 2012). 
Rather than a cost-saving exercise, the reform is best interpreted as part of a strategy 
to create “state structures”, explicit since a December 2012 agreement between 
Convergence and Union and the Republican Left of Catalonia. Scotland’s new tax 
collection agency, Revenue Scotland, was established on an expansive framework and 
was considered by the Scottish Government’s Fiscal Commission Working Group 
prior to the independence referendum as a potential “foundation for the formation of 
a tax administration system for all taxes in Scotland” (Scottish Government 2013a). 
Even in Italy, where fiscal decentralization has been accompanied by a 
significant retrenchment of central funding for devolved functions, ‘fiscal federalism’ 
is viewed with suspicion in poorer regions but maintains widespread support in more 
autonomist regions. In a 2010 Demos survey, just 18% of voters in southern Italy 
thought that fiscal federalism would make things better, compared with 43% of voters 
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in the North, and 63% in Veneto’s Vicenza province (Diamanti 2010a).2 In Italy’s 
more autonomist regions, fiscal devolution is considered “a kind of universal remedy, 
which will result in lower taxes, more autonomy, and more extensive and higher 
quality public services” (Diamanti 2010a). As in the other autonomist regions, the 
institutions accompanying fiscal decentralization are of instrumental benefit: “The 
Taxman…is a flag of center-right liberal federalism… waved by the League” 
(Diamanti 2010b). 
 
PILLAR 4: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RISKS IN DECOUPLING FROM THE NATIONAL FISCAL 
TRAJECTORY 
Autonomist regional actors therefore accept the ‘decentralization bargain’ because it 
is accompanied by institutions that enhance the region’s status and prestige. However, 
because macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal policy are central government (or 
Eurozone) functions, devolved income taxes are associated with economic risks that 
are often well outside regional governments’ influence. Such risks are extensive, 
including budget shortfalls from macroeconomic shocks, boirrowing3 and asymmetric 
impacts from industrial or immigration policies. At a mechanical level, receipts from 
                                                          
2 The poll question asked: “Di recente il parlamento ha approvato la legge sul federalismo. 
Secondo Lei che effetti avrà per la sua regione?” –”Recently the parliament approved the law 
on federalism. In your opinion what effects will it have for your region?”  Demos survey for 
the Industrial Association of the Province of Vicenza, 12 June 2010. Available at 
http://www.demos.it/2010/pdf/1347201006videmos.pdf 
3 See the Appendix for a note on Borrowing Powers. 
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income taxes levied on a surtax or overlapping basis will be influenced by central 
policy competence over thresholds and brackets. In Belgium for example, where the 
regional income tax surcharge is levied directly on the federal tax and not the tax base, 
changes to federal tax rates or thresholds directly increase or decrease the proceeds of 
the regional tax.  
But there are political as well as budgetary risks from active use of tax powers. 
Alert to the threat of losses at the next election from unpopular tax changes, regional 
politicians would be expected to subordinate short-term interests in tax innovation to 
longer-term nation-building objectives. Maintaining prevailing income tax rates (and 
thresholds fixed or only marginally changed) represents a lower-risk policy that 
continues to align regional policy with the trajectory of the rest of the state. If the 
region broadly maintains the national trajectory, voters will perceive little or no 
change from tax devolution, weakening the likely effectiveness of the center’s ‘blame-
shifting’ strategy. This allows regional elites to continue a strategy of simultaneously 
defending the regional interest and projecting blame onto the center. Or, as McLean 
observes in relation to Scotland after tax devolution: “when forced to make cuts, the 
[Scottish] government will once again blame the English” (2012: 650). The contrasting 
strategy is to detach from this national trajectory by engaging in tax competition or 
offering rate changes. This option is higher risk in the short-term because it makes a 
central ‘blame-shifting’ strategy more likely to be successful in the event of policy 
failure.  
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Importantly, these significant political and budgetary risks mean that income 
tax may not be representative of autonomist regional elites’ motivations in cultivating 
differences in other areas of public policy. In decentralized education policy for 
example, evidence from educational curriculum cooperation in Canada is that non-
autonomist provincial governments chose to coalesce around a broad-based 
‘ideational consensus’ that found its expression in a series of intergovernmental 
forums (Wallner 2017). In contrast, autonomous regional elites in Québec used their 
policy autonomy in education to execute nation-building objectives (Béland & 
Lecours 2008, Wallner 2017). Because of its “commitment to nationhood, self-
determination, and the promotion of its own uniqueness… Québec had significantly 
less incentive to harmonize course content with the other provinces” (Wallner 2017: 
432). In many non-tax areas of public policy, autonomist regional elites might be 
expected to use policy levers more radically than their counterparts in the less 
distinctive regions of a state. 
Indeed, that income tax is non-representative may also be applicable in 
relation to other, less-consequential devolved taxes. The relatively-higher visibility of 
income tax means that rate changing risks are substantially higher than for other own-
source regional revenues. In Spain, where a wide range of taxes can be levied by the 
Autonomous Communities, more significant changes have been applied to relatively 
minor taxes such as the Death and Gift Tax and discretionary environmental and sin 
taxes (see Section 2.4.1). This parallels Scotland and Wales’ early willingness to adopt 
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minimum alcohol pricing and plastic bag levies relative to the UK government for 
England (The Guardian, 25 October 2017). In contrast to far-less consequential levies 
that are clearly linked to environmental- or health policy objectives, income tax 
increases pose a direct (and sometimes significant) cost on taxpayers, presenting 
significant risk for regional actors interested primarily in nation-building objectives. 
The following section assesses against the practice of regional income tax use 
in the case countries, arguing that incentives operating on political elites create an 
institutional configuration that is not associated with the frequent and assertive use 
of income tax powers in prominent autonomist regions. 
 
2.4 CHARTING THE PARADOX: THE USE OF INCOME TAX IN SPAIN, ITALY, 
BELGIUM AND THE UK 
A common feature of fiscal decentralization in Spain, Italy, Belgium and the UK has 
been the devolution of part of the central government’s Personal Income Tax as the 
largest (or the second-largest) of new own-source revenues. This section analyses the 
use of such powers in reference to expectations outlined above. Because of the limited 
number of years since tax decentralization and the small number of regions (only 
three in Belgium and one in the UK), any estimates drawn from a regression line 
would be unstable (e.g. Tabachnick & Fidell 2013). Cross-case parallels are therefore 
more appropriate for the purposes of this study than large-N quantitative 
methodologies.  
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2.4.1 SPAIN 
Two distinct sets of territorial financing arrangements have been in place in Spain 
since the constitution of 1978: the common-system for 15 Autonomous Communities 
(ACs) and the Foral regime for the Basque Country and Navarre (from fuero, 
“medieval charter or right”) (Colino 2012).4 The foral regime is characterized by full 
regulatory autonomy over all major taxes (except VAT) and an annual quota paid to 
the Spanish government for non-devolved expenditures such as defense (Colino 
2012).  
Aside from the long history of the foral regime, fiscal devolution in Spain is a 
recent phenomenon (Bird 2015). No fewer than five distinct financing models have 
been in place since 1986, transforming Spain’s territorial financing system from one 
based on earmarked grants to one based on shared- and own-source taxes. All 
                                                          
4 The historic basis for the foral regime was a series of compromises designed to end repeated 
civil wars between the central Spanish state and Carlist traditionalists in the north east of 
Spain, and the inability of the State to effectively collect taxes in the region. As a result, 
Navarre and the three historical provinces today constituting the Basque Country – 
Araba/Álava, Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia (Biscay) – maintained full control over their own taxation 
systems, and this local fiscal autonomy resumed throughout the Basque Country and Navarre 
after Spain’s transition to democracy in the 1970s. The Basque Country financing system is 
regulated under a Financial-Economic agreement (Concierto Económico) which cannot be 
amended by members of parliament representing constituencies outside the Basque Country 
(Colino 2012). Because the Basque Country and Navarre do not make contributions to Spain’s 
interterritorial financial equalization system and benefit from a “politically determined 
miscalculation of the quota remitted to the central government” (Colino 2012: 12), per capita 
funding is at least 60-80% higher than in other Spanish ACs, allowing the Basque Country to 
spend twice as much on health, education and social services (Colino 2012) and therefore able 
to reduce taxes at no cost to their taxpayers (see Bird 2015). This analysis therefore 
concentrates on fiscal decentralization in the common regime. 
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common-system ACs have progressively gained access to all major tax bases and rates 
since 1997, with the exception of corporate income taxes (Ruiz Almendral 2013).  
The ACs have been active in using some of these tax powers. The Death & 
Gift Tax’s decentralization in 2002 led to significant regional differentiation on 
partisan lines: Madrid under the Popular Party (PP) being far more willing to cut taxes 
than Socialist (PSOE) strongholds such as Andalusia (Solé-Ollé 2013). Behavioural 
effects by taxpayers have been largely absent, because Gift Tax levies are based on the 
property’s location rather than the taxpayer’s domicile (Solé-Ollé 2013). Since the late 
1980s, ACs have also been allowed to create new taxes but only in areas that are 
unoccupied by the central government. Although tax proposals have been successfully 
challenged before the Constitutional Court, new environmental levies and ‘sin’ taxes 
have been created under this provision,5 and Catalonia and Galicia have been active 
in this field (Solé-Ollé 2013). However, perhaps given the restrictions impeding their 
more widespread use, Catalonia’s ‘own taxes’ represented just 1.6% of the budget in 
2012 (Castells 2014: 282). 
A far more substantial (and the largest) source of revenue is the regional 
income tax, comprising 31.5% of Catalonia’s 2012 budget (Castells 2014: 283). Prior 
to 2009, the ACs were relatively passive in terms of the structure of income tax. 
                                                          
5 Adopted own source taxes include gambling taxes (e.g., casinos, bingo, slot machines and 
lotteries) and environmental taxes (e.g., water, emissions, landfill, incineration or other 
disposal taxes) 
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Instead, and in a parallel with Belgium, ACs focused on introducing new fiscal benefits 
for specific classes of taxpayers such as child and housing credits (Ruiz Almendral 
2013, Solé-Ollé 2013). Although virtually none of the ACs modified their tax rates or 
schedules during the 2000s, Madrid was again a “pioneer” in introducing small rate 
reductions after 2007 (Solé-Ollé 2013: 352). 
A possible explanation for this reticence is that prior to the most recent 
reforms, ACs could choose whether to exercise their powers to regulate a devolved 
tax. In the absence of a decision the State would continue to levy the tax and transfer 
receipts to the region. This guarantee of continued financial transfers on the basis of 
historical shares created a strong disincentive for ACs to use their new competences 
(Ruiz Almendral 2012). In a move reminiscent of the Calman Commission that first 
recommended overlapping income taxes in Scotland, a 2009 Spanish government 
reform forced the regions to actively legislate for such taxes or forfeit the associated 
revenues. No AC had requested such a change; rather the reform was “intended to 
reinforce fiscal responsibility, if only by forcing ACs to exercise their powers” (Ruiz 
Almendral 2013: 23).  
Despite central efforts to impose a more uniform decentralization settlement 
(Pallarés & Keating 2003), Spanish ACs vary according to their constitutional 
foundations, the speed at which powers were devolved, and the “differential fact” 
(Moreno 2001) of ethnic and linguistic identities that give rise to “large differences in 
self-identification between the historic nationalities and the rest” (Pallarés & Keating 
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2003: 4). The 1978 constitution prioritized the restoration of autonomous government 
to the two foral nationalities plus Catalonia and Galicia where regionalism had “gained 
ground as a legitimate force of democratic resistance against [Franco’s] assimilationist 
and unitary policies” (Swenden 2006: 31). Catalonia is the most prominent historic 
region in the common system; Galicia has a historic identity and language but a 
weaker economy and non-autonomist administrations. The 13 other ACs were 
categorized as ‘ordinary’, but while several had strong existing identities and self-rule 
traditions such as Andalusia and the Canary Islands, others such as La Rioja, Cantabria 
and Murcia had little regionalist sentiment or history of self-government (Heywood 
1995 in Swenden 2006). Some newly-established ACs therefore expanded their 
autonomy more rapidly. Andalusia became a “fast-track” adopter of autonomy, the 
Canary Islands and Valencia were “intermediate-track”, and the remaining 10 ACs 
were “slow-track” adopters (Swenden 2006: 32). Regionalist identification in 
autonomist regions has been much more marked than in the other ‘ordinary’ status 
regions (Pallarés & Keating 2003: 4). 
In practice, despite variation in regional identification, even prior to the 2009 
reforms the formal powers of ‘slow-track’ ACs had caught up with the ‘fast-track’ 
regions (Swenden 2006). Not only is tax autonomy currently quite substantial, but 
there has been an “explosion” in the use of such powers since 2010 (Solé-Ollé 2013). 
ACs have been able to vary the number of tax brackets applying to earned income tax, 
change tax rates applying for all or some of these brackets, and alter the income 
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thresholds applying to each bracket. The use of these policy levers since the 
introduction of such flexibility is summarized in Table 2.1. An interpretation key is 
also provided. 
 
Income Tax Policy Innovation: Key  
Brackets ↑ or Brackets ↓ - Change in the number of tax bands or brackets applying to 
regional taxable income. 
Some Rates ↑ or Some Rates ↓ – Change in income tax rates for some but not all bands 
All Rates ↑ or All Rates ↓ – Change in income tax rates for all bands 
Thresholds Δ - Change in the income thresholds applying to the bands 
‡ - Election held 
2015: Major change to Spanish State tax brackets in 2015. ACs Adopted or Did Not Adopt 
new structure for regional rates. 
Party abbreviations: PSOE–Spanish Socialist Workers' Party; PP–People’s Party; PPdeG–
People’s Party of Galicia; PAR–Aragonese Party; IU–United Left; PSM–PSM Nationalist 
Agreement; ERC–Republican Left of Catalonia; CC–Canarian Coalition; PRC–Regionalist 
Party of Cantabria; IVC–Initiative for Catalonia Greens–United and Alternative Left; 
CiU–Convergence and Union; JxSí–Junts pel Sí; PSPV–Socialist Party of the Valencian 
Country 
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Table 2.1: Income Tax Changes In Common-System Autonomous Communities 
Autonomous 
Community 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Major change to Spanish tax brackets 
(see key) 
No. Years 
of Tax 
Changes * 
Historic Communities 
Catalonia Party Control PSC-ERC-IVC 
coalition, CiU min 
after 12/2010 ‡ 
CiU min CiU min ‡ CiU min CiU min CiU min (JxSí after 10/1/2016) ‡ 1 
Tax Changes  Some Rates ↑ •    Did not adopt.  
Galicia Party Control PPdeG maj PPdeG maj  PPdeG maj ‡ PPdeG maj PPdeG maj PPdeG maj   
Tax Changes      Did not adopt. 
Some Rates ↓ 
1 
Fast- and Intermediate-track ‘Ordinary’ ACs 
Andalusia Party Control PSOE maj PSOE maj PSOE-United Left 
coalition (after 5/2012) ‡ 
PSOE-United Left 
coalition 
PSOE-United Left 
coalition 
PSOE-United Left coalition. PSOE 
min after 6/2015 ‡ 
 
Tax Changes  Some Rates ↑ 
Brackets ↑  
Thresholds Δ   Did not adopt. 2 
Canary Islands Party Control CC-PP coalition CC-PP coalition; CC-
PSOE after 5/2011 ‡ 
CC-PSOE coalition CC-PSOE coalition CC-PSOE coalition CC-PSOE coalition 
‡ 
 
Tax Changes   Some Rates ↑ 
 
  Did not adopt. Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
2 
Valencian 
Community 
Party Control PP maj PP maj ‡ PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj. PSPV/Commitment 
Coalition after 6/2015 ‡ 
 
Tax Changes All Rates ↓ 
 
 All Rates ↑ 
 
  Did not adopt. 
All Rates ↓ 
3 
Slow-track ‘Ordinary’ ACs 
Aragon Party Control PSOE-PAR coalition PSOE-PAR. PP-PAR 
coalit. after 5/2011 ‡ 
PP-PAR coalition  PP-PAR coalition PP-PAR coalition PP-PAR coalition. PSOE min after 
7/2015 ‡ 
 
Tax Changes      Adopted. 
Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
1 
Asturias Party Control PSOE min PSOE min. Asturias Forum 
after 7/2011 ‡ 
Asturias Forum. PSOE 
min after 5/2012 
PSOE min PSOE min PSOE min ‡  
Tax Changes  Thresholds Δ 
Some Rates ↑ 
 
Brackets ↑  
Thresholds Δ 
Some Rates ↓ 
Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↑ 
 
 Did not adopt. 
Some Rates ↓ 
4 
Balearic Islands Party Control PSOE-PSM-IU-ERC 
coalition 
PSOE-PSM-IU-ERC 
coalition; PP Maj after 
5/2011 ‡ 
PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj.  PSOE/PSM-Nationalist 
Agreement after 6/2015 ‡ 
 
Tax Changes     
 
 
 Adopted New Structure. 
Brackets ↑  
1 
Cantabria Party Control PRC-PSOE coalition PRC-PSOE coalition; PP 
maj after 5/2011 ‡ 
PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PRC-PSOE coalition after 
7/2015 ‡  
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Table 2.1: Income Tax Changes In Common-System Autonomous Communities 
Autonomous 
Community 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Major change to Spanish tax brackets 
(see key) 
No. Years 
of Tax 
Changes * 
Tax Changes  Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↑ 
  Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
 
Adopted. 
Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
3 
Castile and León Party Control PP maj PP maj ‡ PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj ‡  
Tax Changes      Did not adopt, except new lowest 
bracket. 
Some Rates ↓ 
1 
Castile–La Mancha Party Control PSOE maj PSOE maj; PP maj after 
5/2011 ‡ 
PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj. PSOE min after 7/2015 ‡  
Tax Changes      Adopted. 
Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
1 
Extremadura Party Control PSOE maj PSOE maj; PP maj after 
5/2011 ‡ 
PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj. PSOE min after 7/2015 ‡  
Tax Changes  Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↑ 
 
 Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
 
Some Rates ↑ 
 
Adopted. 
Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
4 
La Rioja Party Control PP maj PP maj ‡ PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj ‡  
Tax Changes      Adopted. 
Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
2 
Madrid 
Community 
Party Control PP maj PP maj ‡ PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj. PP min after 7/2015 ‡  
Tax Changes     All Rates ↓ 
 
Did not adopt, except new lowest and 
highest brackets. 
Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
3 
Murcia Party Control PP maj PP maj ‡ PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj. PP min after 7/2015 ‡  
Tax Changes   All Rates ↑ 
(match Valencia) 
All Rates ↑ 
 
 Adopted. 
Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
3 
Source: Author and EUROMOD Country Reports – Spain.  
* Including any policy to change the regional tax system to match the Spanish state bracket structure in 2015.  
• Policy decision by previous administration
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A number of patterns can be observed. Several ACs including Valencia, 
Asturias, Extremadura and Madrid used taxation powers frequently whereas others 
used them rarely (Balearics, Catalonia, Galicia, Aragon, Castile and León, Castile–La 
Mancha). Second, in a parallel with Italy, some smaller ACs matched income tax 
policy to those of larger ACs, namely La Rioja (to Madrid) and Murcia (to Valencia), 
perhaps suggesting ‘regional diffusion’. Third, although some changes to income tax 
policy can be explained by reference to party, with right-wing administrations more 
likely to cut rates, again there is no rigid pattern. PP administrations in Galicia and 
Castile & León rarely used such powers but used them widely in Madrid and Valencia. 
Although the small number of observations complicates the results for PSOE, left-
wing administrations did raise taxes in Andalusia and Extremadura, but kept them 
fixed in Castile-La Mancha, Aragon and the Balearics. With the exception of Valencia 
where administrations of both the center-right and center-left (after 2015) used 
powers more frequently, the historic nationalities and faster-track regions used tax 
powers less frequently than those in the slower-track.  
The period analyzed here coincided with an unprecedented economic crisis 
in Spain. While the ACs introduced stimulus measures for significant industrial 
sectors such as car manufacturing (Viver Pi-Sunyer 2010), the tax response was starkly 
dissimilar. Some administrations continued to cut taxes (Madrid, three times); some 
raised rates (Murcia [twice], Canaries, Catalonia [once each]), while others had a 
contradictory rate response (Valencia, Extremadura). Still others altered income 
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thresholds (Andalusia, Asturias), while others increased the number of brackets 
(Andalusia, Asturias, Cantabria, Extremadura). Likewise, electoral cycles have little 
purchase in understanding tax changes in the ACs. Only Asturias, Valencia, the 
Canaries and Murcia undertook tax changes in the year after an election – and 
alternative explanations can be offered for at least two of these changes: the Canarian 
Coalition’s switch from a center-right to center-left coalition in 2011, and Murcia’s 
‘regional diffusion’ with Valencia.  
Of all historic regions in the case countries, an electorally-successful 
‘champion of the region’ strategy is perhaps most associated with the 23-year 
leadership of Catalonia’s Jordi Pujol, during which the CiU “cultivated its image as a 
champion of the Catalan cause” and obtained incremental but significant 
advancements in regional autonomy (Rico 2012: 230). Instrumental economic 
grievances reflecting such a strategy feature frequently in the Catalan government’s 
publications and statements. For example, in advance of the 2017 budget statement, 
the Economy and Tax Office Minister launched a social policy document containing 
proposals by academics for tacking inequality and poverty. But it was reported that 
the Minister rejected all of these initiatives by concluding that: 
…the Catalan government is unable to make these changes, because the major 
taxes are managed by the [Spanish] State.  
… [T]his situation has forced him to prepare a budget for next year ‘that is 
neither the one Catalans deserve nor what they need’ because it does not 
correspond to ‘the economic and fiscal effort made by the citizens. (Catalan 
News Agency, 17 November 2016) 
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Despite all major Catalan parties except the PP supporting greater tax 
autonomy during the negotiation of Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy, to date the 
only change in tax rates was made by a Socialist-led tripartite coalition in 2010. 
Subsequent pro-autonomy minority administrations have refused to change rates, 
despite significant pressure to increase rates from the left-wing Popular Unity 
Candidacy in the 2016 budget negotiations and ERC’s participation in the Junts pel Sí 
government (Catalan News Agency, 10 November 2016). Likewise, although Galicia’s 
dominant party, the People’s Party of Galicia, is a regional offshoot of the statewide 
PP, it has described itself as “autonomist” or “Galeguista” and has adopted the rhetoric, 
symbolism and cultural characteristics of a regionalist party (Schrijver 2006: 159-162), 
adapting to the political dynamics of the region. Galicia’s government modified 
income tax rates only once. 
 
2.4.2 ITALY 
As in Spain, Italy’s territorial financing system is bifurcated between individual 
arrangements for five ‘special statute’ regions and a common system for the remaining 
15 ‘ordinary statute’ regions. The five special regions – Aosta Valley, Trentino-Alto 
Adige/South Tyrol,6 Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia and Sicily – were designated in 
                                                          
6 Legislative, administrative and taxation powers in Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol have been 
transferred to the two self-governing provinces, Trentino and South Tyrol. 
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the 1947-48 constitution either to recognize linguistic or ethnic diversities or a long 
independent history. In addition to regional own-source taxes levied along with 
ordinary regions (see below), the five regions share receipts from national taxes 
generated in the region, with the regional percentage varying from approximately 
100% in Sicily, 90% in Aosta Valley and Trentino-South Tyrol, 70% in Sardinia and 
50% in Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Giarda 2000). Special regions do not participate in 
equalization schemes; as a result there is wide variation in the underlying fiscal bases 
both between the five regions and between special and ordinary regions. The 
combination of high tax-sharing percentages and high per-capita incomes mean that 
Trentino-South Tyrol and Aosta Valley “experience by far the highest levels of per 
capita public expenditures” in Italy (Giarda 2000: 7). This is perhaps possible only 
because of their relative size. While South Tyrol and Aosta Valley have a population 
of 512,000 and 127,000 respectively, high-income regions in the ordinary regime 
including Lombardy (10 million), Lazio (6 million) and Veneto (5 million) are 
indispensable to Italian fiscal equalization. 
For ordinary statute regions created in 1970, reallocation of functions between 
the tiers of government was undertaken during the Prodi administration with the 
1997 Bassanini Act (No. 127/1997), establishing a mechanism for devolving powers 
over a multi-year period (Piperno 2012). On the revenue side, tax autonomy for 
communes had been introduced with a municipal property tax in 1993 and a 
maximum 0.5% flat rate Income Tax surcharge (IRPEF comunale) in 1998. A 
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corresponding Income Tax surcharge for regional administrations (Addizionale 
regionale IRPEF) was also introduced in 1998, consisting of a mandatory flat rate of 
0.9% and an additional discretionary rate of up to 0.5%.  
Unlike Spain, Belgium and Scotland, the largest source of regional own-source 
tax revenues in Italy is not income tax but rather a business tax, the Regional Tax on 
Productive Activities (IRAP), also introduced in 1998. IRAP is a tax on the value of 
net business production and is the main source of revenue for the Italian National 
Health Service that accounts for 85% of spending by regional administrations (OECD 
2015). The standard IRAP rate for private sector activity is currently 3.90% levied on 
a broad tax base, and may be increased or decreased by up to 0.92% by regions. An 
unusual feature of Italy’s territorial financing arrangements is the central 
government’s ability to require regions to increase IRAP and IRPEF rates to meet 
deficits in health expenditure (L'extra deficit sanitario), such that Sicily, for example, 
has levied the maximum rate for both taxes since 2011 (ANSA 28 January 2017). 
Eleven regions currently levy the standard IRAP rate (Aosta Valley, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, 
Basilicata and Sardinia). Southern regions carrying health deficits levy the maximum 
rate (Lazio, Marche, Molise, Abruzzo, Apulia, Calabria, Campania and Sicily). South 
Tyrol and Trentino are able to use their preferential financial circumstances to set 
lower rates of 2.98% and 3.44% respectively (OECD 2014). Most regions therefore 
choose not to exercise their 0.92% discretionary allowance; as a result there is 
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therefore general continuity in IRAP rates (excepting regions with health deficits and 
Trentino-South Tyrol). However, stark regional economic differences generate large 
disparities in receipts. In 2014, the average net tax declared by businesses paying IRAP 
(excluding government agencies) ranged from €11,850 in Lazio and €10,620 in 
Lombardy to €3,380 in Basilicata and just €1,090 in Sardinia (Italia Oggi 22 March 
2016). 
A 2001 constitutional reform entrenched subsidiary and fiscal federalism into 
the constitution; however, this tentative step towards further decentralization was 
followed by almost a decade of hiatus until the passage of implementing legislation in 
2009 and two legislative decrees by the Berlusconi government (in which the 
Northern League participated) in 2010 and 2011 (Piperno 2012). The framework law 
(n.42/2009) provided regions and communes with an assigned share of the VAT; 
additional flexibilities over income tax surcharge rates, deductions and allowances; 
and (as in the Spanish case) the ability to introduce new taxes provided that such levies 
did not encroach upon existing central tax bases (Piperno 2012). Since 2010 the 
‘phasing in’ of fiscal federalism has been associated with repeated increases in the 
discretionary element of the income tax surcharge to a maximum rate of 3.33%. From 
a common base prior to 2010 regional surcharges now vary substantially, from an 
average rate (across all brackets) in 2014 from 0.7% in South Tyrol and 1.15% in 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia to 2.04% in Lazio and 2.05% in Molise (La Repubblica 2014). 
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While the regional surcharges are significantly smaller than the share of income taxes 
levied in the other three case countries, they provide a source of variation for analysis. 
In defining a set of “autonomist regions” for the purposes of analysis, Veneto 
and Lombardy are a suitable addition to the five special regions. Both have a separate 
historical identity, a minority language, as of 2017 are administered by the Northern 
League and have mainstream self-determination movements. Indeed, although the 
Italian Constitutional Court in 2015 rejected a referendum bill on Venetian 
independence approved by the regional council in 2014, it upheld proposals for 
plebiscites on increased autonomy that are expected to be held in both regions in 2017 
(Maugeri 2017). As large net contributors to Italian equalization, and echoing 
Catalonia’s efforts to replace its current financing arrangements with the far more 
generous fiscal autonomy of the Basque-Navarre Foral system, Veneto’s stated 
objective for the 2017 referendum is the South Tyrolean model, retaining 90% of 
income tax receipts (Maugeri 2016). 
As in the Spanish case, there is significant variation in the use of income tax 
powers, with regions varying the number of brackets, changing tax rates, and 
modifying income thresholds. Changes since the increased flexibility of regional 
income tax surcharges are summarized in Table 2.2. 
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Income Tax Policy Innovation: Key  
In addition to Table 2.1: 
Min. Flat Rate –minimum permitted flat rate (prior to 2011) of 0.9% 
Max. Flat Rate –maximum permitted flat rate (prior to 2011) of 1.4% 
Party abbreviations: PD–Democratic Party; UV–Valdostan Union; SVP–South Tyrolean 
People's Party; UpT–Union for Trentino; PATT–Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party; 
PdL–People of Freedom; FI–Forza Italia; LNP–Lega Nord Piemont; LV–Liga Veneta; LN–
Lega Nord; MpA–Movement for the Autonomies; PRC–Communist Refoundation Party; 
SEL–Left Ecology Freedom 
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Table 2.2: Income Tax Changes in the Italian Regions 
Region  2009 2010 2011 ** 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 No. of 
Years of 
Changes* 
Special Statute Regions 
Aosta Valley  Party Control  UV  UV UV UV UV ‡ UV UV UV 0 
Tax Changes  Min. Flat Rate         
South Tyrol Party Control SVP SVP SVP SVP SVP ‡ SVP SVP SVP  
Tax Changes Min. Flat Rate Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
Thresholds Δ 
 
   Tax deduction of 
€20.000  
Tax deduction 
of €28.000 
4 
Trentino Party Control UpT (supported 
by PD, PATT) 
UpT (supported by 
PD, PATT) 
UpT (supported 
by PD, PATT) 
UpT (supported 
by PD, PATT) 
After 10/15: PATT 
(supp. by PD, UpT) ‡ 
PATT (supported by 
PD, UpT) 
PATT (supported 
by PD, UpT) 
PATT 
(supported by 
PD, UpT) 
 
Tax Changes Min. Flat Rate     Brackets ↑  Brackets ↓ Thresholds Δ 3 
Friuli- 
Venezia 
Giulia 
Party Control PdL
  
PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 04/2013 
‡ 
PD PD PD  
Tax Changes Min. Flat Rate    Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
   1 
Sardinia Party Control PdL ‡ PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 
3/2014 ‡ 
PD PD  
Tax Changes Min. Flat Rate        0 
Sicily Party Control MpA  MpA  MpA MpA; PD after 
11/12 ‡ 
PD PD PD PD  
Tax Changes Max. Flat Rate        1 
Ordinary Statute RegionOrdinary Statutes 
Piedmont Party Control PD PD; LNP aft. 3/2010 ‡ LNP LNP LNP LNP; PD aft. 5/14 ‡ PD PD  
Tax Changes Three Rates    All Rates ↑ 
Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
Some Rates ↑ 
Some Rates ↑ 
 
 4 
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Region  2009 2010 2011 ** 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 No. of 
Years of 
Changes* 
Lombardy Party Control PdL PdL ‡ PdL PdL PdL; LN aft. 2/2013 ‡ LN LN LN  
Tax Changes Three Rates    Thresholds Δ 
Some Rates ↓ 
 Brackets ↑  
 
 3 
Veneto Party Control PdL PdL; LV after 3/2010 
‡ 
LV LV LV LV LV ‡ LV  
Tax Changes Two Rates Brackets ↓ to Min. 
Flat Rate 
      2 
Liguria 
 
 
 
 
Party Control 
 
PD PD ‡ PD PD PD PD PD; FI after 6/15 ‡ FI  
Tax Changes Two Rates        2 
Emilia 
Romagna 
Party Control PD PD ‡ PD PD  Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↑ 
PD PD  
Tax Changes Four Rates       Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↑ 
 2 
Tuscany Party Control DS/PD  DS/PD; PD after 3/10 
‡ 
PD PD PD PD PD ‡ PD  
Tax Changes Min. Flat Rate   Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↑ 
  Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↑ 
 2 
Umbria Party Control PD PD ‡ PD PD PD PD PD ‡ PD  
Tax Changes Two Rates     Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↑ 
  2 
Marche Party Control PD PD ‡ PD PD PD PD PD ‡ PD  
Tax Changes Three Rates    Brackets ↑  
 
   2 
Lazio 
 
Party Control PD PD; PdL aft. 3/2010 ‡ PdL PdL PdL; PD aft. 3/2013 ‡ PD PD PD  
Tax Changes Max. Flat Rate Flat Rate ↑    Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↑ 
Thresholds Δ 
Some Rates ↑ 
 4 
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Region  2009 2010 2011 ** 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 No. of 
Years of 
Changes* 
Abruzzo Party Control PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 5/14 ‡ PD PD  
Tax Changes Max. Flat Rate     Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
Brackets ↓ to Max. 
Flat Rate 
 3 
Molise Party Control PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 2/2013 
‡ 
PD PD PD  
Tax Changes Max. Flat Rate Flat Rate ↑ (match 
Lazio) 
   Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
 All Rates ↓ 3 
Campania Party Control PD PD; PdL after 3/2010 
‡ 
PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 
6/2015 ‡ 
PD  
Tax Changes Max. Flat Rate Flat Rate ↑ (match 
Lazio) 
      2 
Apulia Party Control PRC/SEL PRC/SEL ‡ PRC/SEL PRC/SEL PRC/SEL PRC/SEL PRC/SEL; PD after 
6/2015 ‡ 
PD  
Tax Changes Two Brackets Brackets ↓ to Mid Flat 
Rate 
 
Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
 Brackets ↑  
Some Rates ↓ 
   4 
Basilicata Party Control PD PD ‡ PD PD  PD ‡ PD PD PD  
Tax Changes Min. Flat Rate     Brackets ↑  
All Rates ↑ 
  1 
Calabria Party Control PD PD; PdL after 3/2010 
‡ 
PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 
12/2014 ‡ 
PD PD  
Tax Changes Max. Flat Rate Flat Rate ↑ (match 
Lazio) 
      2 
Source: Author and EUROMOD Country Reports – Italy. * Including a policy implementing anything other than the minimum flat rate (0.9%) in 2009 
** Excluding a 0.33ppt increase in the regional income tax in all regions agreed as part of the Italian government's austerity program.  
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The Italian IRPEF evidence mirrors the Spanish case in the far more frequent 
use of tax powers by certain regions. There is no standard pattern in usage other than 
the required increases in the mandatory component from 0.9% to 1.23% in 2011 and 
the required increase in rates in the south to fund health deficits. Regions that faced 
large health deficits including Lazio, Molise, Campania and Calabria raised surcharges 
to compensate for a loss of central transfers, particularly in more recent years. In 
contrast to Spain, party effects are far less important than health deficits or special 
region status. Patterns are equally not associated with electoral cycles: only eight of 
47 total tax changes took place in the year following one of the 35 regional election 
contests between 2009 and 2016.7 
More apparent is the unwillingness of non-statewide parties to alter rates. In 
Aosta Valley the Valdostan Union has never altered IRPEF surcharges. A Christian 
Democrat Union-led administration in Trentino did not use rate-varying powers, 
although a Christian Democrat Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party-led presidency 
and neighboring South Tyrolean People’s Party have been more willing to alter 
thresholds since 2014. Rates changed only very marginally under the League in 
Lombardy (varying upper brackets by 0.01%); and income tax powers in Veneto were 
not used under a Liga Veneta president. Instead, Veneto maintained a flat rate after 
2010, rejecting trends towards a progressive multi-bracket system. 
                                                          
7 Trentino (2014), Piedmont (2015), Emilia Romagna (2015), Lazio (2014), Abruzzo (2015), 
Molise (2014), Apulia (2011) and Basilicata (2014). 
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2.4.3 BELGIUM 
As a result of cross-community negotiations to overcome constitutional crises that 
have toppled incumbent governments or prevented new administrations from being 
formed, a series of six state reforms in 1970, 1980, 1989, 1993, 2001 and 2011 
transferred a large number of functions previously held by the Belgian government to 
subnational tiers. An unusual feature of Belgian federalization is the creation of 
overlapping devolved administrations – linguistically-based Communities and 
territorially-based Regions. Because the Communities have overlapping jurisdictions 
in Brussels they do not levy direct taxes but are instead funded by transfers from the 
federal and regional governments. The Regions gained access to own-source taxes 
after the 2001 state reform, and a new regional personal income tax to be levied 
directly by the region significantly enhanced this autonomy at the Sixth State Reform 
in 2011.8  
The 2001 reform limited regional powers over income tax to the setting of a 
surtax or rebate on the federal tax. Flanders introduced a rebate under a coalition led 
by non-autonomist CD&V (Christian Democratic & Flemish) from 2007, but this was 
                                                          
8 Regions set bases and rates for estate, inheritance and gift taxes, registration fees on property 
transfers, mortgage registration fees, taxes on gambling and betting, taxes on the opening of 
drinking establishments, tax on automatic amusement devices, radio and TV licence fees, road 
fund tax on vehicles, vehicle registration fees and Heavy goods vehicle tax (Spahn 2007). After 
the 2011 Sixth State Reform, the regions also gained autonomy in relation to tax credits for 
owner-occupied housing incentives, service vouchers, work aimed at energy saving and other 
housing-related tax credits. 
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progressively phased out until eventual abolition in 2011 (OECD 2016). As in Spain 
and Scotland, the 2011 reform delivered a much more substantive regional tax that 
required active rate setting, but unlike the other cases the Belgian tax is a surcharge 
on the federal tax liability, or ‘a tax on a tax’. Starting with the 2015 tax year, the 
federal government reduced its tax rate by approximately one quarter (25.99%), room 
in which regions levy a surcharge on the reduced federal tax.9 While overall 
progressivity of the system must be maintained within a 10% level of deviation, 
regions can set rates for each band separately (Bisciari & Van Meensel 2012).  
Neither Flanders (center-right coalition led by the autonomist New Flemish 
Alliance), nor Wallonia (center-left formed by the Socialist Party and the Humanist 
Democratic Centre) have modified the standard regional income tax of 35.117% since 
its introduction. As in the Scottish case below, the three parties to the 2014-2019 
Flemish coalition agreement “resolutely opt not to increase tax rates” for the duration 
of the first term in which new tax powers have been available (Flemish Government 
2014: 190). The Brussels-Capital Region, led since 2014 by a six-party coalition from 
both language groups, has made more (albeit limited) use of these powers. In addition 
to municipal and regional income tax surcharges, Brussels levied an annual tax of €89 
per household and a 1% additional surcharge on the federal income tax 
                                                          
9 In the Belgian tax system, the regional income tax rate is expressed as a fraction that has the 
“autonomy factor” of 25.99% as the numerator and 1 minus the autonomy factor as the 
denominator. In 2015 and 2016, the regional rate in all three Belgian regions was 35.117% (i.e. 
0.2599 ÷ [1-0.2599]). 
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(‘agglomeration tax’) until these were abolished effective 2016. The 2017 budget 
reduced the standard 35.117% income tax surcharge by 0.5ppt (De Redactie 2015). 
 
2.4.4 UNITED KINGDOM (SCOTLAND) 
In the asymmetric system of devolution in the UK, devolved tax powers have existed 
only in Scotland, although partial fiscal decentralization is legislated for Northern 
Ireland and Wales from 2018. 
Along with other autonomist or adaptive statewide parties, the Scottish 
National Party has long cultivated a strategy that projects itself as a better instrument 
for defending Scotland’s interests from external interests, particularly those of the UK 
government (for this strategy in Spain, see Pallarés et al. 1997, Rico 2012). Starting in 
the 1970s, with approximately 90 percent of the UK's oil reserves falling within 
Scottish waters, the SNP first based the case for independence around instrumental 
economic interests crystallized in the slogan “It's Scotland's oil", winning 30 percent 
of the vote and 11 parliamentary seats at the UK’s October 1974 General Election 
(Murkens 2002). 
Following voter approval of the second, tax-varying powers question of the 
1997 devolution referendum,10 the Scottish Parliament was granted the right to 
                                                          
10 63.48% of voters approved the statement “I agree that a Scottish Parliament should have tax-
varying powers” 
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increase or decrease the basic rate of UK income tax by 3ppt. This mechanism was 
similar to the surtax or rebate competence of the Belgian regions after 2001, although 
levied directly on the tax base rather than on the tax liability. But this Scottish 
Variable Rate was never used, and continued payments to the UK tax collection 
agency (HMRC) to maintain capacity to levy the tax at short notice were discontinued 
by the SNP minority administration in 2010. Instead, a block grant (for which a per-
capita based mechanism known as the Barnett Formula calculates annual adjustments) 
continued to fund the Scottish budget.  
As in Belgium and Spain, and drawing from public finance theory, the 
flypaper effect would anticipate greater regional public spending under 
intergovernmental grants than own-source taxes, because ‘money sticks where it hits’ 
(Rodden 2006: 78). An optional surtax system would be expected to incentivize 
regions to rely on grants by simply avoiding active tax rate choices. Scotland’s 
financial settlement was therefore overhauled following a review Commission 
established by pro-Union parties in the Scottish Parliament in 2007 and enacted into 
law in 2012. Speaking in 2008, and echoing the Spanish government’s interest in 
forcing a substate decision over rates, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown argued: 
Devolution has worked, but I do see one problem: while there have been good 
reasons why this is so the Scottish Parliament is wholly accountable for the 
budget it spends but not for the size of its budget. And that budget is not linked 
to the success of the Scottish economy. That is why we asked the Calman 
Commission to look carefully at the financial accountability of the Scottish 
Parliament. And this is a critical part of Calman’s remit. (2008) 
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In addition to transferring two minor taxes, this second settlement therefore 
required the Scottish Parliament to make an active choice over income tax rates. 
Effective 2016, the UK government reduced the basic, higher and additional rates of 
UK income tax for Scottish taxpayers by 10 percentage points and reduced the block 
grant by a proportionate amount.  
This second fiscal devolution settlement was in place for just 12 months (2016-
17), and during this period Scotland did not alter the 10p rate Scottish taxpayers 
previously paid to the UK government. Following the narrow defeat of the 2014 
independence referendum, a third fiscal settlement was rapidly negotiated to give the 
Scottish Government full control over earned income tax and thresholds (except the 
‘personal allowance’, the level of earnings at which taxpayers start paying income tax) 
from April 2017.11 Parties unlikely to form the next administration – Labour, Greens 
and the Liberal Democrats – proposed income tax rate increases at the 2016 Scottish 
Parliamentary elections. However, despite a 2014 proposal to increase the additional 
rate of tax from 45% to 50%, the incumbent SNP government’s re-election campaign 
pledged to not vary rates for the duration of the 2016-21 parliament. The 
administration instead proposed to increase the additional rate tax threshold less 
rapidly than proposed by the UK government, a much more latent and status quo 
action than the pre-devolution policy. Because voters understand tax rate changes far 
                                                          
11 Except for taxes on savings and dividend income and control over setting the level of 
earnings at which taxpayers start paying income tax – the “personal allowance”. 
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more readily than modifications to brackets and thresholds (Blom‐Hansen et al. 2006), 
the initial proposal carried political risks that may have jeopardized the party’s catch-
all appeal and long-term nation-building objectives.  
 
4.5 INCOME TAX DECENTRALIZATION AS AN EQUILIBRIUM INSTITUTION? 
Why would autonomist regional governments that may have championed income tax 
devolution subsequently use such powers less frequently than more ‘centralist’ regions 
of a state?  
Recent tax decentralization in Spain, Italy, Belgium and the UK coincided 
with a global recession that required regions to participate in government-wide fiscal 
retrenchment, either by levying increased tax rates as part of general government 
austerity measures (Italy), shared contributions to a deficit reduction target (Belgium), 
or through reduced transfer payments (Spain, UK).  Where powers over rates are 
devolved, evidence from the US states would expect severe retrenchment to trigger a 
common tax-raising response, not simply to address budget shortfalls but because an 
economic crisis reduces the political risks of increasing taxes (Hansen 1983). However, 
there was no standard reaction to this external shock: considerable variation in tax 
policy was observed.  
In contrast, political party control has some explanatory power in tax policy 
changes over the past decade. Centre-left parties such as PSOE or the Democratic 
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Party were more likely to raise taxes, and center-right parties such as the PP and PdL 
were more likely to reduce them. However, wide discrepancies in tax changes 
between regions controlled by the same party means positioning on the left-right 
economic spectrum cannot be the sole explanatory factor. Further, in autonomist 
regions, parties compete on both the economic dimension and a national 
identity/center-periphery dimension. Downsian convergence on this dimension 
incentivizes party elites to adopt ‘catch-all’ appeals and downplay polarizing income 
tax policies that would otherwise split their pro-autonomy core vote. As B. Guy Peters 
argues in relation to the politics of income tax: “The best strategy (politically) is often 
to ignore the tax systems and allow it to continue pretty much as it has been – perhaps 
with a few changes around the margins” (2001: 10). Indeed, a “smart intersection” 
between a regionalist party’s strength on the two dimensions is to ignore tax rates 
entirely and demand their replacement by a new (and presumably more generous) 
financial settlement (Rico 2012: 221). 
But to credit party competition as the primary explanatory factor for 
differentiated use of devolved income tax powers ignores the intense, nation state-
reshaping competition characterizing territorial politics in the UK, Belgium, Italy and 
Spain. In particular, a region-only explanation overlooks both the center’s interests in 
blame-shifting and the best response by the regions to such a strategy. Despite a 
dynamic environment in which “competition is the motor of territorial politics” 
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(Lecours 2004), there appears to be an alignment of central and regional interests to 
devolve income taxes but for pro-autonomy regions not to vary them.  
Aggravated by electorally-successful ‘champions of the region against the 
center’ strategies that multiply throughout the national territory by a process of 
‘ethnoterritorial mimesis’ and jeopardize putative nation-state solidarity, strategic 
central actors (including senior politicians from the leading parties and senior civil 
servants) are incentivized to ‘pass the buck’ by trying to force regions to make 
politically costly choices. Such blame-sharing may involve negotiated settlements 
such as all-party agreements or constitutional reforms, or by using economic crises to 
expand subnational competences but restrict monies available to fund them. Because 
blame-sharing usually represents a useful long-term strategy to both incumbent and 
future governments, central tier parties may collaborate over such initiatives. 
Instances of such collaboration include the departing Berlusconi government and 
incoming Monti government’s efforts to “squeeze” the regions by replacing transfers 
for health deficits with own-source taxes (Ambrosanio et al. 2014: 2); the PSOE-PP 
agreement on a 2011 constitutional change that Spanish regions must comply with 
maximum structural deficit and debt limits set by the central government (Ruiz 
Almendral 2013); and UK Labour’s proposals to reduce the UK income tax in Scotland 
which the incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in 2010 took up “to 
force the Scottish Parliament to set a tax” (McLean 2012: 650). But while more 
‘centralist’ regions may use income tax powers to engage in tax competition or to 
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change income tax progressivity, the principal objective of autonomist governments 
is not tax innovation but the development of national institutions. In such regions, re-
election interests point to the continuation of a ‘regional champion’ strategy that is 
most likely to be effective when tax rates broadly correspond to the national policy 
trajectory. Paradoxically therefore, ‘nation-building’ regional elites’ best response is 
to accept income tax powers but to decline their proactive use. Rational choice 
institutionalism can understand this tentative equilibrium position as an efficient 
institution because it is mutually beneficial to both central and regional elites. This 
position might also be considered as a Mexican standoff which persists because neither 
region nor center can proceed or retreat without being exposed to jeopardy. 
Occasionally, economic crises may give the central government the upper 
hand in forcing regions to share blame for politically costly measures, as in Italy. But 
more generally, an equilibrium where regional governments accept but avoid 
proactive use of income tax powers is a winning one for regions, because it allows 
autonomist governments to maintain both short-term electoral strategies and long-
term nation-building objectives. But such an equilibrium does not presuppose that 
further change is impossible: if it is mutually beneficial to renegotiate the resulting 
incomplete contract, the parties will do so. Income tax autonomy is an efficient 
instrument – a means to an end – rather than end in itself in the multi-level territorial 
game.  
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An Electoral Calculus? Dual Incentives 
and Committee Assignment in the UK's 
mixed member legislatures 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Although mixed-member electoral systems offer an apparent opportunity to observe 
how different rules shape politicians’ behavior, “contamination” between SMD and 
PR tiers has frequently confounded academic work. Exploiting the unusual treatment 
of dual candidacy in the UK’s devolved legislatures, modelling of committee 
assignments uncovers a split finding. PR members have a higher committee workload, 
and there is some evidence that Welsh SMD members’ assignments might support 
personal vote cultivation. However, other theorized connections between committees 
and members’ re-election interests are not found. The influence of electoral rules is 
conditioned by contextual factors including re-selection rules, chamber size and 
strong parties.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Whether – and how – institutions and electoral rules shape the activities of politicians 
once elected is a research question with a long pedigree. If, as Mayhew contends, re-
election is the one primary objective shared by all politicians, or “the goal that must 
be achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained” (1974: 16), identifying 
the incentives generated in the operation of institutional and electoral rules shaping 
members’ re-election strategies is of primary importance.   
Among the many institutional constraints that limit and shape the activities 
of political actors, electoral systems have long been considered among the most 
significant (for example, Carey & Shugart 1995). Candidate-centered electoral systems 
such as single member plurality should encourage incumbents to cultivate the support 
of voters in their home district, while party-centered systems such as closed-list PR 
should focus politicians’ attention on their internal ‘selectorate’ in pursuit of a 
winnable List position (Gallagher 2005, Depauw & Martin 2009). But testing whether 
politicians respond to incentives in the expected way is frequently confounded 
because we cannot untangle the effects of electoral rules from the many unobserved 
cultural, social and other characteristics specific to a given country. Researchers thus 
find it difficult to identify precisely how behavior would change if different voting 
systems were employed (Stratmann & Baur 2002; Ferrara, Herron & Nishikawa 2005). 
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One way to test the link between electoral rules and member behavior is 
through mixed-member electoral systems (Ferrara et al. 2005), where researchers can 
seemingly evaluate the effects of two electoral rules while controlling for all other 
observed and unobserved variables (Moser & Scheiner 2005). Exploiting this 
opportunity, some scholars who have studied Germany’s mixed member proportional 
variant claim to have observed the effects of electoral rules operating through the 
committee assignments process. While certain Bundestag committee assignments are 
more valuable to SMD members because they better facilitate cultivation of a 
geographically-based re-election vote, other assignments allow PR members to 
promote their party’s interests and increase their chances of a high list ranking. This 
bifurcated incentives structure has been termed a “dual incentives” or “dual mandate” 
effect in mixed member legislatures (e.g. Lancaster & Patterson 1990, Stratmann & 
Baur 2002). However, other researchers (e.g. Ferrara et al. 2005, Thames 2005, Manow 
2015) have found no systematic differences in legislator behavior, primarily due to a 
lack of independence between the SMD and PR electoral contests – “contamination” 
– that incentivizes candidates to both cultivate a constituency vote and a party vote 
to retain a high PR-list position (Ferrara et al. 2005). 
The UK’s devolved legislatures offer an interesting test of the ‘dual mandate’ 
structure in mixed systems. First, while most mixed-member systems in use 
internationally were introduced to replace a previous voting rule, Scotland and Wales’ 
MMP systems have been in place since the establishment of both institutions. This 
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feature reduces (although does not eliminate) the potential of ‘hangover effects’ from 
prior rules that might continue to influence member behavior (Crisp 2007).  Second, 
a ban on dual candidacy imposed at the halfway point of the National Assembly for 
Wales’ institutional life provides a key source of variation: there has been separation 
of candidates between the SMD and PR ballots in Wales, potentially overcoming the 
‘contamination’ that has afflicted studies to date.  
I argue that while differences between members can be observed, namely in 
committee workload, any clear-cut ‘dual mandate’ effects claimed elsewhere for the 
German system are conditioned in the UK cases by re-selection rules, the size of the 
legislature, and strong parties.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, I consider whether 
a connection between electoral systems and the behavior of re-election-seeking 
legislators can be tested in mixed systems. Second, I consider challenges to this 
approach, in particular the likelihood of contamination caused by members running 
for re-election on both ballots, and argue that Wales in particular offers an interesting 
test of the framework due to its ban on dual candidacy from 2007-2016.  After 
outlining hypotheses, data and variables, I test committee assignments for systematic 
differences between constituency and list members elected in the two legislatures, 
present results, and conclude.  
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3.2 ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FROM THEORY TO EVIDENCE 
Electoral systems have long been considered fertile ground for investigating the 
constraints and opportunities provided by institutional rules on political actors. An 
enduring focus of this large literature explores how elected representatives adapt to 
the different accountability mechanisms intrinsic to different electoral systems 
(Gallagher 2005). Under party-centered systems such as closed-list proportional 
representation, incumbents are reliant on their party’s internal selectors for re-
election and are therefore encouraged to cultivate favor with this ‘selectorate’. In 
contrast, under candidate-centered systems such as Single Transferable Vote, open-
list PR or single member plurality, incumbents rely in part on the personal support of 
voters for re-election and are therefore expected to actively engage in constituency-
related activities (Gallagher 2005, Depauw & Martin 2009). But identifying a causal 
link between electoral rules and their consequences is frequently confounding. 
Because we cannot untangle the direct effect of electoral rules from the many other 
cultural, social and other country-specific influences in a given political system, 
researchers cannot demonstrate with certainty how outcomes would change if 
different electoral rules were employed (Stratmann & Baur 2002; Ferrara et al. 2005). 
The rapid expansion in use of mixed electoral systems since the 1990s has been 
identified by several researchers (e.g. Lancaster & Patterson 1990, Stratmann & Baur 
2002, Moser & Scheiner 2004) as an opportunity to test how majoritarian and 
proportional principles of representation modify the behavior of legislators. Voters 
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participating in mixed-member elections cast their vote via two separate ballot papers: 
in the first, they vote for a candidate in a single member district (SMD); in the second, 
for a party list with seats allocated via a proportional formula. By comparing the 
outcomes of the district- and list-based components of the election, researchers can 
seemingly evaluate the effects of different electoral rules, apparently controlling for 
all observed and unobserved country-specific variables (Moser and Scheiner 2005).  
Two features common to parliamentary democracies limit the ways in which 
researchers can the operation of observe electoral incentives that are otherwise 
possible in studies of the US Congress. First, higher levels of intra-party voting 
discipline in parliamentary systems implies that exploring roll-call votes for evidence 
of a “mandate divide” is less likely to be productive. Second, government control of 
money bills in Westminster systems means that members of such legislatures lack an 
important means to secure geographically-targeted spending projects for their 
constituencies (Norris 1997, Norton & Wood 1993, in Martin 2011).  Recent work has 
therefore explored committee assignments as a potential avenue for testing the 
interactions of electoral rules and behavioral incentives in more depth. For example, 
positing that legislators are motivated to win re-election, Stratmann and Baur (2002) 
hypothesize that certain committees in the Bundestag are more valuable to SMD 
legislators because they better enable them to serve their specific electoral 
constituencies and increase their likelihood of re-election.  SMD members select (or 
are assigned to) committees that allow them to serve their geographically-based 
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constituencies (such as Agriculture or Construction), while PR legislators join 
committees that allow members to promote their party’s interests (such as Defense or 
Development), thereby increasing their own chances of a high-enough rank on their 
party list to win re-election.  
However, despite assertions that mixed systems offer researchers a controlled 
comparison to identify legislator motivations, several scholars (Bawn & Thies 2003; 
Ferrara et al. 2005; Hainmueller & Kern 2008) have cautioned that this supposition is 
“only correct to the extent that the two tiers are truly independent from each other; 
the operation of each tier must be unaffected by the presence of a second tier 
characterized by a different set of electoral rules” (Hainmueller & Kern 2008: 2). 
Certain institutional features of mixed electoral systems may “weaken or altogether 
break the link between seat type and behavior” (Ferrara et al. 2005: 203), resulting in 
“contamination” that invalidates the assumption of independence between the tiers.   
Contamination between the SMD and PR tiers has overshadowed many 
recent empirical studies of the controlled comparisons framework.  In a 
comprehensive study of roll-call votes by legislators in Ukraine and Italy, Ferrara et 
al. find that “seat type is a poor predictor of legislative voting… Once factional 
affiliation is accounted for, the effects of seat type and dual candidacy are washed 
away” (2005: 110). Likewise, Thames (2005) found that mandate divides in the 
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operation of mixed systems in Russia, Ukraine and Hungary were evident only in the 
Russian Duma – a legislature with a very weakly institutionalized party system. 
Chief among the reasons for this skepticism is the presence of dual candidacy, 
which gives candidates a ‘fallback’ or ‘insurance’ seat via the party list should they fail 
to be elected in a constituency.  Dual candidacy would be expected to blunt incentives 
for legislators to specialize because “the prospect [of] being nominated to both a party 
list and an SMD race allows incumbents to hedge their bets, focusing some of their 
attention on demonstrating their partisanship to party leaders and some on showing 
their dedication to local constituents” (Ferrara et al. 2005: 103). That 80 percent of 
German legislators are dual candidates at their election reinforces incentives to engage 
in both party and constituency work (Manow 2015).  
Although dual candidacy has been banned in several legislatures elected by 
Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) voting rules, including Korea, Taiwan, Thailand 
and Ukraine, between 2006-2016 the National Assembly for Wales was the only 
legislature elected by a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system to ban dual 
candidacy (Scully 2014). Wales is therefore an instructive case that allows scholars to 
investigate whether differences in behavior might be more observable where there is 
no possibility of running simultaneously on both the PR and constituency ballots. 
Although the Scotland’s MMP system has never banned dual candidacy, the Scottish 
Parliament is another useful case for a different reason. Not only is Scotland a useful 
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cross-case comparison to Wales – both institutions operate at the same vertical level 
of governance, share the same length of institutional history and have parallel 
institutional structures – but unusually for mixed systems outside of Germany, the 
Scottish Parliament has never operated by a prior electoral rule. The Scottish and 
Welsh cases are therefore instructive in helping to identify whether the absence of 
institutional ‘hangover effects’ resulting from the operation of prior electoral rules 
(Crisp 2007) might offset contamination between the PR and SMD tiers.  
Whether Scottish and Welsh List members behave differently from their 
SMD colleagues has been posed elsewhere in the British politics literature.  Lundberg 
(2006) uses survey evidence to compare legislator attitudes in Scotland and Wales in 
with the German Landtage of Brandenburg and Hesse, finding some evidence that 
SMD members of all four legislatures were more oriented towards constituency 
service, whereas List members were more concerned about supporting their party’s 
prospects and working with interest groups. Bradbury and Mitchell (2007), also using 
survey evidence, find that constituency work was broadly prioritized by constituency 
members, but that List members’ constituency focus was perhaps stronger than 
expected. Researchers have also focused on perceived or real “electoral poaching” (List 
members shadowing SMD members), particularly in Scotland where a ban on dual 
candidacy was not imposed, finding mixed evidence (Carman 2005, Carman & 
Shephard 2007). 
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In relation to committee assignments, Battle (2011) finds that PR members of 
the Scottish Parliament who ran exclusively on the regional list have the most 
committee assignments and are most active in the legislature. But there is scope to 
take existing work much further. Battle does not appear to exclude ministers, deputy 
ministers or other office holders even though they do not sit on committees; and 
controls for a member’s party affiliation, seniority, gender and other factors that may 
influence patterns of assignment are necessary to draw inferences about the 
relationship between a member’s seat type and their number (and type) of committee 
assignments. 
That Wales’ dual candidacy ban was imposed at the half-way point of its 
institutional life is of particular advantage in investigating contamination effects. If 
dual candidacy blunts the incentives for legislators to specialize we would expect any 
evidence of a mandate divide to be stronger in Wales after the imposition of the ban; 
likewise, comparable estimates between the two periods could provide evidence that 
the scale of the contamination problem has been overstated elsewhere. Other threats 
to valid inference may continue to challenge empirical investigation: omitted variable 
bias can be mitigated but not eliminated by control variables, and selection bias may 
be present because a candidate’s decision to run on the SMD or PR ballot is not 
randomly assigned.  However, empirical investigation of the two cases may offer a 
new means to address the spillover problem which has so centrally affected research 
in this field. 
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Although Wales’ dual candidacy ban provides a unique point of departure, 
important contextual factors exist such as small legislative size and strong party 
systems that would be expected to at least partially counteract the hypothesized 
centrifugal effects. A large cross-national literature addresses the importance of 
chamber size, bicameralism, term lengths, committee organization, and other 
institutional features in political outcomes (Downs 2014). Legislative size in particular 
is a critical contextual factor that is underemphasized in existing work. First, where 
members are required to serve on multiple committees in small legislatures, pressures 
to populate the committee system may override individual incentives to cultivate a 
re-election vote. Second, in a distributive politics understanding of legislative 
organization such as the Law of 1/n (Weingast, Shepsle & Johnsen 1981), government 
spending (or output) would be expected to increase with the number of legislators 
because individual members internalize all the benefits from distributive projects but 
only a fraction of the costs. Related to the challenge of populating committees in small 
legislatures, any pro-spending bias that incentivizes SMD members to seek 
assignments to “district” committees (Stratmann & Baur 2002) is therefore likely to be 
mitigated because assignments to any particular committee are harder to achieve. As 
a result, it might be expected that any bifurcated pattern of committee assignments 
may be tougher to discern in small legislatures.  
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3.3 TESTING ELECTORAL INCENTIVES IN WALES AND SCOTLAND 
The electoral system selected to return members to the new National Assembly for 
Wales and Scottish Parliament was a deliberate departure from Britain’s First-Past-
the-Post tradition. Both legislatures are elected by an MMP variant in which voters 
cast two ballots and list seats are allocated to parties on a compensatory basis using the 
D’Hondt formula.  The Scottish Parliament is comprised of 73 SMD members and 56 
closed party list members from 8 electoral regions; the National Assembly for Wales 
achieves a lower level of proportionality with 40 SMD members and 20 closed party 
list members elected in 5 electoral regions. Scottish candidates have been permitted 
to stand on both ballots since its establishment in 1999. In Wales, although the first 
two elections in 1999 and 2003 permitted dual candidacy, a 2006 legislative change 
prohibited candidates from standing on both ballots at elections in 2007 and 2011. 
Subsequent UK legislation reversing this ban became effective in 2016; however, the 
2006 reform permits the evaluation of Welsh data from two Assembly terms in which 
dual candidacy was permitted, and two in which it was prohibited.   
A vital contextual factor complicating members’ cultivation of a re-election 
vote are the rules and procedures for candidate selection. Previous research has 
demonstrated the importance of variations in candidate selection rules for the two 
components of mixed member elections on voting behavior once elected (Jun & Hix 
2010). If nomination and re-nomination procedures are tightly controlled by central 
parties, then the basic theoretical assumption underpinning the “dual incentives” 
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hypothesis – that SMD candidates will promote constituency activities to best support 
their re-election prospects – may not transfer to the UK cases. For SMD candidates, 
central party influence in Wales and Scotland over initial selection may be a cause for 
concern. Constituency selections are conducted under a series of rules specified by 
each party’s central organization which vary considerably between the parties. 
Examples include Welsh Labour’s “constituency twinning” to select one female and 
one male candidate from seats that are geographically-proximate and of 
approximately equal “winnability” (see Mitchell & Bradbury 2004).  
However, there is a significant difference in the degree of central coordination 
in the initial selection and subsequent re-selection of an SMD member after their first 
election to a given seat. Once elected to an SMD seat, deselection is extremely rare: 
indeed, among the 214 SMD members elected between 1999 and 2016 deselection has 
occurred only four times, twice in Wales and twice in Scotland. The two Welsh cases 
followed well-publicized rifts between the member and their party, and the two 
Scottish cases followed an SNP policy change before the 2016 elections to replace all 
retiring SMD members by candidates selected from All Women Shortlists, 
encouraging a number of mostly unsuccessful attempts by male candidates to unseat 
sitting members before an election in which the SNP was expected to perform 
strongly in constituency races (and therefore return relatively few members via the 
regional Lists).  Stolz argues that this security may result from “high institutional 
hurdles for de-selection”, the “embeddedness of constituency members in the local 
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party network”, or the threat of de-selection being “perceived as arbitrary or unfair” 
(2010: 94-95). The extremely low probability of deselection for SMD members allows 
them to focus instead on retaining their seat against other parties. Members’ prospects 
for returning to the legislature once elected are therefore not limited to the same 
extent by central party control, and their behavior might be anticipated to mirror the 
traditional cultivation of a personal vote as theorized in the literature.  
For PR members, party influence over List reselection is an important 
assumption underpinning the hypothesis that party-vote cultivation is the best path 
of securing re-election. Although in all cases List re-selection remains internal to the 
party, the balance of central- and regional-party members’ roles in selecting and re-
selecting the List is disputed. Cross-nationally, List selection is associated with 
centralized control as parties attempt to select the preferred candidates of the 
leadership (Epstein 1980 in Bradbury 2009). However, despite variations between 
Scotland and Wales and between the major parties, at least for the first two devolved 
elections Bradbury (2009) argues that there was a tendency towards decentralization 
of candidate selection.  Empirical testing of committee data can perhaps shed new 
light on whether the connection between PR members and party-focused activities 
in the legislature is theoretically sound.  
In contrast to the committees of the House of Commons which have limited 
direct impact on policy-making (Benton & Russell 2012, Mattson & Strøm 1995), 
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committee assignments are an appropriate focus for studying the effect of institutional 
rules on legislator behavior in Scotland and Wales.  The Scottish Parliament has 
permanent committees with strong formal powers that facilitate a major role in 
shaping legislative output (Cairney 2006). Although the Welsh committee system has 
been less stable due to a rapid accumulation of competences since 1999, Welsh 
committees also play a major role in legislative output and scrutiny in the unicameral 
legislature. The importance of committees in both legislatures may therefore be 
expected to provide incentives to members to seek assignments to committees of 
policy or political interest. 
Although committee appointments are made in the final round by each party’s 
leadership and chief whip, in practice members indicate their preferences to their 
party and allocations are an iterative process that also accounts for members’ 
constituency interests. For the Welsh Conservatives for example, although the Leader 
and Chief Whip formally decide members’ assignments and there is no distinction 
between Constituency and List members in the assignment decision, members can 
and do can express their committee interests and have the option of rejecting a 
committee offer if they are firmly opposed (Nick Ramsay, Chair of the Welsh 
Conservative Group, personal communication). For Plaid Cymru, although 
committees are generally allocated to the party’s spokesperson for each portfolio area, 
other assignments are decided by the Business Manager and agreed by the Group, a 
decision in which member interests, availability and work balance are taken into 
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account. Subject committees are generally preferred to committees dealing with the 
workings on the Assembly, and members who demonstrate a particular constituency 
interest in a subject area, such as members from rural constituencies being assigned to 
committees dealing with the environment and farming, may be prioritized for a 
corresponding committee assignment (Elin Jones, Plaid Cymru Deputy Leader, 
personal communication). Likewise in Scotland, SNP committee appointments are 
decided by the Whip; but this decision is again iterative and takes MSPs’ personal 
interests, previous employment and constituencies into account (Fiona McLeod, 
Scottish Government whip, personal communication). There would therefore appear 
to be sufficient flexibility in members’ committee assignments to test whether an 
electoral incentive structure features in the number and type of committee 
assignments. 
In contrast to existing studies of MMP in larger countries, the small size of the 
legislatures in Wales and Scotland may be an important limiting factor because 
incentive-based “pull factors” of a given assignment are bounded simply by the 
challenge of populating every committee. Particularly in Wales, there is a limited 
number of government backbench and opposition members available to populate 
every committee or to make best use of their assignments. For example, between 2007 
and 2011 certain members had four or five assignments at some point during the 
legislative term: this far exceeds comparable levels in the Bundestag where each 
member is generally a full member of only one committee.  The limited number of 
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members available to staff committees in the cases analyzed here is therefore an 
important contextual factor in testing the dual incentives framework.  
Using committee assignments to test the “dual incentives” framework, I 
propose a series of hypotheses that draw on assumptions about rational actors’ office-
seeking motivations widely posited elsewhere in the literature (Black 1972, Stigler 
1972, Alt & Chrystal 1983, Wittman 1989, Schultz 1995, Persson & Tabellini 1999, 
Stratman & Baur 2002). First, if SMD members have a re-election interest in 
cultivating a personal vote by engaging in constituency service, and if List members 
have a party-vote incentive to promote their party’s interests in the legislature, the 
total number of committee assignments should be lower for SMD members than for 
PR members. Following Martin (2011), this hypothesis should hold in candidate-
centered systems where members cannot engage in pork barrel earmarking through 
committee work. In such systems (as in Wales and Scotland), and if SMD members 
have a re-election interest, these interests are better served by engaging in 
constituency work rather than participating in the legislative committees.  
H1: SMD legislators will have fewer committee assignments than PR 
legislators 
Although H1 surmises that a high committee workload can potentially reveal 
something about SMD and List members’ responsiveness to different re-election 
constituencies, not all committees are created equal. If members seek to cultivate a 
geographically-based personal vote, they might be best assisted in this goal by 
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participating in committees that can help them engage with issues affecting their 
constituency, such as committees whose remit includes major industries in their area. 
With re-election motivations as the theoretical underpinning, Stratmann and 
Baur (2002) classify certain Bundestag committees as either “district” committees that 
allow members to direct support to projects in their constituencies, or “party” 
committees that would help PR members serve party interests. But transplanting this 
bifurcation to the UK’s devolved legislatures is problematic: not only do certain 
German (federal) ministerial portfolios not correspond with those in (substate) Wales 
and Scotland, but legislators in Westminster systems cannot normally secure 
geographically-targeted spending for their constituencies. 
To operationalize the ‘usefulness’ of a committee assignment in cultivating a 
constituency vote, it is therefore necessary to construct another measure of a 
committee’s possible value in serving a member’s constituency service goals. 
Constituency service interests would be best assisted by committee work that has a 
relatively high profile and allows a member to give attention to a pertinent local issue 
in their district, or to promote the interests of major local businesses or industries, 
such as agriculture for SMD members representing rural areas.  
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 group together by function or portfolio area Scottish and 
Welsh committees since 1999, ranked by the number of mentions for each committee 
in a major national newspaper (the Scotsman/Scotland on Sunday and the Western 
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Mail in Wales).12   Higher profile committees would be expected to receive a larger 
number of media citations, and are ranked higher in each table. 
                                                          
12 As a broadsheet newspaper based in Edinburgh with a number of correspondents reporting 
from the Scottish Parliament, The Scotsman/Scotland on Sunday was considered likely to have 
provided a sufficient coverage of committee activities since 1999. Other Scottish broadsheet 
newspapers such as The Herald/Sunday Herald would also have been suitable for this purpose, 
but duplication was not deemed necessary because the citations reported here are for 
illustrative purposes and are not included in the regression model. For Wales, the Western 
Mail is the only Wales-based broadsheet newspaper. 
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Table 3.1: Scottish Parliament Committees, Grouped by Function or Portfolio Area, Ranked 
by Number of Citations in the Scotsman and Scotland on Sunday 
Committee (Grouped across terms by 
Function or Portfolio Area) 
No. of Citations per Parliamentary Term 
1st 2nd 3rd  4th  
(to 05/2014) 
Total 
Citations 
Average 
Citations 
1. Justice 323 133 119 155 730 183 
2. Enterprise/Economy 177 132 122 142 573 143 
3. Education 351 31 54 97 533 133 
4. Finance 102 213 123 62 500 125 
5. Health 226 85 65 46 422 106 
6. Rural Affairs 259 60 24 8 351 88 
7. Standards 230 52 37 14 333 83 
8. Audit/Public Accounts 81 73 79 33 266 67 
9. Public Petitions 92 57 63 27 239 60 
10. Local Government 115 37 56 17 225 56 
11. Equal Opportunities 77 14 16 25 132 33 
12. European/External Relations 62 27 6 13 108 27 
13. Subordinate Legislation 38 6 4 3 51 13 
Total 2,133 920 768 642 4,463 1,116 
 
Table 3.2: National Assembly for Wales Committees, Grouped by Function or Portfolio Area, 
Ranked by Number of Citations in the Western Mail  
Committee (Grouped across terms by 
Function or Portfolio Area) 
No. of Citations per Assembly Term * 
1st  
(from 01/01) 
2nd 3rd  4th  
(to 05/2014) 
Total 
Citations 
Average 
Citations 
1. Education 145 98 92 81 416 104 
2. Health 104 70 83 147 404 101 
3. Enterprise / Economic Dev’t 152 68 92 86 398 100 
4. Environment / Rural Affairs 124 98 58 84 364 91 
5. Audit / Public Accounts 93 75 98 85 351 88 
6. Culture / Communities 184 58 26 45 313 78 
7. Finance - - 112 47 159 80 
8. Petitions  - - 38 50 88 44 
9. Local Government 28 11 ** 45 84 28 
10. Standards 27 24 5 14 70 18 
11. Legislation / Subordinate 
Legislation / Legislative Affairs*** 
12 3 2 18 35 9 
12. Equal Opportunities 7 16 11 - 34 11 
13. European / External Relations 9 4 11 - 24 8 
Total 885 525 628 702 2,740 685 
Citation data obtained by a LexisNexis search of Scottish Parliament committee names and 
variations thereof.  Not all committees are shown: Committees included are those with subject 
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or functional areas that can be linked with committees with similar remits in other 
parliamentary terms. 
* Citation data commences January 1, 2001   
** Not included because of cross-counting with the Health committee grouping  
*** Not including the five Legislation committees from the Third Assembly 
 
As one of the most prominent devolved policy areas, health has been a major 
issue in Scottish and Welsh election campaigns since devolution, and SMD candidates 
have been returned on the basis of campaigns to protect local hospitals. Major parties 
have registered to appear on the ballot paper alongside the name of local hospitals,13 
and a General Practitioner opposed to health cuts was elected as an Independent in 
2003 in a Scottish constituency.14  With the health committee having a high profile in 
both legislatures, assignments might therefore offer a platform for SMD members to 
engage with constituency campaigns that assist their re-election goals.15 Likewise, an 
Enterprise or Economy committee appointment might give members an opportunity 
to support major industries or employers in their constituency, as may the Rural 
Affairs/Environment committee for rural SMD members. Other high profile 
committees, such as Justice or Education, are of generalized national importance 
                                                          
13 For example, "Plaid Cymru - Save Llandudno Hospital" and "Plaid Cymru - Save Withybush 
Hospital” appeared on the ballot paper at the 2007 election in the marginal seats of Aberconwy 
and Preseli Pembrokeshire. 
14 Strathkelvin and Bearsden constituency, won in 2003 by Dr Jean Turner. 
15 See for example “Withybush hospital ‘downgrade’: More than 700 protest at Welsh 
Government plans”, Wales Online, 18 June 2014 
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rather than necessarily “useful” for SMD members appealing to an issue of important 
local campaigning concern to maximize their chances of re-election.16  
Moreover, in contrast to SMD members, and if members are motivated to win 
re-eleciton, then their PR list colleagues should prioritize party ‘selectorate’ interests 
to ensure placement in a winnable position on the party list.  List members might 
therefore have an incentive to engage with committees that support their party’s 
interests in the legislature and exist to keep the parliament or assembly running, 
rather than those that are high profile among the general public. Three groupings of 
committees in both legislatures that meet these criteria are standards, petitions, and 
subordinate legislation/legislation/legislative affairs. 
That the ‘usefulness’ of an assignment differs for SMD and List members can 
be stated in two hypotheses as follows:  
H2: SMD members will be Overrepresented (and List members 
Underrepresented) on Committees that can best assist in cultivating a 
Personal Constituency Vote 
H3: PR legislators will be Overrepresented (and SMD legislators 
Underrepresented) on committees that focus on Parliamentary Functions  
Finally, the 2007-2016 prohibition of dual candidacy in Wales offers a unique 
opportunity to test whether the option of an ‘insurance’ list seat prompts incumbent 
                                                          
16 In relation to Education for example, school closings are often an issue affecting a village or 
small community rather than an entire constituency, and unlike hospital closings, decisions 
on school reorganisations are generally the responsibility of local rather than devolved 
government. These features make Education less “useful” than the Health committee for SMD 
members aiming to maximise the electoral impact of their constituency work. 
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legislators to hedge their bets, focusing both on re-nomination to a winnable position 
on the party list and on local constituency campaigns. If dual candidacy blunts the 
incentives for legislators to specialize, we would expect any evidence of a mandate 
divide to be stronger in Wales between 2007-16: 
H4: Evidence of a “Mandate Divide” will be more pronounced where Dual 
Candidacy is prohibited 
 
The rest of this chapter examines these propositions, first outlining the 
variables and data, then presenting the results of statistical modelling. 
 
3.4 VARIABLES AND DATA 
To identify the presence or absence of a mandate divide in the operation of the UK’s 
mixed member systems, I analyze a series of variables focusing on different aspects of 
members’ committee service. Following cues in the literature with respect to the 
possible incentive effects of mixed systems on legislator behavior, the main 
explanatory variable of interest for all hypotheses is the seat type of members elected 
to both legislatures since their establishment in 1999; assigned the value of (1) for 
SMD (or “First-Past-The-Post”) seats, and (0) for List (or “PR”) seats.  
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Hypothesis H1 (Total Committee Assignments) is examined by totaling each 
member’s number of committee assignments per annual legislative session.17 Where 
exact dates of committee memberships were available, and if a member served on a 
committee for only part of an annual legislative session, they were credited with 
membership if their appointment lasted at least six months.18 This workload indicator 
is defined here as dummy variable, taking the value of (1) for a total number of 
committee assignments that is greater or equal to 2, and (0) otherwise.19 
Hypothesis H2 (SMD legislators’ overrepresentation on constituency-service 
committees) is tested by a dummy variable with the value of (1) for membership of 
                                                          
17 Excludes the regional committees of the National Assembly (1999-2007) to which all 
Assembly members were assigned. 
18 Where exact dates of membership were not available (Wales 2003-2011), members were 
credited if their membership was recorded in The Wales Yearbook. 
19 I use a binary rather than a continuous variable for hypothesis H1 because of the relatively 
small number of observations in the Wales dataset and the large number of assignments that 
are clustered around the center of the distribution. In the Wales dataset, members’ committee 
assignments are distributed as follows.  
 
Total Committees Frequency 
0 3 
1 35 
2 74 
3 61 
4 9 
5 1 
 
While using a binary variable could be construed as losing information, using a continuous 
variable gives prominence to non-representative outlier members (those with 0, 4 or 5 
assignments) and produces very volatile results depending on whether and which of these 
non-representative members are included or excluded from the model. A standard “removal 
of outliers” procedure in this case is arbitrary and tentative. Given the relatively small number 
of observations, there is clearly a case for caution in the generalizability of the study results 
for Wales – further research is needed with additional parliamentary terms of the Assembly. 
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the Health committee, Enterprise/Economic Development/Economy committee, or 
the Environment/Rural Affairs committee, and (0) otherwise. Likewise, H3 (SMD 
legislators’ underrepresentation on parliamentary function committees) is a dummy 
variable taking a value of (1) for members on the standards, petitions, or subordinate 
legislation/legislation/legislative affairs committees, and (0) otherwise. 
H4 (“Mandate divide” is stronger in Wales) is tested by an interaction of the 
main explanatory variable (SMD seat) and a dummy variable for the two legislative 
terms during which dual candidacy was banned (2007-16) for each of hypotheses H1-
H3.  The data comprise the electoral, biographical and committee assignment history 
of every member of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales in the 
first four legislative periods since the establishment of both institutions (1999-2003, 
2003-07, 2007-11, and 2011-2016). Committee membership data for Scotland were 
obtained from the Scottish Parliament website. Committee memberships in the first 
and fourth terms of the National Assembly were available at that institution’s website; 
assignment data for the second and third terms were unavailable from that source but 
were instead obtained from The Wales Yearbook, an annual reference book for 
government and public affairs in Wales.  
116 individuals have served as members of the National Assembly for Wales 
and 252 served in the Scottish Parliament between 1999 and 2014, representing 900 
and 1,942 annual observations for each serving member in the two datasets 
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respectively.  Given the length of this time series and number of members, two units 
of observation are possible: members’ initial assignments in the first year of each 
legislative term; or annual observations, one per member per year. Annual 
observations are useful in identifying within-term changes such as committee 
reassignments, ministerial promotions, or changes to party affiliations. However, they 
also overcount members who remain on the same committee for more than one year 
(as is usual), thereby exaggerating the magnitude of any behavioral differences.  As a 
result, this analysis settles on observing patterns of committee assignment and 
member behavior in the first year of each legislative term.  
I also include a set of control variables to allow consideration of other factors 
that may account for differences in SMD and PR legislator types in mixed systems. 
The safety of a member’s seat might influence their behavior in the legislature, 
including their total number of committee assignments or the types of committees on 
which they serve. For SMD members, Safe Seat is an above-median vote margin in 
their constituency ballot at the last election.20 List members are considered here to 
have a safe seat if their list seat allocation was among the top two from the four seats 
available in each Welsh electoral region, or within the top 3 (of 7) in Scotland. I also 
include a dummy variable for a member’s gender (Female), and a measure of the 
                                                          
20 Previous election performance is not a perfect indicator of seat safety in subsequent elections, 
but it is a reasonable proxy and has been adapted as an explanatory variable in the literature 
(e.g. Heitshusen, Young and Wood 2005; Ferrara et al 2005). 
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member’s length of service in the legislature (Seniority). Given the technical nature 
of certain committee work, Rare Skills Profession is a dummy variable to test whether 
a member’s career background is associated with their subsequent assignments to 
certain committees: (1) if a member has a previous legal or medical career; (0) 
otherwise.  A dummy variable if a legislator is a Member of the Governing Party tests 
whether backbench members of the governing party (or parties in a governing 
coalition) sit on a disproportionate number of committees to maintain broad 
proportionality in committee assignments, especially during periods of minority 
government.  Finally, because party affiliations may condition the influence of seat 
type on behavior (Ferrara et al. 2005, Bawn & Thies 2003), I include dummy variables 
for the Conservatives, SNP / Plaid Cymru, Liberal Democrats, Minor Parties 
(Scotland), and Independents (Wales), with Labour as the reference category. Because 
party membership is correlated with members holding a SMD or PR seat (for example, 
Welsh Labour and SMD seats), including party dummy variables allows consideration 
of within-party variation of electoral rules. Because the MMP variant is less 
proportional in Wales, although the four major parties won seats via both the SMD 
ballot and the regional list, the strong performance of Welsh Labour in Assembly 
elections since devolution has resulted in a membership that was disproportionately 
elected through the SMD ballot. 
Two potentially important determinants of committee assignment are not 
directly included in the model. First, ministers and deputy ministers are generally not 
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assigned to committees (except, and somewhat unusually, during the first two terms 
of the Welsh Assembly),21 and the Presiding Officer or Deputy Presiding Officers are 
generally assigned to specific legislative business committees. These members are 
therefore removed from the sample. Second, although previous studies have directly 
analyzed a candidate’s dual candidacy at the time of their initial election (e.g. Ferrara 
et al. 2005, Battle 2011), the direction of causality means that dual candidacy is 
challenging to include as a variable in the model. In considering re-election 
incentives, it is not a member’s dual candidacy at the last election but their interest in 
securing a high party list ranking and a winnable constituency at the next election 
that is relevant to legislator motivations. This temporal discrepancy creates the 
possibility of reverse causality in modelling the determinants of committee 
assignments; furthermore, only those explanatory variables that precede in time the 
dependent variable can be included on the right hand side of a regression equation. 
Although not directly included, the prohibition of dual candidacy in Wales still 
informs the overall model because the “firewall” preventing candidates from running 
                                                          
21 During the first two Welsh Assembly sessions (1999-2003 and 2003-2007), subject 
committees were created to mirror the newly-created ministerial portfolios, and unusually, 
the cabinet portfolio holder was also a member of the corresponding subject committee in the 
legislature.  In the case of ministers being required to sit on committees on account of to their 
executive portfolio, there is no element of agency in their assignment, and therefore not 
instructive in analysing the behavior of members once elected. 
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on both ballots would be expected to sharpen any evidence of a dual mandate via the 
coefficient on SMD seat (H4).22 
 
3.5 RESULTS 
Table 3.3 presents results from multiple regression models estimating the effect of a 
member’s seat type on three dependent variables. The first set of models analyzes the 
determinants of a higher committee workload (defined as greater or equal to 2 
assignments). The second set estimate the determinants of assignment to committees 
that are theoretically of greater interest to SMD legislators (“Constituency Service 
Committees"); and the third examines those committees that are of greater interest to 
PR legislators (“Parliamentary Function Committees”). 
Because a member’s appointment to a particular committee type is a binary 
rather than a categorical variable, a probit model is used to analyze each hypothesis. 
To interpret these regressions I employ Hanmer and Kalkan’s Observed Values 
method (2013). Instead of setting all other explanatory variables to particular values 
(such as their sample means or modes) to calculate marginal effects for the variable of 
                                                          
22 There are other reasons to be cautious about including dual candidacy as a standalone 
variable in the model. As shown in Table 3, the use of dual candidacy is highly dependent on 
party effects in Scotland. In Wales, notwithstanding its prohibition at the 2007 and 2011 
elections, it is also difficult to discern enough dual candidacy observations prior to the ban, 
and these observations are highly correlated with the second Assembly election in 2003. 
Although 53 of 60 members elected at the 2003 elections were dual candidates, 41 of 60 
members elected in 1999 had been candidates on one ballot only. 
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interest, this method holds each of the other explanatory variables at their observed 
values for each observation in the data, calculates the marginal effect for each of these 
observations, then takes the mean average over all of these cases. The advantage of 
this approach for theory-driven empirical research is that it draws inferences from the 
entire population of interest from the sample rather than from one single, average case 
(Hanmer & Kalkan 2013: 269). Marginal effects calculated by this method are shown 
in Table 3.3. 
 
    
Table 3.3: Electoral System Effects on Committee Assignments: Average Marginal Effects from a Probit Regression Calculated Using the Observed 
Values Method 
Dependent Variable =  H1: Total Committee 
Assignments ≥ 2 
 
H2: Constituency Service 
Committees 
 
H3: Parliamentary Function 
Committees 
Variable 
Scotland Wales  Scotland Wales  Scotland Wales 
         
SMD Seat 
 –0.196*** 
(0.052) 
–0.133** 
(0.067) 
 –0.044 
(0.053) 
0.158* 
(0.085) 
 –0.056 
(0.046) 
–0.116 
(0.089) 
Safe Seat 
0.040 
(0.042) 
0.040 
(0.062) 
 0.014 
(0.043) 
0.149 
(0.071) 
 –0.036 
(0.039) 
0.062 
(0.070) 
Female 
-0.034 
(0.041) 
0.066 
(0.062) 
 0.005 
(0.044) 
–0.029 
(0.085) 
 –0.015 
(0.041) 
0.065 
(0.080) 
Seniority 
–0.006 
(0.008) 
–0.010 
(0.009) 
 0.001 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
 –0.012* 
(0.007) 
–0.002 
(0.012) 
Rare Skills Profession 
0.043 
(0.067) 
0.006 
(0.113) 
 0.136** 
(0.062) 
0.035 
(0.146) 
 0.005 
(0.058) 
0.133 
(0.137) 
Member of Governing Party 
0.361*** 
(0.043) 
–0.220 
(0.545) 
 0.104** 
(0.051) 
0.039 
(0.199) 
 0.067 
(0.045) 
0.020 
(0.196) 
Conservative 
–0.220*** 
(0.071) 
–0.467** 
(0.183) 
 –0.064 
(0.077) 
0.027 
(0.235) 
 –0.079 
(0.071) 
–0.201 
(0.232) 
SNP / Plaid Cymru 
–0.166*** 
(0.048) 
–0.326** 
(0.152) 
 –0.028 
(0.055) 
0.072 
(0.187) 
 –0.027 
(0.049) 
–0.098 
(0.183) 
Liberal Democrat 
–0.118* 
(0.068) 
–0.274 
(0.193) 
 –0.028 
(0.077) 
–0.004 
(0.236) 
 –0.035 
(0.067) 
0.022 
(0.233) 
Minor Party / Independents 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 –0.057 
(0.101) 
- 
- 
 –0.204* 
(0.112) 
- 
- 
         
Legislative Term Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.11  0.03 0.04  0.04 0.04 
Note: Probit results were converted to marginal effects using Hanmer and Kalkan’s ‘Observed Values’ method (2013); the figures here are not coefficients. Delta-
method Standard Errors in Parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.  n= 431 (Scotland); n=183 (Wales). Note that the Pseudo R-squared for all models increases 
significantly if office holders are included in the regression rather than removed from the sample. 
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Analyzing hypothesis H1, which predicts a smaller committee workload for 
SMD members than PR members, the effect on SMD Seat for both Scotland and Wales 
is in the predicted (negative) direction and is statistically significant. Consistent with 
expectations, the estimated marginal effects in the Total Committee Assignments 
regression for Scotland indicate that SMD legislators are approximately 20 percent less 
likely to be assigned to 2 or more committees than are list legislators, significant at P 
≤ 0.01. For Wales, the magnitude is slightly lower at 13 percent, but is in the expected 
direction and significant at the five percent level. For Scotland, a legislator’s 
membership of the governing party is strongly significant, implying that backbench 
members of the governing party have a higher total number of committee assignments 
than members of opposition parties. Party effects are significant at the five percent 
level for Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats in Wales, and for the SNP and 
Conservatives at the one percent level in Scotland.  There are no effects of note for 
seat safety, gender, or a medical or legal career background. Contrary to expectations 
that any evidence of “mandate divide” should be stronger in Wales, the marginal 
effect for Scottish committee assignments is slightly higher than that for Wales, 
although both are of the expected direction.   
Evidence of a dual incentive structure that would encourage SMD members 
to participate in committees serving a constituency re-election interest (hypothesis 
H2) is weaker, but remains present for Wales. In relation to constituency service 
committees (Health, Enterprise/Economy, and Rural Affairs/Environment), the 
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marginal effect for Wales on SMD Seat again has the predicted sign and is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, implying that SMD legislators are approximately 
16 per cent more likely to sit on committees that advance their constituency re-
election interest than are PR legislators. Conversely, the sign for Scotland is negative 
(although far from statistical significance): there is no evidence that Scottish 
constituency members are overrepresented on such committees relative to their list 
counterparts. These results may provide some basis of support for H4, that any 
mandate divide (if it exists) would be stronger where dual candidacy is not permitted.  
References to member’s SMD seats are made frequently in Welsh Assembly 
committee proceedings, drawing attention to issues of concern in their constituencies 
such as ports, small businesses and hospitals, particularly when ministers are giving 
evidence.23 
Turning to hypothesis H3, although of the anticipated (negative) sign, the 
effect of holding an SMD seat on membership of parliamentary service committees is 
not statistically significant. There is therefore little evidence that PR members are 
                                                          
23 See for example, National Assembly Business and Enterprise Committee, Thursday, 02 
October 2014 
(http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s32023/2%20October%202014%20morning.
html?CT=2) or Thursday, 19 March 2015 
(http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s38148/19%20March%202015.html?CT=2); 
or the Health and Social Care Committee’s sessions of Wednesday, 1 July 2015 
(http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s42219/1%20July%202015.html?CT=2); 
Thursday, 19 March 2014 
(http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s38249/19%20March%202015.html?CT=2 
Wednesday, 11 March 2014 
(http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s38182/11%20March%202015.html?CT=2). 
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significantly more likely to participate in committees that have low external profile 
but keep the legislative process operating. In fact, there are no major hypothesized 
determinants of participation for either legislature that reach significance (excepting 
the very small sample of independents and members from minor parties and a small 
negative effect for seniority in Scotland).  
Because dual candidacy was banned at the halfway point of the National 
Assembly for Wales’ institutional life, I next analyze whether the marginal effects of 
seat type on committee assignments was substantively different either side of the ban. 
I conduct a formal test of the interaction between SMD Seat and a dummy variable 
representing the terms during which dual candidacy was banned. In two cases (H1 
and H3), any dual mandate effect is slightly larger in magnitude after the ban (see 
online annex), but in general patterns are generally consistent across the institutional 
life of the National Assembly and appear unaffected by the dual candidacy ban that 
became effective at the 2007 elections. The marginal effects of the interaction term 
do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance for any of the hypotheses 
tested.24 
                                                          
24 A formal test of the interaction of SMD Seat and Welsh Assembly terms in which dual 
candidacy was prohibited yielded average marginal effects of 0.050 for H1 (serving on two or 
more committees); 0.068 for H2 (serving on constituency service committees); and -0.085 for 
H3 (serving on parliamentary function committees). The P values associated with these 
marginal effects were outside conventional levels of statistical significance, at P=0.668, P=0.653 
and P=0.561 for the three hypotheses respectively. 
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That these results do not replicate the clear-cut effects claimed elsewhere for 
the German MMP system can perhaps partly be explained by the difficulty of 
populating a committee system from a small pool of legislators. Previous studies have 
generally observed large legislative settings such as Germany, Italy, Hungary, Russia, 
Ukraine and Japan. In contrast, Scotland and Wales’ legislatures have 129 and 60 
members respectively. Chamber size is therefore an important contextual variable in 
limiting members’ freedom to respond to behavioral cues from the electoral system. 
However, a simple re-affirmation that ‘contamination’ dilutes the theoretical 
incentives for members to choose specific committee assignments cannot be the end 
of the story. In relation to H1, a clear workload split between PR and SMD members 
was found in both Wales and Scotland. In both legislatures, PR members were 
associated with a higher number of committee assignments: they are, to coin a term 
from Battle (2011), the “workhorses” of the committee system.  This implies not only 
that there are some observable differences between list and constituency members in 
both institutions, but that context specificity is of critical importance in empirical 
research of dual incentive structures in mixed systems. 
 
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
An extensive research field investigating the influence of electoral rules on legislator 
behavior has produced contradictory findings in diverse settings (Depauw & Martin 
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2009). While some researchers have found in mixed systems a “mandate divide” by 
seat type that is manifested in pork barrel projects, constituency service or committee 
assignments (Lancaster & Patterson 1990, Stratmann & Baur 2002), others have found 
that extensive contamination between the PR and SMD invalidates causal inferences 
from such comparisons (Ferrara et al. 2005, Manow 2015).  But while there exists an 
extensive parallel literature on the consequences of context-specific organizational 
features such as bicameralism and chamber size, the focus on spillover effects between 
the tiers as the likely source for the absence of cross-national dual mandate findings 
may have obscured other important contextual influences on reelection-seeking 
legislators. 
With Wales the only MMP system to ban dual candidacy (2006-2014), this 
chapter has proposed an identification strategy to exploit a crucial source of variation 
in the otherwise most-similar institutions of UK subnational government. Compared 
with systems in which candidates frequently run for election on both ballots, the 
contamination explanation for the general absence of dual mandate effects might 
suggest that Wales’ ban on dual candidacy would reinforce any bifurcated re-election 
incentives for SMD and PR members. Conversely, important context-specific features 
of the legislative and party system in the devolved countries of the UK were 
anticipated to counteract this potential firewall; in particular strong party discipline 
and small chamber size which moderate legislator incentives to specialize. The 
devolved legislatures of the UK were therefore proposed to offer a different set of 
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conditions for testing a ‘dual mandate’ framework from previous empirical tests in this 
field. 
Probit regression models using two datasets of members’ biographical and 
electoral history and committee assignments since the establishment of the National 
Assembly for Wales and the Scottish Parliament detects some evidence for ‘two 
legislator types’ that withstands a series of controls. There is evidence for a difference 
in committee workload between PR and SMD members, with list members associated 
with a larger number of committee assignments.  In Wales, there is also weaker 
evidence that SMD members are overrepresented on committees that assist with 
cultivating a constituency vote, such as Health, Enterprise/Economy, and Rural 
Affairs/Environment.  Elsewhere, the clear-cut dual mandate effects claimed for the 
German system are not evident: there is little evidence that Welsh and Scottish 
members are generally able to choose assignments in reference to that committee’s 
usefulness in cultivating a party re-election vote in the hypothesized manner, and in 
Wales there was no difference in patterns of committee assignment either side of a 
dual candidacy ban imposed after 2006.  
However, given the small size of Wales and Scotland’s legislatures and the 
strong party discipline characteristic of traditional Westminster systems, the pattern 
of heterogeneity in the findings indicates that contextual factors might be expected to 
condition dual mandate incentives in predictable ways.  While strong parties are able 
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to provide an element of committee workload relief for SMD members facing greater 
casework demands from their constituencies, this relief does not extend to personal 
re-election interests that might be advanced through a particular committee 
assignment choice. Such a split finding would appear to substantiate the importance 
of candidate selection and re-selection procedures underpinning members’ incentives 
to cultivate a personal vote. Depauw and Martin (2009) find that incentives to 
cultivate a personal vote are weaker where parties operate selection rules that give 
greater control by party leaderships. Where candidate reselection procedures are 
more centralized, incumbents prioritize advancement in the ranks of government to 
raise their profile; a strategy that generally reinforces party unity by discouraging 
personal vote cultivation that requires action by members against their own party’s 
position. But if the process of re-selecting SMD candidates and ranking PR lists has 
become less centralized over the period (see section 3.2), we might anticipate that 
responding to party leadership cues would be a weaker strategy for both SMD and PR 
members.  In that case, PR members might find direct appeals to party members a 
more effective re-election strategy than internal legislative work to appeal to party 
leaderships. 
That context specificity matters implies that the heterogeneous and 
idiosyncratic effects found in the UK’s devolved legislatures might be replicated in 
other traditional Westminster systems with small chambers and strong parties. New 
Zealand’s unicameral parliament might offer a particularly promising case; with 120 
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members it has a legislative size and national population that is comparable to 
Scotland’s. Given its small size and 13 subject committees, it could be anticipated that 
the challenges of populating the committee system would counterbalance any 
underlying specialization incentives.  With the apparent importance of context 
conditionality, New Zealand should represent an important case for testing the dual 
mandate framework despite the otherwise ostensible parallels to the German 
Bundestag. 
In focusing on spillover effects, existing research on electoral incentives in 
mixed systems has perhaps obscured important institutional constraints such as strong 
parties and the assumption that the legislature is big enough to allow specialization. 
As shown by evidence of differentiated workload management between SMD and PR 
members in Wales and Scotland presented above, parties and institutions have made 
innovative adaptations to these constraints, some of which align with divisions 
between legislator types.  
The incentive effects of mixed electoral systems are not clear-cut: patterns 
that ostensibly appear to be contamination may in fact represent party or institutional 
adaptation to contextual factors, adaptations that may reinforce rather than weaken 
divisions between legislator types in mixed member systems. Given the apparent 
importance of institutional effects such as legislative size and party management in 
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the operation of such systems, a more systematic understanding of context 
conditionality is central to a more unified approach in this research field.  
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Why Decentralization Doesn’t Always 
Improve Responsiveness:  
Evidence from FOI Requests 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Decentralization has become an established policy objective across the globe, 
validated by claims of accountability and proximity that could improve the 
responsiveness of governments to their citizens. But there is scant empirical evidence 
for these claims. Recognizing the value of FOI in facilitating large-scale data 
collection, and that the UK’s institutional diversity offers an important source of 
between- and within-tier variation, I compile a large new dataset of government 
responsiveness by emailing two separate FOI requests to 812 UK public bodies with 
an executive function. Identifying significant variations in timeliness and quality 
between UK territories, I argue that differing foundational motives can help 
understand patterns of responsiveness between institutions established as part of 
transparency-facing reform programs and those designed to resolve conflict. But the 
absence of empirical confirmation that lower-tier governments are generally more 
responsive challenges the more fundamental claims about decentralization that have 
informed academic debate and real-world practice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, countries across the globe have adopted decentralization reforms 
both in response to bottom-up demands for greater autonomy and self-government 
and top-down pressures by international organizations such as USAID and the World 
Bank (Hindriks & Lockwood 2009). This advocacy was influenced in large part by 
longstanding theoretical expectations of the ‘first generation’ of fiscal federalism 
theory (Qian & Weingast 1997) that expected decentralization and transparency to 
trigger efficiency gains from increased accountability and proximity that could 
reconnect citizens with their governments (for example, World Bank 1999, DFID 
2002). More recent, empirically-anchored contributions from a ‘second generation’ 
(Qian & Weingast 1997) have been far more skeptical, arguing that outcomes under 
decentralization are at best mixed and largely attributable to incentives intrinsic to 
institutions in a given country (Rodden & Wibbels 2002). But because measurements 
of concepts such as accountability and responsiveness are so contestable, there is scant 
empirical corroboration of these claims and counterclaims.  
These extensive decentralization reforms have paralleled a global expansion 
of Freedom of Information laws, which had been adopted in 115 countries by 2017 
(freedominfo.org). Although this expansion has been the focus of many country-
specific and cross-case studies, researchers are only slowly recognizing the potential 
value of FOI as “a powerful tool” and “democratizing force” in empirical research 
(Savage & Hyde 2014: 304) and tests of public bodies’ responsiveness to FOI requests 
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remain comparatively rare. To fill this gap and to reassess longstanding claims about 
responsiveness and decentralization, I email two FOI requests to the complete 
universe of 812 public bodies in the United Kingdom with an executive function at 
either the central-, devolved- or local government level to construct a large new 
dataset.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. After first specifying 
theoretical expectations about improved responsiveness at the lower tiers of 
government, I investigate three countervailing hypotheses, namely top-down forms 
of accountability that should dilute the electoral link between voters and local-tier 
officials, administrative capacity constraints, and institutions’ foundational motives 
that should incline certain public bodies towards – or away from – greater 
transparency. I then outline why the UK’s significant diversity of institutions offers 
an ideal test of such perspectives. Third, I identify the methodology and data used to 
operationalize three hypotheses as part of a large-N research design in which I codify 
responses from two large waves of FOI requests and create two objective measures of 
responsiveness. Fourth, I illustrate the results of statistical modeling of these 
measures, testing organizations’ timeliness and quality results against a number of 
potential correlates. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for 
broader academic understanding of government responsiveness. 
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2. DECENTRALIZATION AND THREE COUNTERVAILING THEORIES 
INFLUENCING GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS 
2.1 DECENTRALIZATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS 
Decentralization – the transfer of national government powers and functions to 
authorities at regional and local levels – is a policy that has transformed the 
constitutions of growing numbers of developed and developing countries over the past 
several decades. By the early 1990s, and influenced by early fiscal federalism theory, 
advocacy by donor governments and international organizations helped foster a broad 
consensus that decentralization was a positive force for more satisfied consumer-
voters, better democracy and freer markets (Beramendi 2007).25  
This assertion that decentralization could improve outcomes emerged from 
two well-developed theoretical claims relating to allocative efficiency26 and the 
accountability of government to citizens (Lockwood 2006). First, if decentralization 
optimizes allocative efficiency by improving the fit between public goods provision 
and the preferences of local people, improved policy outcomes and more informed 
and responsive local governments should be the result (Kincaid 1998 in Yackee & 
                                                          
25 For example, a 2002 joint policy note by the international development ministries of the UK 
(DFID) and the Netherlands (DGIS) observed that “donors generally support decentralization. 
Decentralized cooperation, circumventing ineffectual central governments, has become a core 
part of development assistance […] Local governance is closely linked with the empowerment 
of voiceless groups, such as the poor and women” (2002:1). 
26 In contrast to productive efficiency which refers to producing goods and services at the 
lowest possible cost, allocative efficiency refers to the optimal distribution of goods and 
services, taking into account consumers’ (citizens’) preferences. 
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Palus 2010). And second, in “the most important theoretical argument concerning 
decentralization [and] central to the motivations of real world reformers” (Faguet 
2014: 2), decentralization should also improve the accountability of government to 
citizens (Lockwood 2006). 
But the very definition of accountability is so contested and “notoriously 
difficult to pin down precisely” (Hindriks & Lockwood 2005: 3) that empirical 
research in this area is “fragmented, episodic, and scarce” (Brandsma & Schillemans 
2012: 953). Although conceptualized at a basic level as “specific social relation or 
mechanism that involves an obligation to explain and justify conduct” (Schillemans & 
Bovens 2015: 5), academic uses of the term are so disconnected from each other that 
“the result is that accountability seems to be an ever-expanding concept, which has 
come to stand as a general term for any mechanism that makes powerful institutions 
responsive to their particular publics” (Mulgan 2003: 8 in Schillemans & Busuioc 2014: 
193). From political economy for example, accountability variously refers to 
requirements that spending should be in some way linked to a government’s taxation 
choices (e.g. Darby, Muscatelli & Roy 2002), to constraints on public officials’ rent-
seeking activities such as corruption, to increased innovation and effort (Lockwood 
2008). 
However imprecisely defined, realization of these efficiency and 
accountability gains requires a preference revelation, or linking mechanism, between 
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citizens and the public decision-making process. In traditional fiscal federalism 
theory, this mechanism is democratic elections, lobbying, or by “voting with your 
feet” by moving to other jurisdictions (Rodden 2011), all of which assume knowledge 
and meaningful local participation by citizens and groups. Hence the importance of 
access to information and openness as a necessary first condition for preference 
revelation and accountability (Dethier 2002, Albalate 2013). As Azfar et al. argue, 
“[u]nless the public knows what goods and services are provided by the government, 
how well they are provided, who the beneficiaries are, and how much they cost, it 
cannot demand effective government” (1999: 12). 
Although rarely intersecting directly, the theoretical extensions of fiscal 
federalism theory to participation and access to information share a focus of interest 
with the small but growing FOI literature. Partly because of the substantial diversity 
in the size, power and composition of local governments (Piotrowski 2011; Welch 
2012 in Worthy 2013) the majority of this literature focuses on central governments, 
and the resulting small number of FOI studies across more than one tier makes 
generalization difficult. But a limited number of theoretical and empirical 
contributions mirror fiscal federalism theory in suggesting that local governments 
might be relatively more open than central governments. For example, in the United 
States, Peters & Pierre (1998) argue that higher levels of citizen trust confer a greater 
degree of legitimacy on state and local governments, giving them greater governing 
latitude than their federal counterpart. And in considering the relatively recent 
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passage of FOI laws in the UK, Worthy (2013) argues that “local government was 
already, in relative terms, more open” than the center, largely because local 
governments had been subject to public access legislation such as open meeting 
requirements for far longer.27  
But despite hundreds of academic articles and thousands of policy reports 
(Faguet 2014), there has been little empirical investigation of the basic question of 
whether lower tiers of government are associated with more responsive government 
(Hindriks & Lockwood 2005, Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2009). While FOI is clearly not 
the only possible measure of government responsiveness, FOI laws are one of the key 
ways of promoting transparency (Worthy 2013), and their rapid international 
expansion allows researchers to test responsiveness not only across countries but 
between the tiers of government using objective metrics. The remainder of this 
section outlines three countervailing perspectives challenging conventional wisdom 
that decentralization should necessarily be associated with improved responsiveness. 
 
4.2.2 ELECTORAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY  
It is perhaps unsurprising that theory expects decentralization to be associated with 
improved government accountability. Local governments have more frequent and 
                                                          
27 The Local Government Acts of 1972 and 1985 introduced similar requirements to US ‘open 
meeting’ legislation that obliged councils to allow public access to meetings and documents, 
and national legislation not specific to local government such as data protection and audit 
regulations also provide access to particular personal records or accounts (Worthy 2013). 
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personalized public interactions, are constrained by both electoral and “exit-and-
voice” accountability (Hirschman 1970), benefit from higher levels of citizen trust, 
and – from the FOI literature – have been subject to transparency laws for far longer 
than central governments. But in focusing on electoral or exit-and-voice 
accountability, fiscal federalism neglects a separate intergovernmental accountability 
mechanism that shapes the interactions of public officials, namely the hierarchies of 
principal-agent controls that variously discourage or incentivize public officials to be 
more or less responsive to citizens.  
Of the various alternative accountability mechanisms that could shape actors’ 
incentives, the principal-agent model has “become the predominant paradigm in the 
study of bureaucracy” (Meier & Krause 2003: 297 in Schillemans & Busuioc 2014). 
Principal-agent models conceive modern bureaucracies as vast chains of delegations 
of authority between voters, legislators, government ministers and civil servants, 
where principals at each stage of the chain delegate power to an agent (Brandsma & 
Schillemans 2012). In such models, public officials’ incentives are shaped not only by 
elections but by top-down influences such as performance management systems and 
audit controls. 
Fiscal federalism theory has tended to discount the general applicability of 
this approach because the electoral mandate conferred on elected officials at multiple 
stages of the chain is not widely replicated in other P-A applications, most obviously 
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the vertical hierarchy of the firm (Oates 2005). Because of the more personalized 
nature of citizen-politician interactions at the lower level (at least in contrast to 
distant ministerial departments and their agencies), even very recent work in this field 
tends to reiterate the importance of electoral forms of local accountability. For 
example, arguing that the relative importance of elections is decreasing with the 
relative length of the chain of accountability from voter to officials, Hong (2017) 
argues that while the actions of central government officials will be shaped more by 
management systems and less by elections, the reverse is true for officials working for 
local governments.28 But while conceptually neat, the characterization of a chain of 
delegation implies a degree of equality at each link in the chain that may overstate the 
strength of the accountability connection between voters and local public officials, 
for two primary reasons.  
First, local government elections are often weak mechanisms for preference 
revelation and for voters to hold local politicians to account. In particular, they are 
associated with far lower levels of participation and tend to reflect the electorate’s 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the political environment at the central level rather 
than issues specific to local races (Heath et al. 1999); in other words, they are second–
                                                          
28 Reflecting the common perception of proximate citizen-politician interactions, Hong bases 
this assumption “on the fact that the gap between a politician facing election (or the voters 
themselves) and the lowest-level public servant is generally greater in central governments 
than in local ones.” (Hong 2017: 123) 
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order elections (Berry & Howell 2007, Cutler 2008, Webber et al. 2014, see Marien, 
Dassonneville & Hooghe 2015).  
Second, FOI is generally imposed on lower-tier bodies and subsequently 
enforced by oversight by ‘principals’ at the central or regional29 tier. Full compliance 
with such regulations is costly, so organizations that are subject to – and not 
responsible for enforcing – such laws have different interests from these principals. 
And because principals do not know which records are held or the time or cost 
required to respond, FOI ‘agents’ benefit from information asymmetries. But although 
these characteristics make FOI a particularly appropriate P-A application (in which 
FOI ‘agents’ at all tiers incentives to shirk from full compliance), agency supervision 
theory suggests that the credibility of the principals’ control mechanisms against such 
a potential are not equal for local government and central agencies, and that 
enforcement should be more efficient at the central level than it is at the local. 
In a seminal contribution, McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) distinguish two 
distinct forms of oversight by principals: ‘Fire-alarm oversight’ involving procedures 
for aggrieved citizens to ‘raise the alarm’ about agency performance to regulatory 
bodies; and ‘Police-patrol oversight’ involving direct oversight of agency activities 
such as committee hearings, reports and audits. Fire-alarm oversight is a convenient 
shorthand for the role of Information Commissioners, ombudsmen or Data Protection 
                                                          
29 For example, in Scotland, the Canadian provinces, German Länder and the fifty US states. 
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Commissioners, the ‘enforcer’ of FOI regimes in many countries,30 regulators that can 
be alerted when either central agencies or local governments are perceived to have 
misused their authority. But police-patrol oversight should be far more effective with 
respect to central agencies than it is for local governments because ministerial 
principals have credibility in enforcing compliance. Such bodies are obliged to 
publicly account for their performance to ministers and supervisory agencies (Bovens 
2007: 4), their chief executives can be dismissed, their services outsourced or 
privatized, or their whole agency abolished or amalgamated. Of course, ministers 
could abolish or merge recalcitrant local governments, but this is far more expensive 
and therefore not a credible threat.31 
In sum, while local government might be expected to be more responsive than 
central counterparts, agency oversight theory would suggest an association in the 
opposite direction. Not only is the local government electoral connection weakened 
by their second-order nature, but the consequences of poor responsiveness should be 
less severe for local governments than for central agencies. A first hypothesis can 
therefore be specified as follows: 
                                                          
30 In the UK, because Scottish ministers are the source and the Scottish Information 
Commissioner the enforcer of Scottish FOI legislation, Scottish ministers are a ‘principal’ 
subject to the same dynamics as central (UK) ministerial principals and the (UK) Information 
Commissioner. 
31 Central principals have no comparable role in the employment contracts or performance 
monitoring of local government chief executives. And low-paid, often part-time local 
councillors are in a far weaker position in monitoring council chief executives and FOI officials 
than are cabinet ministers and legislative committees overseeing central agencies. 
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H1: Central Departments and Agencies will be more responsive to FOI 
requests than Local Government bodies 
 
4.2.3 THE CHALLENGE OF CAPACITY 
Quite apart from principal-agent and electoral accountability mechanisms, 
decentralization and information access laws create new challenges for public 
organizations that may have starkly unequal capacities to discharge their 
responsibilities (Terman & Feiock 2014). Capacity constraints have been particularly 
prominent since the 2007-08 financial crisis and subsequent public spending 
constraints in many OECD countries, and such pressures have been particularly acute 
at the lower tier where governments often do not have legal authority to run large 
budget deficits. If officials do not have the policy expertise, staffing and/or fiscal 
resources to discharge their responsibilities (Howlett 2009, Terman & Feiock 2014), 
lower-tier governments may simply lack the capacity to put into effect the greater 
responsiveness expected of them in theory. 
Given the assumption that local government should be more responsive, it is 
essential to test such claims. But in contrast to the large principal-agent literature, 
there is surprisingly little research that considers how local capacity constraints can 
influence government responsiveness (or even outcomes in general) (Terman & 
Feiock 2014). Evidence from FOI responses can be used to fill this gap in 
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understanding with respect to capacity constraints. In reference to these theoretical 
and empirical arguments made above, I test a second hypothesis, namely: 
H2: Governments subject to greater capacity challenges will be less responsive 
to FOI requests  
 
4.2.4 INSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS TOWARDS OPENNESS 
A third countervailing factor to the assumptions of decentralization theory concerns 
organizational culture, and in particular the idea that institutions more inclined 
towards openness might be more amenable to the demands of FOI. Previous research 
has indicated the importance of factors such as administrative culture, local advocacy 
and leadership to institutional openness (Piotrowski 2011, Welch 2012; see Worthy 
2013). For example, surmising that local government’s history of openness made the 
local tier better able to deal with FOI requirements, Worthy, John & Vanonni argue 
that “bodies with greater experience of transparency are better placed to move from 
formal procedure to embedded norms” (2017: 490).  
But any focus on differentiated transparency norms between local and central 
government bodies neglects the global expansion in the role of the regional tier 
(Hooghe, Marks & Schakel 2010) that has paralleled the growth of FOI legislation 
itself. Newly-created political institutions in the modern government era might be 
more receptive to transparency demands – and more capable of entrenching 
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transparency into their institutional norms – than bodies with long histories of 
operating in closed systems. 
Not all newly-created intermediate-tier bodies are however created with 
similar foundational inclinations. In large parts of the world, federalism and 
decentralization have been adopted as tools in conflict resolution, as in Iraq, Nigeria 
and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Recasting violence into more peaceful forms of interaction 
requires complex institutional architectures – such as minority groups’ inclusion in 
powersharing mechanisms like consociationalism (Keil 2012, Wallensteen 2015) – and 
these conflict resolution imperatives may act contrary to the transparency and 
responsiveness objectives that have inspired decentralization reforms elsewhere. As 
The Economist argued in November 2013: 
Peace often fails to bring the prosperity that might give it lasting value to all 
sides. Powersharing creates weak governments; nobody trusts anyone else 
enough to grant them real power. Poor administration hobbles business. 
Ethnic mafias become entrenched. Integration is postponed indefinitely. 
Lacking genuine political competition, with no possibility of decisive electoral 
victories, public administration in newly pacified nations is often a mess. (The 
Economist, 9th November 2013) 
 Drawing from conceptions of diverging institutional foundations, a third 
hypothesis anticipates that the foundational imperatives of public bodies will 
influence their subsequent responsiveness: 
H3: Institutions inclined towards openness and transparency will be more 
responsive to FOI requests than powersharing institutions designed to resolve conflict  
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Interactions between these hypotheses suggest that expectations of greater 
responsiveness under decentralization are likely to be insufficient at best.  
 
4.3 TESTING RESPONSIVENESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In investigating how the countervailing factors outlined above might influence the 
responsiveness of central, devolved and local governments in the United Kingdom to 
FOI requests, two features of the UK case are of particular value to the research design. 
First, it is a venue for comprehensive FOI legislation covering a sufficiently large 
number of organizations at all tiers to facilitate data collection and quantitative 
statistical analysis. And second, significant differentiation in the foundational 
underpinnings of the regional-tier institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland offers an ideal test in investigating whether institutions inclined towards 
openness and transparency might be more responsive than consociational institutions 
designed to resolve conflict. 
 
4.3.1 ELECTORAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY - UK 
In contrast to perspectives that local elections offer voters a preference revelation or 
electoral control mechanism, UK local elections have long been argued to be second-
order (or close to second-order) contests (Heath et al. 1999). They are subject to 
considerably lower turnouts than first-order general elections and “local government 
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election results are a largely accidental by-product of central government’s popularity 
at local election time” (Miller 1988: 2).  
Moreover, along with New Zealand, Britain’s Next Steps initiative most fully 
epitomized the New Public Management restructurings undertaken in many OECD 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s and inspired by bureaucratic control considerations 
(Schick 2002). As a bureaucratic form embodying the top-down, arm’s-length ideal of 
police-patrol oversight, it is the principal organizational type for UK central 
government service delivery (James et al. 2011), with approximately 80 percent of 
civil servants relocated from ministerial departments (Wettenhall 2005: 616). Unlike 
local government bodies, principal-agent considerations are therefore explicit in the 
organizational specification of UK central agencies. 
 
4.3.2 THE CHALLENGE OF CAPACITY - UK 
‘Capacity’ is a term with a very broad reach and a number of possible proxy measures, 
none of which are fully satisfactory on their own. Unfortunately, data is not generally 
comparable across the vastly different bodies in the sample (compare for example the 
£4 million annual budget of West Somerset District Council – the smallest in England 
– with the £173 billion spent in 2016-17 by the UK Department for Work and 
Pensions). To consider capacity challenges I therefore limit the investigation to local 
government bodies, a suitable sample for two reasons. Not only do they represent the 
largest single subset of relatively-comparable organizations in the data (N=433), but 
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local government is the destination at least 70-80% of all FOI requests in the UK, a 
proportion which is growing (Worthy & Hazell 2017).  
Paradoxically, existing contributions argue that “local authorities have 
managed this disproportionately large volume more efficiently than central 
government” (Worthy, John & Vannoni 2017: 490). But this rapid increase in FOI 
requests coincided with a long squeeze on public finances that has restricted local 
authority budgets since 2010, a policy which offers one potential source of variation 
for considering capacity. Because local government funding is a devolved government 
responsibility in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, changes to local government 
resource budgets have varied significantly across the UK. In particular, the 2010 policy 
decision by the incoming UK government to cut spending but protect health and 
education expenditure in England resulted in disproportionate cuts to English local 
government resource budgets, a decision that was not matched in Scotland and Wales. 
English councils spent 22% less in real terms in 2015-16 than they did in 2009-10 
(Amin-Smith et al. 2016), compared with reductions of 15% in Scotland and 11.5% in 
Wales. Given more rapid cuts in funding in England, English councils’ responsiveness 
to FOI requests would be expected to be worse than counterparts in Scotland and 
Wales. 
However, this is a blunt measure of capacity because other social, cultural or 
political factors may also influence outcomes across the four territories of the UK. A 
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more granular approach therefore draws on local government budget data collected 
by the UK Department for Communities and Local Government. Since this data is not 
directly comparable across the four UK territories, these additional variables represent 
proxies for two possible capacity measures for the 353 councils in England: the local 
council’s total budget for central services (‘back-office’ functions) in 2014-15; and the 
percentage change in this budget over the austerity period between 2010-11 and 2014-
15. If resources are an intervening factor in the overall level of organizational 
transparency (Piotrowski 2011), responsiveness should be increasing with staff and 
budget size. Because this data is also an imperfect and incomplete measure, additional 
variables that might influence government responsiveness can also be included, such 
as Office for National Statistics socio-economic data collated at the local government 
level, and local council political composition data. 
 
4.3.3 INSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS TOWARDS OPENNESS - UK 
A key advantage in investigating whether differentiated institutional foundations 
influence responsiveness is the UK’s very considerable diversity in the longevity and 
foundational underpinnings of its governmental institutions. As one of the oldest 
consolidated nation-states in the democratic world, the British central government’s 
working norms have long predated modern-era interests in transparency and open 
government. The prevailing understanding in the FOI literature that UK central 
government should be less open than local government draws from what might be 
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understood as a historical institutionalist interpretation: Executive dominance and 
political traditions entrenched secrecy as a “historical, cultural and institutional 
phenomenon” in Britain over a period of centuries (Worthy 2017: 17).32 
But in “the most radical constitutional change [the UK] has seen since the 
Great Reform Act of 1832” (Bogdanor 2001: 1), devolution recast the administrative 
apparatus of the UK state by creating three new intermediate-tier institutions with 
significant ‘self-rule’ autonomy. And very unusually for a decentralizing state in 
Western Europe, these new intermediate-tier institutions in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland were underpinned by entirely divergent foundational imperatives. 
Devolution to Scotland and Wales was born as part of a broad constitutional 
reform program during the first Blair Government that included the FOI legislation 
itself, the Human Rights Act and (later) the Supreme Court replacing the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords. Labelled “New Politics” by contemporary Scottish 
and Welsh commentators (e.g. Cairney 2012, Mitchell 2000, Osmond 1998), the 
potential for more transparent and responsive government was perhaps the most 
important non-nationalist justification for the establishment of the Scottish 
Parliament and National Assembly for Wales. While politicians in Wales took up the 
connections between ‘New Politics’ and openness shortly after the first Welsh 
                                                          
32 Indeed, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 only closely succeeded the Official Secrets Act 
1989, a law that further entrenched secrecy norms (Worthy 2017). 
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elections (e.g. Michael 1999),33 ambitions for transparency and responsiveness for the 
new institutions were particularly embedded in Scotland. For several decades, the 
Scottish home rule movement had drawn together academic, legal, cultural and 
political figures from across Scottish public life, at venues including the Campaign for 
a Scottish Assembly, the 1989 Claim of Right and the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention. James Mitchell argues that while “New Politics” was never precisely 
defined, it had long “been part of the rhetoric of the Scottish home rule movement” 
and that “three features stood out from this rhetoric: new institutions, new processes 
and new political culture” (Mitchell 2000: 5).34 Indeed ‘access and participation’ 
became one of the four key principles adopted by the consultative group tasked with 
drafting the detailed proposals on how Scotland’s devolved institutions should operate 
(Consultative Steering Group 1999) 
In contrast, three distinctive factors underpin devolution in Northern Ireland: 
conflict resolution through mandatory powersharing; political paralysis; and a direct 
lineage from the previous Stormont Government and the post-1972 Direct Rule 
                                                          
33 In a keynote lecture during his short tenure as the National Assembly’s inaugural First 
Secretary, Alun Michael argued that integral to the ‘New Politics’ was that “The government 
of Wales is no longer carried out behind closed doors, but out in the open. And that can only 
be a good thing for democracy and for the quality of our decision making” (1999: 7). 
34 After 1997, “New Politics” became most associated with Secretary of State for Scotland (and 
future First Minister) Donald Dewar (Mitchell 2000), but the belief that the devolved 
institutions should be bestowed different underpinnings substantially pre-dates the Blair 
Government. In particular, the Constitutional Convention was viewed as “the proving ground 
for the new politics" (Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown, quoted in Macwhirter 1990: 
34). 
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machinery. A fourth factor, sectarian partisan competition and historic discrimination 
by some councils in employment and housing, is also fundamental in understanding 
Northern Ireland local government. 
First, the 1998 Belfast Agreement that re-established devolved government 
attempted to stem chronic political violence by addressing not only constitutional and 
security matters but also human rights and social and economic inclusion (Wilford et 
al 2003: 32), thereby creating a macro architecture in which conflict resolution 
through political accommodation was the primary imperative (Carmichael 1999).35 
Second, traditional linkages between elections and government formation are 
obscured in Northern Ireland politics. Because the main British parties do not 
generally compete in Northern Ireland elections, “the vote had little direct influence 
on the policy content of government in the province for almost thirty years” (Rhodes 
et al. 2003: 38), circumstances which offered local politicians “all the advantages of 
political activity with none of the disadvantages of responsibility” (Prior 1982, cited 
in Bogdanor 2001: 99). Third, Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions are not new 
but are instead the successor of the 1921-1972 Stormont Parliament and the Direct 
Rule Northern Ireland Office, a body which was itself “the lineal descendant of the 
old Stormont Cabinet Office” (Bell 1987: 212). Northern Ireland’s Civil Service 
                                                          
35 Indeed, the devolved institutions have been claimed to be “inherently unstable” because 
they “institutionalised sectarianism and sectarian division” (Wilson & Wilford 2003 in 
McLaughlin 2005: 115) and may have worsened public administration with “less cohesive 
government” and decisions “made on a lowest common denominator basis” (Birrell 2009: 245). 
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working for this body “found it difficult to adjust to the accountability demands placed 
on them by the return of devolved government in December 1999” (Knox 2009: 436).36 
And fourth, these tensions are perhaps even more pronounced at the local level, 
where local authorities have emerged from an era in which council chambers were 
described as a “bearpit of sectarianism” (Knox 1998: 1) and where “religious 
discrimination by some local authorities in employment and housing [became] a 
motivating factor behind the civil rights protests in 1968 and subsequent outbreak of 
disturbance” (Knox 1998: 3).  
While such disturbances are less apparent since the Belfast Agreement, these 
divergent institutional underpinnings provide a theoretical basis for anticipating that 
local governments in Northern Ireland might be less responsive than councils in 
England, Scotland and Wales, and that Northern Ireland’s devolved-tier bodies would 
also be associated with poorer responsiveness than their counterparts in Scotland and 
Wales.  
 
                                                          
36 Rhodes et al (2003) argue that “the Assembly, the executive and its constituent departmental 
structure have been reconfigured in ways that owe little to administrative efficiency and much 
to political expediency” (2003: 69). This interpretation is perhaps reflected in Northern 
Ireland’s apparent lack of interest amending the Westminster-passed FOI Act despite 
legislative competence that would allow it to do so. As Wilford & Wilson (2001) argue, “So far 
the Assembly has followed Westminster in its freedom-of-information regime, not yet 
exploring as in Scotland a more liberal variant. A combination of the parochialism of some 
members and the lack of habituation of the Northern Ireland civil service to close democratic 
scrutiny has led to tensions over access to information held by the executive” (2001: 4). 
 Chapter 4: Why Decentralization Doesn’t Always Improve Responsiveness 
  
157 
4.4 MEASURING RESPONSIVENESS THROUGH FOI REQUESTS 
The global expansion in right-to-know laws since the late 1990s has spawned a 
number of country-specific and comparative studies that assess the impact of FOI in 
a number of different settings (Hazell & Worthy 2010). Despite this growth however, 
FOI legislation has far less frequently been employed as a methodology in 
experimental research, although this is beginning to change (e.g. Lewis & Wood 2012, 
Ross & Whittaker 2009, Cherry & McMenemy 2013, Michener & Rodriguez 2015, 
Worthy, John & Vannoni 2017). 
In contrast to other potential and existing measures of good governance, there 
are a number of advantages of using emailed FOI requests to obtain an objective, 
comparative metric of government responsiveness. First, the technique relies on a 
universal requirement that public bodies must respond to or refuse the request within 
a statutory period (20-working days in the UK), an expedient obligation in mitigating 
selection biases that frequently confound survey data (Cherry & McMenemy 2013). 
Second, by codifying objective metrics from information provided remotely in 
response to identically-worded emails rather than expert surveys, the data is less likely 
to capture respondents’ impressions that may bias traditional governance indictors 
(Rodriguez-Pose & Di Cataldo 2015). And third, public bodies at all tiers of 
government have equal access to email as a universal means of communication. In the 
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UK, email or websites are the preferred method of public contact for completing tasks 
such as renewing driving licenses, road tax or passports (OFCOM 2013).  
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (applying to England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland) and the Freedom of Information Act (Scotland) 2002 came into 
force on 1 January 2005. Both Acts established a general right of access to information 
held by public bodies and imposed a duty upon public bodies to disclose information 
held by them on receipt of a request for information. They have extensive coverage 
of at least 100,000 bodies (Birkinshaw 2010) including central government 
departments and executive agencies, local councils, the National Health Service, 
universities, schools, police forces and fire authorities.  
The Acts also established Information Commissioners to act as enforcers and 
champions of the legislation. Information Commissioners are publicly appointed37 and 
are independent from government in disseminating information to the public, issuing 
guidance to public bodies on their obligations under the Acts, and in their 
enforcement function where public bodies are adjudicated to be in breach of the Acts. 
Because compliance requirements do not vary between the types of public bodies 
                                                          
37 The UK Information Commissioner is appointed on the nomination of the UK Government 
subject to a pre-appointment hearing of the relevant parliamentary select committee. The 
Scottish Information Commissioner is appointed on the nomination of the Scottish Parliament.  
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covered by the Acts, FOI regulations on their own should not affect the opportunities 
for certain bodies to shirk in complying with disclosure requirements.38 
 
4.4.1 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
To operationalize the test of responsiveness to FOI requests, a complete list of email 
addresses for the universe of public bodies subject to FOI laws was assembled from 
official registers and the annual reference guides in the devolved countries: the 
Scottish Political Guide, The Wales Yearbook and the Northern Ireland Yearbook. 
Organizations were emailed FOI requests if they were considered to have an 
executive function at any level of government. Selecting the universe of public bodies 
intended to avoid sample biases and to generate sufficient responses: despite the legal 
obligation to respond previous work has reported a low response rate (e.g. Michener 
& Rodriguez 2015). Along with UK ministerial departments, the devolved 
governments and local councils, Non-Departmental Public Bodies at both the UK-
level (such as the Homes and Communities Agency) and devolved-level (such as the 
Wales Audit Office) were included. Advisory and Tribunal Non-Departmental Public 
                                                          
38 In common with other FOI legislation, there are a number of exemptions for disclosing 
certain information, such as the absolute exemptions covering information received from 
security bodies, court records, and communications with senior members of the Royal Family. 
(Information Commissioner’s Office: When can we refuse a request for information? Accessed 
18 November 2017 at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-
information/refusing-a-request/) 
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Bodies which sit infrequently and/or have a shoestring staff were excluded. Also 
excluded were town-, community- or parish- councils, universities, schools, police 
forces and fire authorities. Although public sector NHS bodies in Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland were included, NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups in England 
(which had been recently established at the time of the trial) were excluded. Table 4.1 
details the final set of 197 central government bodies and 181 devolved government 
bodies. 
Table 4.1: Central and Devolved Public Bodies Receiving Two FOI requests 
Type of Agency UK Scotland Wales 
Northern 
Ireland 
Ministerial Department or Devolved Government 22 1 1 12† 
Executive Agency 39 8 0 0 
Non-Departmental Public Body 114 34 17 47 
Non-Ministerial Department 22 5 0 0 
Commissioner 0 6 4 1 
NHS body 0 23 10 12 
Total 197 77 32 72 
† In contrast to Scotland and Wales, each Northern Ireland ministerial department is established as 
separate corporate entity  
 
A series of local government reorganizations effective 1974, 1986, 1995-1998 
and 2009 replaced a uniform two-tier system across Great Britain (sic) with a 
complicated hybrid. Although Scottish and Welsh reforms were straightforward, 
replacing the previous two-tier system with 32 and 22 single-tier councils, the English 
system accommodates both continuity two-tier areas and single-tier authorities 
combining previously-separate county and borough functions (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Local Authorities by Type, United Kingdom 
Local Authority Type Number of Councils 
England  
Single-tier areas  
London Borough 32 
City of London Corporation 1 
Metropolitan Borough Council 36 
Unitary Authority 56 
Total Single Tier Authorities 125 
  
Two-tier areas  
Non-Metropolitan County Council (Upper tier)  27 
District or Borough Council (Lower tier) 201 
Total Two-Tier Authorities 228 
  
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland  
Unitary Authority (Scotland) 32 
Unitary Authority (Wales) 22 
District Council (Northern Ireland) 26 † 
Total Single Tier outside England 80 
† Since 1 April 2015, 11 single-tier districts 
The final wording of each email was identical for all organizations and is 
reproduced in Figure 4.1. At the outset of the project I spent several months designing 
a process that fully complied with the Freedom of Information Act, consulting a 
number of people with direct experience of drafting and answering FOI requests.39 In 
their discussion on the ethics of research involving Freedom of Information Act 
                                                          
39 Chris Gilson, Patrick Dunleavy and Rebecca Rumbul provided a great deal of helpful advice 
at this stage of the research. 
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requests, Savage & Hyde (2014) argue that two ethical issues may arise that researchers 
should bear in mind when designing their project. First, public authorities may fail to 
redact or delete personal data in their responses; and second, “embedded data within 
a disclosed document which may identify the producer of the document, even if 
personally identifying information on the face of the document has been redacted” 
(2014: 310). To avoid any such accidental disclosures, organizations’ FOI responses are 
not published either in individual or consolidated form: the results analyzed here 
concern the responsiveness of government bodies to my requests rather than the 
content of their replies.  
Importantly, the project involved no deception: I was clearly identified as the 
requester in both the email address and signature accompanying each request. 
However, because previous research in this field (Cuillier 2010; Michener & 
Rodriguez 2015) has shown that public bodies “can react differently according to the 
identity, or perceived identity, of requesters” (Worthy, John & Vannoni 2017: 492), 
the emails did not state that they were being sent as part of a research project because 
of the serious potential risk to the validity of a survey testing the fundamentals of 
government responsiveness to their citizens. This is an acceptable approach under the 
FOI Act which is legally “requester blind”. Modest administrative inconvenience was 
anticipated in the passage of the FOI Act in that the law allows organizations to reject 
burdensome or vexatious requests: not a single organization in the trial rejected an 
FOI request for this reason. That the two waves of requests were separated by at least 
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six months also minimized any inconvenience. Finally, I took care to phrase the 
request as clearly as possible by consulting former FOI officers, thus avoiding 
cumbersome follow-ups and making the process as straightforward as possible.   
The requests were drafted to be reasonable but sufficiently challenging, and 
needed to be equally relevant across a wide range of organizations with different 
functions and responsibilities. The questions illuminated two key features of an 
organization’s bureaucratic capacity and quality, namely asset management and 
procurement. The ability of an organization to keep track of its assets is fundamental 
to its governance; the first email therefore asked for detailed information on the 
number of laptops that had been issued to staff. The second email asked for 
information about single-bidder contracting, a “red-flag” indicator of corruption 
(Fazekas et al. 2016: 369, also Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). This request asked organizations 
to state how many contracts had been put out for tender and how many were awarded 
after a process in which only one contractor submitted a bid. To test data retention 
quality, both emails asked for the most recent year available at the time of the trial 
(2013) and for older data (2010). 
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Figure 4.1: Sample Emails 
 
Subject: Freedom of Information Request 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Under the Freedom of Information Act I would like to request the following information 
about the distribution of laptops to staff:  
 
Could you please provide me with the total number of laptops owned by your organisation 
that were registered to and/or in the possession of staff members (whether directly employed 
by your organisation or otherwise) on the following two dates: 
 
a) 1 May 2010 (or nearest available date – please specify), and  
 
b) 1 May 2013 (or nearest available date – please specify). 
 
I would prefer to receive this information electronically as a reply to this email. 
 
 
Subject: Freedom of Information Request 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Under the Freedom of Information Act I would like to request the following information 
about the issuance of contracts:  
 
1. Could you please provide me with the total number of contracts put out for tender by your 
organisation during the following two periods:  
 
a) January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010 (or the nearest available 12-month period – please 
specify), and 
 
b) January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013 (or the nearest available 12-month period – please 
specify) 
 
2. For each of these two periods, please state how many of these contracts were awarded 
after a tendering process in which only one contractor submitted a bid. 
 
I would prefer to receive this information electronically as a reply to this email. 
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Because I anticipated receiving large volumes of data, I set up two Gmail 
accounts under my own name to receive responses from the requested organizations 
(see Savage & Hyde 2014). The wording of each email was tested using a small trial 
sample including universities, fire authorities and police forces that were not on the 
list of recipients. The first email concerning asset management was sent to 849 public 
bodies between 28 February 2014 and 7 March 2014.  Due to the UK Government’s 
abolition of regional probation trusts on 31 March 2014 (between the two waves of 
FOIs), 812 bodies received the second FOI between 19 August 2014 and 8 October 
2014. The subject of both emails was clearly stated as “Freedom of Information 
Request”. I used responses to these two requests to create two large cross-sectional 
datasets constructed from observations of public bodies’ responsiveness at 
approximately the same point of time (or where any incidental differences in time 
would be ignored). Combining these two datasets into one by coding organizations’ 
responses using standardized metrics would permit investigation of any variation 
between the two trials and allow me to create composite measures for the two trials 
together. 
 
4.4.2 CODING PROCEDURE 
After emailing the FOI request to each public body, I logged the timing and content 
of each response and replied to any requests for clarification. Although coding 
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responses to FOI requests can pose challenges to researchers, the requests deliberately 
asked for numerical data (such as the number of single-bidder contracts) that would 
be suitable for coding. I logged the timing and content of each reply, including the 
date on which the organization acknowledged and replied to the request, whether 
they provided precise or approximated information, and whether the information 
related to the specific dates or time period requested. I also recorded any additional 
relevant qualitative information provided by the responder. There is no legal 
requirement for respondents to acknowledge receipt of FOI requests; however, 641 
out of 849 public bodies (76%) acknowledged the first email and 627 of 811 (77%) the 
second, a consistent performance between both waves. I sent each email to the 
organization’s named point of first customer contact, for example, 
reception@ceredigion.gov.uk. Where no first contact address was listed, or if emails 
were returned to sender, I redirected requests to the organization’s FOI team, for 
example freedomofinformation@darlington.gov.uk.  
There was significant variation in the administration of requests between 
organizations. Several wrote back to an incorrect email address. One English district 
council attached unrelated taxi invoices to its acknowledgement. Others used two 
separate replies but gave different answers to the same question in each response.40 
Despite evidence from Scotland that that councils rarely keep cost records (Cherry & 
                                                          
40 Unless an organization’s second reply indicated that additional material was being provided 
to supplement or to correct an earlier response, only the first response was coded. 
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McMenemy 2013), excessive cost was the most common exemption claimed for 
refusal, with one central ministerial department estimating that a complete response 
to the first FOI email would “incur a cost of around £125,000”. Others reported an 
arbitrary cost of replying even when refusing the request, for example: “Information 
not held. For your information this request has cost the Council £18.75 to process.” 
Organizations frequently self-reported an incorrect 20-working day deadline by 
which they would respond, or gave an incorrect date on which they had received the 
email.  
 
4.4.3 RESPONSE VARIABLES 
Two variables of interest were constructed from the database to measure the 
timeliness and overall response quality. 
Timeliness: The first measure, a binary variable, assesses the timeliness of an 
organization’s two responses, based on the number of days that it took an organization 
to respond. I score the organization one if both responses were received within the 
20-working day statutory period, and zero otherwise. 
Quality: The second score gauges the quality of the two responses. For the first email, 
I assign a score of one (and zero otherwise) for each of the following: the date the data 
refer to was exactly correct for 2010; the date the data refer to was exactly correct for 
2013; the number of laptops had been exactly stated for 2010; and the number of 
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laptops had been exactly stated for 2013. Organizations that did not provide a 
response, or where a response was received late, scored zero. An answer providing the 
correct date and the exact number of laptops for both years and within the statutory 
deadline receives a maximum score of four. I then standardize this measure to range 
from zero to one.  
For the second email, I assign a score of one (and zero otherwise) for each of 
the following: the total number of contracts was specified for 2010; the total number 
of contracts was specified for 2013; the total number of single-bidder contracts was 
specified for 2010; the total number of single-bidder contracts was specified for 2013; 
the 2010 information related to the 12-month date range which had been requested; 
and the 2013 information related to the 12-month date range which had been 
requested. Thus the maximum possible score is six, and again, this measure is 
standardized to range from zero to one. I obtain a composite measure of the quality of 
an organization’s responses by taking the average score for each question.  
 
4.4.4. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  
For Hypothesis H1, which investigates whether central bodies perform better 
than local government bodies, I create a dummy variable for local and central-tier 
organizations and regress these dummies on the composite measures of timeliness and 
quality.  
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Hypothesis H2 anticipates improved responsiveness to be associated with 
greater capacity. As outlined in section 4.3.2., both a broader and more granular 
approach can be used to operationalize this hypothesis. At the broader level, I create 
dummy variables for local government bodies in England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. Because of smaller grant cuts to local government budgets, Scottish 
and Welsh councils should be more responsive to FOI requests than those in England. 
The more granular method uses UK government data41 to create two continuous 
variables representing the log of each English council’s reported budget for central 
services (‘back-office’ functions) in 2014-15 and the percentage change in each 
council’s budget between 2010-11 and 2014-15. 
Hypothesis H3, which expects responsiveness to be positively correlated with 
‘new politics’ institutions oriented towards openness, is even more challenging to 
investigate with quantitative data. To establish whether there is any evidence for the 
theorized variations in outcomes, I create dummies for ‘new politics’ institutions 
(Wales and particularly Scotland) against a dummy for ‘consociationalism/conflict 
                                                          
41 2010-11 data: Local authority revenue expenditure and financing England: 2010 to 2011 
Individual local authority data. Published 9 December 2010. Revenue Account (RA) budget 
2010-11. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/local-authority-revenue-expenditure-
and-financing-england-2010-to-2011-individual-local-authority-data--6  
 
2014-15 data: Local authority revenue expenditure and financing England: 2014 to 2015 
Individual local authority data. Published 23 July 2014, Last updated 22 October 2014. 
Department for Communities and Local Government. Revenue Account (RA) budget 2014-
15  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/local-authority-revenue-expenditure-and-
financing-england-2014-to-2015-individual-local-authority-data 
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resolution’ institutions (Northern Ireland). Importantly, this approach cannot directly 
distinguish between the hypothetical ‘openness’ characteristics of Scotland and Wales 
or ‘conflict-resolving’ nature of Northern Ireland: differences could instead be 
attributed to local factors other than foundational motives. While there is no 
straightforward quantitative resolution, the research design exploits the significant 
foundational variations between the UK’s various government bodies and evidence 
from contemporary politics identified in the discussion of hypothesis H3 and the 
results.  
In addition to the main explanatory variables of interest, sufficient data exists 
for local government bodies to examine a number of other socio-economic and 
political variables identified elsewhere in the FOI literature.  
Certain socio-economic factors such as fiscal deficits and debt levels are 
unsuitable here because UK councils cannot incur such deficits. But other measures 
including population size (e.g. Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya 2007) and real per capita 
incomes (e.g. Alt, Lassen & Rose 2006, Piotrowski & Van Ryzin 2007) are added to 
the model and reported as Log Population and Log Gross Value Added per Head for 
each local government area.42 These models exclude the City of London Corporation 
because of this area’s extremely high GVA and extremely low resident population. 
                                                          
42 See Guillamón et al. 2011 for a summary of socioeconomic influences. 
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To test party control (e.g. Piotrowski & Van Ryzin 2007, Guillamón, Bastida 
& Benito 2011), I include a dummy of the largest political party on the council, and 
to test political competitiveness (e.g. Piotrowski 2011, Worthy 2013), I use a large 
dataset of local government election results between 1999-00 and 2014-1543 to create 
a continuous variable representing the Effective Number of Parties (Laakso & 
Taagepera 1979)44 represented on the council. I use a multi-year average because the 
period 2010-15 was associated with an “electoral meltdown” (Cutts & Russell 2015: 
70, 72) in local representation by Liberal Democrat councillors in which a previously 
very-competitive party at local level lost more than 1,300 council seats. This 
precipitous decline created apparently uncompetitive councils in areas that had been 
politically competitive for more than a decade. Rather than an unreliable snapshot of 
party representation during the year in which the survey was undertaken, I therefore 
show competitiveness as the mean average ENP for each council over the 16 years 
available.45  
 
                                                          
43 I am grateful for the assistance of Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher in providing access 
to this data. 
44 The Effective Number of Parties represented on the council is computed by the formula: =
 
1
∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 , where 𝑁 the number of parties with at least one council seat and 𝑝𝑖
2 is the square of 
each party’s proportion of all seats on the council.  
45 Note that in the UK is not possible to test the percentage of voter abstention as a factor 
influencing transparency as found elsewhere (see Esteller-Moré & Polo Otero 2012) because 
some elections are coterminous with UK General Elections or devolved government elections 
which significantly (and artificially) inflate local turnout, and some councils elect by thirds. 
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5. RESULTS  
4.5.1 DESCRIPTIVE MEANS  
Before statistically analyzing variation in the timeliness and quality of UK public 
bodies’ FOI responses for each hypothesis outlined above, I first illustrate descriptive 
means for both composite measures. Timeliness scores are shown in Figure 4.2, 
disaggregated into three charts each showing various combinations of the tiers and 
territories of the UK. Just over half of the public bodies (418 out of 812, or 51%) 
responded to both emails within the statutory deadline, a response rate that while 
poor, exceeds those of prior studies (Cuillier 2010; Michener & Rodriguez 2015; 
Worthy, John & Vanonni 2017).  
Figure 4.2 Timeliness of Responses 
Note: Organizations responding to both emails within the statutory deadline. I calculate the 
average timeliness of responses by public bodies across levels of government (n = 812), local 
governments (n = 434) and three devolved governments (n = 181). An organization scores one 
if both responses were received within the 20-working day statutory period, and zero 
otherwise. Each bar represents the average for the public bodies in the relevant category. The 
grey dashed lines indicate the mean for the relevant sample. 
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Examining Figure 4.2, chart (a) appears to show some variation across the 
three levels of government, with local government slightly below the average, 
devolved government slightly above the average, and central government bodies close 
to it. Devolved government bodies are most timely in their responses, with 59% 
answering both emails on time. Chart (b) shows local government variation between 
the UK’s territories, with Northern Ireland councils performing well below average, 
English councils close to it, and Scottish and Welsh councils better than average. 
Chart (c), corresponding to the expected direction of effects in Hypothesis H3, shows 
substantial differences between the devolved territories: 75% of public bodies in 
Scotland always respond by the deadline, 63% in Wales, and only 40% in Northern 
Ireland. 
Figure 4.3 shows variation in the quality of responses across the tiers and 
territories of the UK. Just 101 of 812 public bodies (12%) contacted in both waves 
provided exactly the information asked for in both emails and on time; 175 (22%) did 
not provide any accurate information by the deadline. The average quality score is 
46%, indicating that less than half of the required information was received by the 
deadline. Overall, patterns in Figure 4.3 are very similar as those in Figure 4.2, and 
the correlation between the two measures is .66.  
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Figure 4.3 Quality of Responses 
Note: The quality of public bodies’ replies to two Freedom of Information requests. Each 
organization’s reply is given a score for quality (see section 4.4.3 for the scoring criteria) which 
is then standardized to range from zero to one. I take the average score for each FOI request 
to obtain a composite measure of the quality of each organization’s replies. Each bar represents 
the average for the public bodies in the relevant category and the grey dashed lines indicate 
the mean for the relevant sample.  
 
4.5.2 STATISTICAL MODELLING  
I next investigate these patterns via statistical modelling, taking each hypothesis in 
turn. While fiscal federalism and an albeit-limited evidence base from FOI theory 
expect local governments to be more responsive than the center, Hypothesis H1 
proposed that a countervailing accountability influence on public bodies might result 
in improved responsiveness at the central level. Using Probit regression for the binary 
variable (timeliness) and a linear model for the continuous variable (quality), Table 
4.3 summarizes the relationships between the central and local tiers (the devolved tier 
is also shown but not analyzed until the discussion of Hypothesis H3). Model 3A 
shows timeliness and model 3B quality; local government is the reference category. 
0 1
Quality of responses
Devolved
Central
Local
(a) Levels of government
0 1
Quality of responses
Scotland
Northern Ireland
Wales
England
(b) Local govt by UK Territory
0 1
Quality of responses
Scotland
Wales
Northern Ireland
(c) Devolved government
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These results find no evidence to support fiscal federalism/FOI theory or the 
alternative proposed by Hypothesis H1; instead, central government performance for 
both the timeliness and quality measures is not different from local government at 
any conventional level of significance.  
Table 4.3 Responsiveness Measures for Devolved and Central Tiers versus Local Tiers 
 
Timeliness  
(3A) 
Quality 
(3B) 
Devolved 0.112*** 0.125*** 
 (0.044) (0.03) 
Central 0.057 0.024 
 (0.043) (0.028) 
Constant  0.424 
  (0.015) 
   
Model  Probit OLS 
Observations 812 812 
R-Squared 0.03 0.023 
Notes: (i) Probit results for model 3A were converted to marginal effects using Hanmer and 
Kalkan’s (2013) ‘Observed Values’ method: the figures in this column are not coefficients. 
The Observed Values method holds each of the explanatory variables other than the 
variable of interest at their observed values for each observation in the data, calculates the 
marginal effect for each of these observations, then takes the mean average over all of these 
cases. (ii) The reference category comprises local government bodies across the UK. (iii) 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (iv) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
 
To corroborate this rejection of hypothesis H1, Table 4.4 tests for any 
territory-specific effects in the central-local relationship by disaggregating the 
coefficients and marginal effects into associations for local government bodies in each 
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of the four territories of UK. Model 4A shows timeliness and model 4B quality; UK 
central government bodies are the reference category. In general there is no 
difference, except that Northern Ireland councils are less likely to always respond at 
time, significant at the 5 percent level. Although English councils are less responsive 
than UK central bodies, this association is of small magnitude and just outside 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level. Except for Northern Ireland, this 
evidence again rejects both traditional assumptions about local government 
responsiveness and the alterative hypothesis that favored central government bodies. 
Table 4.4: Local Government responsiveness across the 4 UK territories versus 
Central Tier bodies 
 
Timeliness  
(4A) 
Quality 
(4B) 
Scottish Local Government 0.928 0.038 
 (0.095) (0.059) 
Welsh Local Government 0.058 -0.026 
 (0.112) (0.064) 
Northern Ireland Local Government -0.275** -0.023 
 (0.108) (0.067) 
English Local Government -0.062 -0.030 
 (0.044) (0.029) 
   
Model  Probit OLS 
Observations 630 630 
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.012 0.004 
Notes: (i) Probit results as Table 4.3 (ii) The reference category comprises central 
government bodies. (iii) The Greater London Authority is classified as part of English local 
government. 
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I next consider hypothesis H2 and the role of capacity in influencing 
responsiveness. As discussed in section 4.2.3, there are a large number of possible 
proxies for capacity and Tables 4.5 and 4.6 consider three of these for the timeliness 
and quality measures respectively. The first three territory dummies in each table 
represent a broader measure, namely smaller cuts to local government budgets 
between 2010-11 and 2014-15 in Scotland and Wales compared with England. The 
next two continuous proxy variables represent the narrower measure that uses local 
government financial resource data for 353 local governments in England. These 
represent the percentage change in the body’s central services budget between 2010-
11 and 2014-15 (models 5B and 6B), and the log of the body’s total budget for central 
services (‘back-office’ functions) in 2014-15 (models 5C and 6C). 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 also include additional socio-economic and political 
variables that might influence government responsiveness as outlined in section 4. 
Models D-G in both tables assess the timeliness and quality scores against 
LogPopulation and LogGVA; party political control (dummies for Labour and 
Conservative); and for English councils, the average Effective Number of Parties 
represented on the council over 16 years (as a proxy for political competitiveness). 
Model 5H and 6H presents the full model.46. 
                                                          
46 Because the party control variables have no relevance in the Northern Ireland party system, 
the Northern Ireland dummy is excluded from these models. 
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Table 4.5: Local Government Responsiveness to FOI Requests – Average Marginal Effects from a Probit regression (Timeliness Measure) 
 Timeliness 
(5A) 
Timeliness 
(5B) 
Timeliness 
(5C) 
Timeliness 
(5D) 
Timeliness 
(5E) 
Timeliness 
(5F) 
Timeliness 
(5G) 
Timeliness 
(5H) 
Explanatory Variable         
Scotland Locals 0.154*    0.156* 0.199**  0.203** 
 (0.091)    (0.090) (0.096)  (0.096) 
Wales Locals 0.119    0.101 0.145  0.133 
 (0.109)    (0.112) (0.119)  (0.121) 
NI Locals -0.212**    -0.185* -0.084   
 (0.105)    (0.111) (0.140)   
Capacity: % Change in Central 
Services budget, England only 
 0.052   
(0.078) 
  
 
  
 
Capacity: Log Central Services 
budget, £, 2014, England only 
  0.048   
(0.034) 
     
Log Population    0.167** 0.063*   0.047 
 
   (0.080) (0.032)   (0.035) 
Log GVA     -0.103   -0.098 
 
    (0.074)   (0.075) 
Labour      0.149  0.124 
 
     (0.097)  (0.099) 
Conservatives      0.124  0.124 
 
     (0.100)  (0.100) 
Effective Number of Parties 
(16-yr Average, England only) 
      -0.017  
(0.061) 
 
         
         
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.001 0.004 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.0002 0.02 
Number of Observations (iv) 433 353 353 433 433 433 353 407 
Notes: (i) Probit results as Table 4.3. (ii) The reference category comprises local government bodies in England.  (iii) Delta-method Standard Errors in 
Parentheses, *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. (iv) City of London Corporation is removed from models. 
  
Table 4.6: Local Government Responsiveness to FOI Requests – Coefficients from an OLS regression (Quality Measure) 
 Quality 
(6A) 
Quality 
(6B) 
Quality 
(6C) 
Quality 
(6D) 
Quality 
(6E) 
Quality 
(6F) 
Quality 
(6G) 
Quality 
(6H) 
Scotland Locals 0.070    0.051 0.100*  0.082 
 (0.057)    (0.059) (0.059)  (0.061) 
Wales Locals 0.005    -0.029 0.132  -0.005 
 (0.061)    (0.062) (0.065)  (0.067) 
NI Locals 0.009    -0.045 0.070   
 (0.065)    (0.073) (0.085)   
Capacity: % Change in Central 
Services budget, England only 
 0.043  
(0.046) 
  
 
  
 
Capacity: Log Central Services 
budget, £, 2014, England only 
  -0.027   
(0.654) 
     
Log Population     -0.024   -0.031 
 
    (0.021)   (0.021) 
Log GVA    -0.090** -0.087*   -0.097** 
 
   (0.042) (0.045)   (0.045) 
Labour      0.049  0.067 
 
     (0.060)  (0.061) 
Conservatives      0.073  0.084 
 
     (0.061)  (0.061) 
Effective Number of Parties 
(16-yr Average, England only) 
      -0.025  
(0.038) 
 
         
Constant 0.417*** 0.417*** 0.655*** 1.326*** 1.579*** 0.356*** 0.472*** 1.690*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.193) (0.421) (0.492) (0.057) (0.085) (0.478) 
R-squared 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.001 0.02 
Number of Observations (iv) 433 353 353 433 433 433 353 407 
Notes: (ii) The reference category comprises local government bodies in England.  (ii) Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses, *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
(iii) City of London Corporation is removed from models. 
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Models 5A and 6A show results for local government responsiveness in the 
four territories of the UK without controls. Although territory does not explain the 
quality of an organization’s responses (model 6A), for the timeliness score (model 5A) 
Scottish councils were 15 percentage points more likely to always respond on time 
than English councils (significant at the 10 percent level), and Northern Ireland 
councils 21 percentage points less likely to respond on time than English councils 
(significant at the 5 percent level). That Scottish councils perform better is consistent 
with the ordering predicted for hypothesis H2. The coefficient for Welsh councils is 
positive relative to English councils, although the relationship does not reach 
conventional levels of significance. 
In contrast, the more granular measures of capacity (models 5B, 5C, 6B and 
6C) are not associated with improved government responsiveness, providing evidence 
against Hypothesis H2. For the timeliness measure (Table 4.5), a larger log population 
is associated with greater local government responsiveness at the 5% level as a 
standalone variable (model 5C), although the strength of this association just slips out 
of significance in the full model 5H. In Table 4.6, population has no association with 
the quality of a response, but Log GVA has a small (negative) effect at the 5 percent 
level as a standalone variable (model 6C) and in the full model (6H), indicating that 
higher area incomes are associated with lower quality responses. In contrast with 
timeliness, neither territory nor socioeconomic factors have explanatory purchase for 
quality scores. None of the political variables shown in models 5F, 5G, 6F and 6G are 
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significant.47 Perhaps unexpectedly, as with Hypothesis H1 and at least at the granular 
level, statistical modelling therefore does not corroborate hypothesis H2 that 
governments subject to greater capacity challenges will be less responsive to FOI 
requests.  
A final hypothesis, H3, anticipated that ‘new politics’ intermediate-tier 
institutions in Scotland and Wales founded as part of a broad constitutional reform 
program would outperform Northern Ireland’s conflict-resolving institutions that 
are lineal descendants of an older, more secretive government apparatus. Returning 
to Table 4.3, there is strong empirical evidence that territory matters: the top row 
corroborates the descriptive means in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Devolved governments 
and their agencies are 11 percent more likely to respond on time and have a 13 
percent higher quality score than UK local governments, both significant at the 1 
percent level.  
Table 4.7 disaggregates this combined devolved-tier effect into separate 
results for Scotland and Wales; Northern Ireland is the reference category. These 
findings are stark: the Scottish Government and its agencies are 34 percent more 
likely to respond on time and have a 20 percent higher quality score than their 
Northern Ireland counterparts, both significant at the 1 percent level. Although 
                                                          
47 For the timeliness measure, Labour and Conservative as standalone variables are both 
positive; in fact, the Labour dummy significant at the 5% level. But this is a Northern Ireland 
party system effect: once NI is included as a control variable the association vanishes 
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there is no difference in quality, Wales’ devolved bodies are 21 percent more likely 
to respond on time, significant at the 5 percent level and again in the direction 
anticipated by hypothesis H3. 
Table 4.7: Responsiveness by Devolved-Tier Bodies in the UK 
 
Timeliness  
(7A) 
Quality 
(7B) 
Scotland Devolved 0.335*** 0.203*** 
 (0.063) (0.058) 
Wales Devolved 0.205** -0.087 
 (0.092) (0.075) 
   
Model  Probit OLS 
Observations 182 182 
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.08 0.07 
Notes: (i) Probit results as Table 4.3.  
 
A note of caution is required here because the very low R-squared results 
reported here indicate very significant unexplained variance. Such omitted variables 
may include certain organizational characteristics that cannot be captured in 
quantitative data, and randomness at the level of the individual responder to the FOI 
request (as Piotrowski & Van Ryzin 2007: 321). The presence of this significant 
randomness appears to corroborate recent behavioralism research that is seeking to 
explain why outcomes from most-similar organizations can yield quite dissimilar 
outcomes (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). Not only organizations’ political or 
bureaucratic leadership, but the individual officers tasked with responding to FOI 
requests may differ in their personal partisanship, cognitive biases (such as being 
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personally pro- or anti-transparency), have greater or lesser experience with FOI, 
and be more or less able to process a large number of requests. Such individual-level 
heterogeneity implies that a large amount of individual variation must be expected 
in understanding institutional responsiveness.  
Nevertheless, the strength of the devolved coefficients and marginal effects 
in Tables 4.3 and 4.7 suggests that hypothesis H3 appears a closer explanation of 
performance across the UK’s territories than administrative capacity constraints or 
intergovernmental forms of accountability derived from agency oversight theory. 
While quantitative data is unsuitable for direct tests of institutional culture, there are 
a number of contemporary cues suggesting that such influences may affect the 
markedly different findings between Northern Ireland and Scotland. In 2015, the 
Northern Ireland Department of Finance and Personnel was served with the first 
Enforcement notice of its type by the Information Commissioner’s Office,48 and a 
series of media reports from this period suggest a climate of non-transparency 
permeating from the very top of the department: 
“[The Department of Finance and Personnel] censured for refusal to answer 
FoI requests” (Belfast News Letter, 2 February 2015) 
                                                          
48 The ICO resorted to its “regulatory powers and in June served an enforcement notice on the 
Department of Finance and Personnel Northern Ireland, requiring it to respond to four 
significantly overdue requests” (ICO Annual Report 2015-16: 25) 
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“Stormont department ignored FoI request for almost four years” (Belfast 
News Letter, 9 June 2015) 
“Alarm over Stormont special advisors vetting FOI requests” (Irish News, 1 
September 2016) 
“Stormont admits: We’re now massively less transparent than under direct 
rule” (Belfast News Letter, 20 June 2015).  
In contrast, in 2016, the Scottish Government became one of the 15 founding 
subnational government participants of the Open Government Partnership (OGP 
2016). Importantly, Northern Ireland’s poorer responsiveness cannot be explained 
by a different regulatory environment or a weaker capacity for public responses than 
the other devolved governments. Northern Ireland has the same legal Freedom of 
Information arrangements as England and Wales, and despite a smaller population, 
and 55 press officers were employed by the Northern Ireland Executive in 2016, 
compared with 45 by the Scottish Government, 21 by the Welsh Government and 
54 by the Republic of Ireland government (Irish News, 23 September 2016).  
Secondary evidence of the importance of institutional histories can be 
derived from the equally poor performance by Northern Ireland’s local councils for 
the timeliness measure. In section 4.3.3., I argue that characteristics of local 
government in the province – in particular sectarian partisan competition and 
historic discrimination by some councils in employment and housing – is directly 
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connected with Northern Ireland’s history of conflict. That Table 4.4 shows 
Northern Ireland’s councils to be significantly (and uniquely) less timely in their 
responsiveness than their counterparts elsewhere again points to the importance of 
post-conflict sectarian political competition in subsequent responsiveness. FOIs 
submitted to local councils are directly associated with post-conflict sensitivities 
because of their capacity to reveal information that could (in a local council’s view) 
undermine that organization’s authority with respect to one side of the 
nationalist/unionist divide.  
If markedly different responsiveness both between- and within- the tiers of 
government in the UK is reflective of individual- and organizational cultural biases 
with respect to openness, this is an important result for the government 
administration literature that would open up a research agenda where new 
hypotheses could be developed and tested with qualitative methods. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Does decentralization improve the responsiveness of governments to their citizens? 
This deceptively simple question has motivated hundreds of articles and policy papers, 
inspired transparency-enhancing constitutional reform programs in OECD countries, 
and perhaps most significantly, encouraged advocacy by international organizations 
that decentralization can improve government accountability and control corruption. 
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These optimistic prescriptions of early theory had, by the mid-1990s, helped foster a 
broad consensus that decentralization was associated with efficiency gains for the 
public and government institutions alike. But despite copious academic output, the 
difficulty of defining and measuring concepts such as accountability and 
responsiveness, and how these might vary under different decentralization regimes, 
meant that empirical evidence for the assumed connections between decentralization 
and responsiveness has been wanting.  
To investigate these longstanding theories that have been hard to substantiate, 
I take advantage of the UK’s comprehensive FOI legislation and intermediate-tier 
governments established for entirely different foundational motives to undertake an 
innovative large-N research design. Sending two waves of FOI requests to a universe 
of 812 UK public bodies with an executive function, I construct two objective 
measures of the timeliness and quality of an organization’s responses from a large 
database.  
In contrast with prevailing expectations, I hypothesize that responses to 
citizen FOI requests might instead be influenced by three countervailing factors: 
Ministerial principals and FOI enforcers may have more credibility in containing 
central government agencies’ incentives to shirk from full compliance than for local 
government bodies; administrative capacity constraints may prevent local bodies from 
being as responsive as assumed in theory; and institutions established as part of a 
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transparency-enhancing constitutional reform program may be more responsive than 
government bodies with longer institutional histories or those designed to achieve 
conflict resolution. I also test a number of additional socio-economic and political 
variables highlighted elsewhere, namely population, area incomes, party control and 
political competitiveness.  
Extensive statistical analysis does not corroborate the theorized associations 
between responsiveness and most of these correlates, excepting limited evidence for 
population (with respect to the timeliness measure) and area incomes (quality 
measure), and stronger evidence for the importance of within-tier variation with 
respect to institutional openness (hypothesis H3). The models also report a very high 
degree of randomness, perhaps caused by individual-level heterogeneity in FOI 
respondents. This heterogeneity may be associated with the cognitive biases and 
experiences of individual responders (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017), or hidden practices 
to circumvent and minimize the impact of FOI legislation that are extremely difficult 
to identify because they are informal and “may be actively denied by governments” 
(Roberts 2005: 19). 
Apart from individual heterogeneity, the best fit in the statistical modelling 
appears to be the third hypothesis which drew attention to the importance of 
foundational underpinnings in inclining institutions towards – or away from – greater 
openness. There is substantial within-tier variation between the UK’s devolved 
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governments: Scottish bodies performed significantly better than their counterparts 
in Northern Ireland where transparency concerns are subsumed within an 
architecture in which conflict resolution is the primary objective. Although 
evidenced by large coefficients and marginal effects in the expected direction and a 
number of indications from contemporary FOI developments in Northern Ireland, 
this hypothesis cannot be definitively confirmed because cultural biases such as these 
cannot be directly measured by large-N quantitative data. Additional qualitative work 
would be required to corroborate the connections between institutional cultures and 
responsiveness as developed in this chapter. 
Of course, other explanations are possible. The analysis found substantial 
unexplained variance that suggests omitted explanatory variables, and Northern 
Ireland’s local government indicators improved between the timeliness and quality 
scores. There is also little difference between the tiers for the quality measure in 
general. This study also did not consider whether the volume of FOI requests in a 
given year may affect an organization’s performance.  
But that such a comprehensive research design could not find evidence of the 
theorized correlates of anticipated responsiveness poses a significant challenge to the 
fiscal federalism and emerging FOI literatures. Far from an incidental side benefit, the 
assumed connections between accountability, transparency and responsiveness and 
decentralized forms of government are “central to the motivations of real world 
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reformers” (Faguet 2014: 2). To investigate these assertions this chapter employed a 
research design that drew from the UK’s comprehensive FOI legislation and 
significant institutional variation to measure the responsiveness of more than 800 
public bodies across three tiers of government. Given that it is hard to imagine an 
alternative design that would allow these claims to be tested in an equally-replicable 
manner, this absence of empirical confirmation poses a serious challenge to the more 
fundamental claims about decentralization that have informed both academic debate 
and real-world practice. 
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5 
 
Critical discussion and conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
Here we may observe, at close quarters, the interaction of institutions, 
individuals and ideas – and before time has encrusted the habits, traditions 
and accepted wisdoms characteristic of more mature (and typically more 
stagnant) political systems. 
 
Richard Wyn Jones & Roger Scully 2011: 155 
 
Two decades after the arrival of a ‘new wave’ of more skeptical and empirically-
anchored academic contributions in the comparative literature, any proposition that 
decentralization might somehow be associated with unidirectional positive outcomes 
has long since been disproven. Such is the weight of theoretical and empirical 
evidence rejecting an unambiguous ‘devolution dividend’ that attention has instead 
shifted to the incentive structures that make the positive outcomes claimed for 
decentralized government in theory more likely to be observed in practice.   
The introduction to this thesis began by firmly locating its three core papers 
within the political economy literature in the broader discipline, and in the ‘second 
generation’ of contributions in the field of federalism and decentralization. With 
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Western Europe argued to be the ‘epicenter’ of the global decentralizing tendency 
(Russell 2005), I posited that Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom would 
constitute an ideal venue to test the theoretical and empirical questions of 
decentralization that would be the subject of this thesis. All four countries in this set 
are subject not only to intense center-periphery competition between the tiers of 
government that has triggered constitution-reshaping political reforms, but are also 
subject to considerable variation in the extent to which regional populaces in each 
country are oriented towards the pursuit of collective goals at the regional level 
(Jeffrey 2012). The United Kingdom in particular offered an ideal test of two 
important questions. In considering whether different electoral systems encourage 
reelection-seeking members to behave differently in legislatures, the two mixed-
member legislatures of Scotland and Wales offered a crucial source of variation in the 
operation of electoral rules, contributing new insights from regional case studies to 
explore persistent questions that are usually tested at the national level. And the UK’s 
comprehensive Freedom of Information regime facilitated investigation of the factors 
associated with variation in the responsiveness of governments across the tiers of 
decentralizing states. In considering these research questions, this thesis rejected the 
validity of a single methodological approach and instead opted to employ the most 
suitable method available in each of its three core chapters to investigate practical 
empirical problems in multi-tiered states.  
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Harnessing political economy and new institutionalist approaches employed 
to great effect elsewhere in this field, the three core chapters of this thesis all found 
that context specificity originating from institutional variation and the diverse 
cultural and historical underpinnings of a given country systematically influence the 
direction, magnitude and very presence of the outcomes expected from 
decentralization theory. But aside from corroborating the merit of an institutionalist 
approach that has long since been distilled into the axiom that “institutions matter”, 
this thesis makes a number of new and substantive contributions to academic 
understanding. 
Each subsection of this final chapter re-emphasizes these contributions to the 
discipline. I then comment on the policy implications and external validity of my 
findings and the methodologies used in this thesis, and suggest potential avenues for 
future research.  
 
5.1 REJECTING ‘METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM’ IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The three core chapters of this thesis add substantial evidence corroborating recent 
work that rejects ‘methodological nationalism’, or the state as the sole unit of 
analytical interest in political science (Jeffrey & Wincott 2010). Chapter 2 
characterized the unexpected tax policy stalemate after fiscal decentralization as an 
equilibrium institution, emerging from intense competition between political elites at 
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the central and regional tiers of government. And in the UK’s far-reaching devolution 
of national executive power to regional governments and legislatures, Chapter 3 found 
an ideal test of institutional incentives on political actors operating in mixed-member 
systems. Because MMP had not replaced a previous voting system to elect the Scottish 
Parliament or National Assembly for Wales, I posited that member behavior should 
be less likely to be subject to ‘hangover effects’ (Crisp 2007) from the operation of 
prior electoral rules. Finally, in considering the burgeoning literature on government 
responsiveness and Quality of Government indicators, Chapter 4 found that 
governance scores drawn from studies of central governments or entire countries as a 
whole are of limited use. Patterns of responses to 812 FOI requests found significant 
variation in the performance of public bodies operating at the three tiers of 
government in the UK. Here, I argued that single-country analyses fatally neglect vital 
inter-tier incentives affecting bureaucratic performance, such as principal-agent 
dynamics from top-down accountability mechanisms, differentiated administrative 
capacity constraints faced by the different tiers, and the fact that institutions at any 
tier that were founded during the open-government era may be more inclined 
towards openness than bodies with longer histories of operating during periods in 
which transparency concerns were far less prominent. 
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5.2 ‘WITHIN-TIER’ VARIATION AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT AS ‘BETWEEN-TIER’ 
VARIATION IN DECENTRALIZING STATES 
But at least as important as this between-tier variation in outcomes between the tiers 
of government in multi-level states, this thesis draws attention to the critical 
importance of within-tier variation in explaining outcomes under decentralization. 
All three core chapters strongly corroborate and contribute to emerging evidence of 
stark within-country diversity, such as the European Regional Quality of Governance 
Index (Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo 2015). This finding will be of substantial 
importance to several parallel debates.  
In analyzing the tax changes in the decentralizing states of Western Europe, 
Chapter 2 found that distinguishing regions according to the strength of their regional 
identities (Henderson et al. 2013) and regional political elites’ ability to orient the 
local populace towards collective goals at the regional level (Jeffrey 2012) is essential 
in explaining outcomes. Far from being among the most likely to modify tax rates and 
brackets, the most ‘autonomist’ regions of a state are not prominent tax innovators 
after fiscal devolution. This chapter finds that ‘centralist’ areas with little regionalist 
sentiment or history of self-government such as Brussels-Capital, Madrid and Lazio 
made wider use of their new powers than their ‘autonomist’ counterparts such as 
Flanders, Catalonia and Veneto after tax devolution. I theorize this surprising 
outcome as a consequence of the different motivations of political actors in these 
different classifications of regions. Whereas ‘centralist’ regional elites may seek to use 
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their new powers to engage in tax competition (especially by right-leaning 
administrations) or to respond to budget pressures as anticipated by traditional theory, 
‘autonomist’ regional elites are influenced by competing incentives. Avoiding 
proactive use of income tax powers allows autonomist political actors to continue an 
electorally-successful ‘champion of the region against the center’ strategy and 
involves far less jeopardy for their long-term nation-building objectives.  
Investigating enduring claims that more proximate tiers of government should 
be more responsive to their citizens, Chapter 4 finds not only significant variation in 
responses to FOI requests across the different tiers of government in the United 
Kingdom, but that patterns of responsiveness vary dramatically between the 
territories of the state. I argue that researchers must remain alert to inter-regional 
variation in foundational underpinnings of institutions that may incline actors 
working in such systems towards – or away from – greater openness. For example, 
identifying significant variation in patterns of FOI responses between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, I posit that institutions established as part of a transparency-
enhancing constitutional reform program (such as the Scottish Parliament) are likely 
to be significantly more responsive than bodies designed to achieve conflict resolution 
(as in Northern Ireland). 
Finally, Chapter 3 explicitly draws on institutional variation in electoral rules 
between the two devolved legislatures of Scotland and Wales in an identification 
strategy to test a hypothesis that dual candidacy in mixed-member systems should 
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blunt the incentives for members to ‘specialize’ in their legislative activities as List or 
SMD members. But while there is evidence that PR members have a higher committee 
workload, the major theorized connections between committees and members’ re-
election interests (and the theorized consequences of dual candidacy restrictions) 
were not found. 
 
5.3 REJECTING CENTRALIZING COUNTERCLAIMS FROM ‘SECOND 
GENERATION’ THEORY  
Although all three core chapters of this thesis are rooted in the more skeptical, 
empirically-focused ‘second generation’ in the field, I also reject some of the stronger 
counterclaims derived from theoretical approaches used in the more recent literature. 
In Chapter 4, while rejecting claims from ‘first generation’ fiscal federalism that local 
governments should be more responsive to their citizens, I also reject a counterclaim 
derived from principal-agent and agency oversight theory that central agencies should 
outperform lower-tier governments. In fact, the largest differences in bureaucratic 
performance were found between the intermediate-tier governments of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. Not only does this finding once again underline the important of 
within-tier variation in explaining outcomes under decentralization, but it implies 
that an institution’s foundational underpinnings and its inclinations towards 
transparency and openness are highly significant in understanding patterns of FOI 
responsiveness. 
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5.4 LITTLE EVIDENCE OF “TWO CLASSES” OF MEMBERS IN MIXED MEMBER 
LEGISLATURES  
In relation to legislative behavior in mixed-member systems, Chapter 3 found little 
evidence of the purported existence of ‘two member types’ or, more pejoratively, ‘two 
classes’ of elected representatives that has been a common criticism of Mixed Member 
Proportional systems in New Zealand (Vowles 2005, Ward 1998) and in Scotland and 
Wales (Lundberg 2006). The major differences claimed for the committee work of 
legislators in the Bundestag - that members seek assignments that might conceivably 
aid their divergent constituency- or party- reelection interests (Stratmann & Baur 
2002) – are not found. Far from being split down the middle according to members’ 
re-election interests, committee assignments in Scotland and Wales appears to 
demonstrate marked consistency between list and constituency members; where 
behavior varies is in the larger committee workload of list members. Extending and 
corroborating other work in this field (Jun & Hix 2010, Ferrara et al. 2005, Manow 
2015), I argued that the associations between electoral system design and legislative 
behavior are far from or straightforward. I surmise that candidate selection and re-
selection rules, chamber size and party discipline both in the legislature and in the 
selection process all play very significant roles in marshalling the behavior of 
legislators in mixed-member systems. These topics would appear a fruitful avenue for 
future research. 
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5.5 EMBRACING THE CHALLENGE OF INTERMEDIATE-N  RESEARCH  
As an “increasingly-international enterprise” (Marsh & Stoker 2010: 3), the 
broadening and deepening of the political science discipline over the past few decades 
has triggered an explosion in the variety and scope of methods used to investigate a 
large and growing number of topics and cases (Marsh & Stoker 2010: 11). But meta-
analyses of the methodologies used in this voluminous academic work have repeatedly 
observed a sharp dip in the number of contributions in the discipline that consider an 
‘intermediate’ number of cases, a term encompassing a loose range between one or 
two and fewer than twenty cases (Sigelman & Gadbois 1983, Bollen et el. 1993 in 
Ragin et al. 1998). Ragin (1989, 1998) conceives this ‘lacuna’ as a U-shaped frequency 
distribution plotting the number of studies against the number of cases investigated 
in each study. Such a gap exists because intermediate numbers of cases stretch the 
practicality of qualitative methods in effectively analyzing each case in detail and do 
not provide enough data points for statistical techniques designed for large numbers 
of cases or observations.  
This thesis faced this ‘medium-N challenge’ in at least two chapters. But in 
reflecting that “studies with intermediate-sized Ns may well prove to be more relevant 
both for building a systematic knowledge of cases and for advancing theory” (Ragin 
et al. 1998: 751), I rejected any notion that empirical problems cannot be satisfactorily 
studied unless the ‘N’ of cases or observations is large enough. Instead this thesis 
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employed innovative methodologies to advance knowledge in the field and broader 
discipline in this intermediate-N range.  
Chapter 2 explicitly recognized that the small number of regions and newness 
of tax decentralization in the four western European countries limits the potential for 
large-N statistical analysis. Rather than rejecting the possibility of analyzing these 
new cases, I instead used cross-case comparisons to work around the limited number 
of years and observations. To supplement limited case evidence from the small 
number of tax changes in Scotland and the three Belgian regions since tax devolution, 
I collated two separate tables to catalog regional tax changes in Italy and Spain over 
the past decade from annexes of annual reports by the EUROMOD project, a European 
tax-benefit microsimulation model based at the University of Essex.  
In Chapter 3, although 900 member-year observations were available to test 
members committee assignments in the National Assembly for Wales against various 
hypotheses, I argued that using annual observations would overcount members who 
remain on the same committee for more than one year and thus exaggerate the 
magnitude of any behavioral effects. I therefore included each member’s committee 
assignments only for the first year of each legislative term, resulting in a far smaller 
number of observations. To control for other influences on members’ committee 
assignments, I also investigated the relationships between Scottish and Welsh 
members’ educational and political backgrounds, type of seat, and seniority in the 
legislature. From print- and web-based sources including parliamentary yearbooks, 
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committee websites, and member biographies, I constructed two entirely new 
datasets. Statistically analyzing this new and expansive data, I tested members’ 
committee assignments using marginal effects from probit regressions calculated using 
Hanmer & Kalkan 2013’s ‘observed values’ method, a marked innovation over prior 
methods.  
 
5.6 METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS IN QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 
To supplement the statistical modelling in chapters 3 and 4, I used a number of 
methodological innovations that could be of wider interest in the discipline. In 
chapter 3, and in considering the potential usefulness of a committee assignment in 
helping a member cultivate a personal re-election vote, I undertook a complete search 
of all media citations for every committee in both legislatures since devolution using 
LexisNexis. This search exposed very large variations in the public profile of Wales 
and Scotland’s legislative committees. In Scotland, the Justice committee had an 
average of 183 citations per term in the Scotsman and Scotland on Sunday, compared 
with just 13 for the Subordinate Legislation Committee. And in Wales, the Education, 
Health and Economic Development committees all recorded more than 100 average 
citations in the Western Mail per term, compared with 11 for the Equal Opportunities 
Committee and just 8 average citations per term for the European and External 
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Relations Committee. Little wonder perhaps that these latter two committees were 
abolished at the start of the fourth Assembly term.  
This use of LexisNexis citation searches is a low-cost method of investigating 
coverage of all aspects of a legislature’s work, not only for citations of committee 
activities as in this thesis, but also to explore media profiles of ministers or backbench 
members. With the advantage of time, I could have investigated committee or 
member citations in local press outfits such as the Rhondda Leader or the Greenock 
Telegraph. Local press citations would offer a potentially more incisive method of 
capturing the link between a members’ committee work and their profile in their 
home constituency.  
Chapter 4 deploys another methodological innovation in this research field. 
Freedom of Information laws have been subject to a rapid global expansion over the 
past two decades, such that 115 countries had adopted national-level FOI laws by 2017 
(freedominfo.org). But although this expansion has been the focus of many recent 
country-specific and comparative academic studies, researchers have yet to fully 
release the potential methodological value of FOI requests in empirical investigations 
of related research questions (Savage & Hyde 2014). This slow adoption of FOI 
requests as a research methodology is puzzling given their potential efficacy in 
allowing single researchers to undertake the type of large-scale data collection that 
was previously the domain of well-funded and intensive research projects (Savage & 
Hyde 2014).  
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FOI responses were also of considerable merit in addressing a persistent 
problem of measurement in the government responsiveness and Quality of 
Government literature. Existing governance indicators tend to be aggregated from 
surveys of representative individuals such as government officials, business owners or 
academics (Rodriguez-Pose & Di Cataldo 2015). These surveys are vulnerable to 
charges of bias in their construction, wording or sampling frame and are subjective 
because replies can be difficult to separate from interviewees’ normative judgments of 
the government in question (Kaufmann & Kraay 2008). Using two waves of FOI 
requests emailed to all public bodies in the United Kingdom with an executive 
function at the central, devolved and local tiers, I constructed two large datasets from 
which I calculated two new measures of the timeliness and quality of each 
organization’s responses and found significant variation across the tiers of government 
and the different geographical areas of the UK. This emerging new methodological 
approach could be used far more widely to investigate other topics of interest in the 
discipline.  
 
5.7 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis therefore makes a number of substantive and methodological contributions 
to the empirical literature on decentralization. But beyond the academic literature, 
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the findings from the three core chapters of this thesis also have important 
implications for contemporary policy debates.  
The principal implication to be drawn from the ambiguous and multifaceted 
findings from this thesis is that the conditions under which decentralization should 
lead to uniformly positive outcomes remain elusive. A more efficient, proximate 
government that better responds to its citizens is not achieved with the stroke of a 
bill-signing pen. For example, fiscal devolution has featured prominently in 
constitutional reform debates over the past two decades, not only in the four major 
western European countries considered here, but also in other OECD and developing 
countries across the globe. But chapter 2 found that the prominent autonomist regions 
often at the forefront of political campaigns for greater devolution are among the least 
likely to modify tax rates and brackets after fiscal powers are devolved. I argue that 
fiscal decentralization itself is an instrument – a means to an end – rather than a policy 
objective in itself. For central actors, tax devolution is a vehicle to pass the buck for 
politically-costly income tax decisions, locking regions into blame-sharing and fiscal 
retrenchment. Political elites in autonomist regions accept this assignment of new 
powers in order to retain a greater share of own-sourced revenues and establish new 
tax agencies and treasuries. But in recognizing that assertive use of rate-varying 
powers carries short-term risks that may jeopardize longer-term autonomy objectives, 
autonomist regions chose to align their ‘fiscal trajectory’ with that of the center. The 
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effectiveness of the center’s efforts to ‘pass the buck’ is far weaker if voters perceive 
little or no change from tax devolution. 
This finding is significant enough to feature not only in the inevitable policy 
debates on additional fiscal devolution to Scotland and Wales, and not only before the 
first new tax powers are transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly and potentially 
England’s newly-elected metropolitan mayors, but in political systems across the 
globe that are characterized by intense center-periphery competition.  
Of course, this finding does not imply that decentralization should (or could) 
be abruptly reversed. Rather, and as noted at the start of this concluding chapter, 
when considering new innovations, policy-makers must pay close attention to the 
future incentive structures that will encourage senior politicians and officials 
operating in multi-tiered states to behave in unexpected ways. For example, not only 
should regional actors be aware that decentralization can be a double-edged sword, 
shifting blame for expensive or controversial policy decisions or unfunded mandates 
(including perhaps FOI requests), but central actors should be cognizant that their 
blame shifting can be rebuffed by strategic regional actors eager to build up the 
institutions of a nascent state yet anxious to avoid jeopardizing their longer-term 
autonomy objectives. And chapter 4 finds that the purported responsiveness 
advantages from a proximate government are far more ambiguous than previously 
claimed. Where incentives for shirking exist and capacity constraints are high, 
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governments (at whichever tier) were found to be less responsive to citizen FOI 
requests. And while devolved governments founded as part of a new politics 
transparency program were indeed more responsive to citizen FOI requests, devolved 
governments established to resolve inter-community conflict were less responsive. In 
short, incentive structures matter profoundly in multi-tiered institutional design. 
A final, critical policy implication is that even if decentralization is successful 
in achieving some of the gains claimed in theory, it is unlikely to simultaneously 
achieve all of these advantages. For example, where decentralization has been 
successfully prescribed to mitigate inter-community conflict, it may not be associated 
with the purported efficiency or responsiveness advantages claimed elsewhere in the 
literature. Chapter 4 argued that while Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions had 
largely achieved their primary objective of stemming chronic political violence, they 
may have represented a step back for public administration and the quality of 
government. This finding gives comparative empirical context to single-case analyses 
of Northern Ireland that have been skeptical of the quality of devolved government 
since the end of Direct Rule in 1998. For example, in reviewing Derek Birrell’s 
comprehensive account of the governance of Northern Ireland before and after 
devolution, Alan Greer observes that Birrell “seems rather wistful at the passing of 
direct rule and not fully convinced of the merits of devolution” (2012: 282). In his 
account, Birrell writes: 
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Devolution provides less cohesive government, not based on collective 
responsibility. There is also limited evidence of efficient government. The 
Executive’s complex and rigid decision-making procedures and blocking 
mechanism has led to much slower decision-making than under direct rule 
and hold ups and policy deadlock have been frustrating for civil servants, 
pressure groups, the media and the public (Birrell 2009: 246). 
Decentralization is therefore subject to trade-offs, and the potential 
advantages of conflict resolution may be one of the benefits that cannot be observed 
by testing organizations’ responsiveness to FOI requests. Coming full circle from the 
introductory chapter, this thesis once again establishes that “when it comes to the 
political and economic consequences of federalism [and decentralization], the devil is 
in the details” (Beramendi 2007: 759-760). 
 
5.8 EXTERNAL VALIDITY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
The introduction to this thesis observed that contributions to the ‘second generation’ 
of research in the field of comparative federalism and decentralization have been 
copious, with hundreds of academic contributions since the turn of the millennium 
that have addressed a vast range of research questions. Moreover, because the 
consequences of decentralized governance on policy, political and fiscal outcomes are 
now understood to be systematically influenced by case-specific institutional 
configurations, recent contributions have tended to be more incremental than those 
of the earlier generation. As a result, the core papers of this thesis are targeted in their 
approach, focusing on explaining outcomes in states characterized by intense center-
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periphery political competition. The external validity of these results beyond states 
undergoing territorial transition can therefore not be assumed. Rather than 
investigating outcomes in the more extensively-furrowed older federations 
(particularly between the states of the USA), this thesis directed its attention to the 
relationship between decentralization, accountability and governance in the dynamic 
decentralizing states of Western Europe. Indeed, I would not assume that my finding 
that fiscal devolution is an instrument rather than an end in itself would be replicated 
in countries where regional political elites do not have nation-building objectives. 
This likely divergence in outcomes depending on country type was observed in the 
2016 example of the Australian state premiers rejecting the same mechanism of fiscal 
devolution that was accepted by elites in the prominent autonomist regions of Europe 
(News.com.au, 4 April 2016). 
Apart from the unavoidable limitation of short institutional histories since the 
establishment of both institutions in 1999, the National Assembly for Wales and the 
Scottish Parliament proved challenging venues in testing how institutional and 
electoral incentives influence elected members. First, in contrast to the vast literature 
analyzing roll-call votes in the US Congress for evidence of behavioral differences, 
very high levels of intra-party voting discipline in Wales and Scotland suggest that 
exploring voting records for evidence of ‘two member types’ would be particularly 
challenging. Second, government control of money bills (as in other Westminster 
systems) means that MSPs and AMs lack an important means used in other political 
 Chapter 5: Critical Discussion and Conclusion 
 
208 
systems to secure pork barrel projects for their constituencies, which could otherwise 
furnish valuable data to test a historically-important method of cultivating a 
geographically-based personal vote. Third, although information recording how 
members split their time between their legislative duties and their home districts 
would be very useful in identifying legislators’ activities as they seek to win re-
election, the parliamentary institutions themselves do not record how members spend 
their time. As a result, any such analysis would be reliant on subjective interview- or 
survey-data collated from members themselves and subject to the usual likely sample 
biases. In summary, while Chapter 3 explored committee assignments to test the 
interactions of electoral rules and behavioral incentives in more depth, there is no 
perfect proxy for observing how these incentives might operate on members. This is 
particularly demanding in small legislatures such as the devolved parliaments of 
Scotland and Wales. 
In relation to the theme of democratic representation, responsiveness, and 
accountability, Chapter 4 noted that as a term applied liberally across the economics 
and political science literature, responsiveness is extremely difficult to define, let 
alone subject to empirical testing. This thesis therefore chose a targeted approach to 
shed new empirical evidence to a longstanding debate, proposing that if Freedom of 
Information laws are one of the key ways of promoting transparency (Worthy 2013), 
public bodies’ responses to FOI requests might serve as a proxy that could facilitate 
testing of longstanding claims made for decentralization in relation to improved 
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responsiveness. I emailed FOI requests to every public body with an executive 
function in the United Kingdom to collate an objective, comparative metric of 
government responsiveness at the organizational level.  
But this approach is not without its limitations. If used far more widely in the 
discipline, there could be a feedback reaction in the performance of public bodies 
receiving notably larger numbers of requests. And more immediately, assessing a 
public body’s performance through its replies to FOI requests could miss other aspects 
of an agency’s responsiveness. The suggested interaction between responsiveness and 
bureaucratic capacity constraints theorized in Chapter 4 could be problematic: the 
downsizing of an organisation’s FOI office due to budget cuts could override the more 
delicate institutional orientations towards openness or principal-agent mechanisms 
that may otherwise incentivize individuals working in such organisations to respond 
differently to their citizens. And finally, Chapter 4 did not consider whether an 
organization’s FOI response rate might in fact be an inverse measure of agency 
responsiveness; in other words, that the time organizations use to respond to FOI 
requests could be spent in engaging with members of the public through other means. 
Future research should therefore be open to new methods and proxies for revealing 
how government responsiveness to its citizens varies under decentralization. 
In confidently engaging with the ‘lacuna’ in the discipline in the middle range 
of cases between quantitative and qualitative research, I argued that intermediate-N 
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case comparison work can yield important empirical evidence to address practical 
problems in politics. But limitations remain. With the advantage of time, it would 
have been desirable to supplement the intermediate-N case comparison work in 
Chapter 2 with interview data from senior politicians and officials from various 
central governments, ‘centralist’ regions and ‘autonomist’ regions in each of the four 
case countries. Given the relatively large number of Italian and Spanish regions, case 
selection for interviews would need to be cognizant of the risk of bias from selecting 
on the dependent variable. A sample of regions would need to be carefully drawn 
from the independent variable of ‘centralist’ and ‘autonomist’ regions to avoid this 
bias. There is clear scope here for future research that would expand on the findings 
identified in Chapter 2 using larger, freestanding case studies of fiscal policy in the 
four Western European countries.  
Cognizant of these confines and prospects for future research, this thesis 
aimed to demonstrate the potential of empirical research even in complex cases 
characterized by deep context specificity. With the discipline now understanding that 
case specific institutional configurations influence outcomes all the way down and all 
the way across, the study of complex institutions with a limited number of years and 
observations will be at the heart of the future agenda. Methods and empirical 
techniques will need to adapt to this heterogeneity, not just between institutional 
forms, but to the complex constitutional, political-economic and cultural contexts that 
make multi-tiered states such a captivating and dynamic venue for academic study. 
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Note A1: Note on Regional Borrowing Powers 
In theory, borrowing powers should offer regional political elites an economic 
stimulus tool that is lower-risk in the short term because it avoids the negative 
political consequences of income tax increases. Borrowing should be particularly 
lower-risk in a ‘soft budget constraint’ environment, in which the central government 
gives capital markets an implicit or explicit guarantee that it would meet the regional 
government’s obligations to its creditors in the event of a default. In the absence of a 
no-bailout clause (or ‘hard budget constraint’), expanding subnational access to credit 
would be expected to generate fiscal indiscipline and significant regional budget 
deficits (Rodden 2006). In the case countries however, and particularly since the 2007-
08 fiscal crisis and subsequent public expenditure restraint, tight limits mean that 
regional political actors have limited room for maneuver with respect to borrowing: 
Spain: During the period analyzed in chapter 2, the fiscal crisis in Spain severely 
restricted the Autonomous Communities’ access to capital markets. In 2012, the 
Spanish government set up a series of extraordinary financing measures, including a 
regional liquidity fund (FLA) to “address autonomous regions’ debt maturities and 
obtain the resources needed to fund the borrowing they were allowed under the 
stability regulations” (Delgado et al. 2016: 10). In 2015 this fund was converted into a 
Regional Financing Fund that would continue to provide liquidity support to regions 
as well as access for ACs to the lower borrowing costs available to the central 
government. As beneficiaries of liquidity support, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, 
Catalonia, Murcia and Valencia are subject to budget and public debt monitoring; all 
of these ACs significantly reduced issuance from 2011 to 2014 to practically no debt 
at all (Delgado et al. 2016). 
Italy: Italian subnational borrowing levels as a share of GDP are below OECD 
averages, and the majority of outstanding debt is in the form of bank loans (59% in 
2013). As in Spain, and in response to the fiscal crisis and subsequent spending 
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restraint at lower tiers of government, the Italian central government established a 
debt buyback scheme in 2013 to repay regional liabilities (UCLG-OECD 2017: 205). 
UK: Since the Scotland Act 2016, the Scottish Government has a £3 billion borrowing 
limit subject to a £450 million annual cap; these are low limits as a percentage of GDP. 
Because the Scottish Government does not have a prudential borrowing regime in 
which it could determine its own limits based on debt service affordability, the IFS 
argued that “the Scottish Government got less in the way of additional borrowing 
power than it hoped for” in the 2016 negotiations over Scotland’s Fiscal Framework 
(Bell et al 2016: 9).  
Belgium: The Belgian regions are subject to a prudential borrowing regime (i.e. no 
specific legal borrowing limits); however, as a federated entity they participate in 
Belgium’s stability program required by the European Stability and Growth Pact. 
Fiscal consolidation is an agenda item at Belgium’s monthly Coordination Committee 
meeting between federal, regional and community premiers. The Belgian High 
Council of Finance sets budgetary targets for each level of government such that all 
federated entities share the burden of the ‘fiscal consolidation path’: these targets 
provide an implicit limit on regional borrowing capacity. In the event of a significant 
deviation from this path an automatic correction mechanism would require the 
effected government to take the necessary correction measures; however, this 
mechanism has never been invoked (Coppens 2015; Personal Communication 
National Bank of Belgium).  
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Table A1: Income Tax Changes in the Common-System Autonomous Communities – Detail 
Autonomous 
Community  
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015: Major change to Spanish State tax brackets Change
s 
Andalusia Party  PSOE maj PSOE maj PSOE-United Left 
coalition (after 5/12) 
PSOE-United Left 
coalition 
PSOE-United 
Left coalition 
PSOE-United Left coalition. PSOE min after 6/15   
  Tax 
Change 
none Added two 
intermediate 
brackets.  
Increased tax rates for 
earnings over 
€80,000. 
Lowered Andalusia-
only €80,000 bracket to 
€60,000 and eliminated 
Andalusia-only 
€100,000 bracket.  
Increased tax rates for 
earnings between 
€60,000-€100,000 and 
above €120,000. 
none none Did not adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets for regional income tax. 
 
No change to rates for any regional bracket. 
2 
Aragon Party  PSOE-PAR coalition PSOE-PAR coalition PP-PAR coalition (after 
May 2011) 
PP-PAR coaltion PP-PAR 
coaltion 
PP-PAR coaltion (until 7/2015)   
  Tax 
Change 
none none none none      Did adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets.  
 
Reduced tax rates for earnings below €12,450 of income. 
Increased tax rates between €12,450-€17,707 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €17,707-€20,200 of income.  
Increased tax rates between €20,200-€33,007 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €33,007-€34,000 of income. 
Increased tax rates between €34,000-€53,407 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €53,407-€60,000 of income. 
No change in rates for earnings above €60,000. 
1 
Asturias Party  PSOE-PAR coalition PSOE-PAR coalition PP-PAR coalition (after 
May 2011) 
PP-PAR coaltion PP-PAR 
coaltion 
PP-PAR coaltion (until 7/2015)   
  Tax 
Change 
none Reduced the €120,000 
threshold to €90,000 
of income. 
Increased tax rates for 
earnings over €90,000 
Added new threshold 
between €120,000-
€175,000 of income.  
Increased Asturias-only 
threshold for paying the 
21.5% rate from 
Added new threshold 
between €70,000-
€90,000 of income.  
Increased tax rates for 
earnings over €90,000 
of income. 
none Did not adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets for regional income tax, except for the new lowest 
bracket of €0-€12,450 and removing the Asturias-only 
bracket between €90,000-€120,000. 
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Autonomous 
Community  
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015: Major change to Spanish State tax brackets Change
s 
€90,000 to €120,000 
(effectively reversing 
previous year change) 
Reduced tax rates for 
earnings over €175,000 
Reduced rates below €12,450 of income. 
No change to rates for all other regional brackets. 
Balearic Islands Party  PSOE-PSM-IU-ERC 
coalition 
PSOE-PSM-IU-ERC 
coalition; PP Maj 
after 5/2011 
PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
  Tax 
Change 
none none none none none Added 5 new brackets to the Spanish Government's reduced 
number of brackets.  
 
Reduced tax rates for earnings below €18,000 of income. 
Increased tax rates between €18,000-€34,000 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €34,000-€48,000 of income.  
Increased tax rates between €48,000-€53,407 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €53,407-€75,000 of income. 
No change in rates for incomes above €75,000 
1 
Canary Islands Party  CC-PP coalition CC-PP coalition; CC-
PSOE coalition after 
5/2011 
CC-PSOE coalition CC-PSOE coalition CC-PSOE 
coalition 
CC-PSOE coalition   
  Tax 
Change 
none none Increased tax rates for 
earnings over €53,407 
none none Did not adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets for regional income tax, except for the new lowest 
bracket of €0-€12,450 
 
Reduced rates below €12,450 of income. 
No change to rates between €12,450-€53,407 of incomes. 
Increased rates above €53,407 of income. 
2 
Cantabria Party  PRC-PSOE coalition PRC-PSOE coalition; 
PP maj after 5/2011 
PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
  Tax 
Change 
none Added three 
intermediate 
brackets.  
Increased tax rates for 
earnings over €67,707 
none none Reduced tax 
rates for 
earnings 
between 
€17,701. 
Did adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets.  
 
Reduced tax rates for earnings below €12,450 of income. 
Increased tax rates between €12,450-€17,707 of income. 
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Autonomous 
Community  
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015: Major change to Spanish State tax brackets Change
s 
Increased tax 
rates for 
earnings 
above €99, 
407. 
Reduced tax rates between €17,707-€20,200 of income.  
Increased tax rates between €20,200-€33,007 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €33,007-€34,000 of income. 
No change to rates between €34,000-€53,407 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €53,407-€60,000 of income. 
Increased tax rates between €60,000-€80,007 of income. 
No change in rates for earnings between €80,007-€99,407 of 
income. 
Reduced tax rates for earnings above €99,407 of income. 
Castile and 
León 
Party  PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
  Tax 
Change 
none none none none none Did not adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets for regional income tax, except for the new lowest 
bracket of €0-€12,450 
 
Reduced rates below €12,450 of income. 
No change to rates for all other regional brackets. 
1 
Castile–La 
Mancha 
Party  PSOE maj PSOE maj; PP maj 
after 5/2011 
PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
  Tax 
Change 
none none none none none Added 1 new bracket to the Spanish Government's reduced 
number of brackets (middle-incomes) 
 
No change in rates below €17,707 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €17,707-€20,000 of income.  
Increased tax rates between €20,000-€33,007 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €33,007-€34,000 of income. 
Increased tax rates between €34,000-€35,200 of income. 
No change in rates between €35,200-€53,407 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €53,407-€60,000 of income. 
Increased tax rates for earnings above €60,000 of income. 
1 
Catalonia Party  PSC-ERC-IVC coalition, 
CiU min after Dec 2010 
CiU min CiU min CiU min CiU min CiU min   
  Tax 
Change 
none Increased tax rates for 
earnings over 
none none none Did not adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets for regional income tax. 
1 
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Autonomous 
Community  
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015: Major change to Spanish State tax brackets Change
s 
€120,000 (2pp above 
120,000; 4pp above 
175,000) * 
 
No change to rates for any regional bracket. 
Extremadura Party  PSOE maj PSOE maj; PP maj 
after 5/2011 
PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
  Tax 
Change 
none Added four 
intermediate 
brackets, ending 
standard regional rate 
of 21.5% at €60,707 of 
income rather than 
€120,000).  
Reduced the 
threshold for the 
highest rate of tax 
(24.5%) to just €7 
above the threshold 
of the next-lower 
Spanish bracket of 
€120,000. 
Increased tax rates for 
earnings over 
€60,707. 
none Added two new 
brackets within the 
lowest tax bracket, 
decreasing tax rates for 
earnings under €14,000 
and particularly 
€10,000. 
Increased tax 
rates for 
earnings 
between 
€17,707-
€33,007 
Added 5 new brackets to the Spanish Government's reduced 
number of brackets. Eliminated Extremadura's starting 
bracket of €0-€10,000 of income. 
 
Decrease in tax rates for earnings below €12,450 of income.  
Small increase in tax rates for earnings between €12,450-
€17,707 of income.  
Decreased tax rates for earnings between €17,707-€20,200 
of income.  
Increased tax rates for earnings between €20,200-€33,007 of 
income.  
Reduced tax rates between €33,007-€35,200 of income.  
Increased tax rates between €35,200-€53,407 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €53,407-€60,707 of income. 
Increased tax rates above €60,707 of income. 
4 
Galicia Party  PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
  Tax 
Change 
none none none none none Did not adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets for regional income tax. 
 
Reduced rates below €17,707 of incomes. 
No change to rates for earnings above €17,707. 
1 
La Rioja Party  
 
PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
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Autonomous 
Community  
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015: Major change to Spanish State tax brackets Change
s 
  Tax 
Change 
Decreased tax rates for all 
earnings (matches 
Madrid) 
none none none none 
(decouples 
from Madrid) 
Did adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets.  
 
Reduced tax rates for earnings below €12,450 of income.  
Increased tax rates between €12,450-€17,707 of income.  
Reduced tax rates between €17,707-€20,200 of income.  
Increased tax rates between €20,200-€33,007 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €33,007-€34,000 of income. 
Increased tax rates between €34,000-€53,407 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €53,407-€60,000 of income. 
Increased tax rates for incomes above €60,000 
2 
Madrid 
Community 
Party  PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
  Tax 
Change 
Decreased tax rates for all 
earnings (matches La 
Rioja) 
none none none 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decreased tax 
rates for all 
earnings 
(decouples 
from La Rioja) 
Did not adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets for regional income tax, except for the new lowest 
bracket of €0-€12,450 and the new upper bracket for 
incomes above €60,000  
 
Reduced rates below €12,450 of income. 
No change to rates between €12,450-€60,000 of incomes. 
Small increase in rates above €60,000 of income. 
3 
Murcia Party  PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
  Tax 
Change 
none none Increased tax rates to 
match standard regional 
level for earnings over 
€120,000. 
Increased tax rates 
above standard regional 
level for earnings above 
€120,000. (match 
Valencia) 
Increased tax rates for 
earnings over €175,000 
none Did adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets. Regional tax rates and brackets reformed to 
exactly match equivalent Spanish rates and brackets. 
 
Reduced tax rates for earnings below €12,450. 
Increased tax rates between €12,450-€17,707. 
Reduced tax rates between €17,707-€20,200 of income.  
Increased tax rates between €20,200-€33,007 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €33,007-€34,000 of income. 
Increased tax rates between €34,000-€53,407 of income. 
Reduced tax rates between €53,407-€60,000 of income. 
3 
   Appendix 
 
 
246 
Autonomous 
Community  
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015: Major change to Spanish State tax brackets Change
s 
No change in tax rates between €60,000-€120,000 of 
income. 
Reduced tax rates for incomes above €120,000 
Valencian 
Community 
Party  PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj PP maj   
  Tax 
Change 
Small decrease in tax rates 
for all earnings. 
none Increased tax rates to 
match standard regional 
level for earnings over 
€120,000. 
Increased tax rates 
above standard regional 
level for earnings above 
€120,000. (match 
Murcia) 
none none Did not adopt the Spanish Government's reduced number of 
brackets for regional income tax. 
 
Small reduction in rates for all regional brackets. 
3 
Source: Author and EUROMOD Country Reports – Spain.  
* Policy made by previous administration 
PSOE – Spanish Socialist Workers' Party; PP – People’s Party; PAR – Aragonese Party; IU – United Left; PSM – PSM Nationalist Agreement; ERC – Republican Left of 
Catalonia; CC – Canarian Coalition; PRC – Regionalist Party of Cantabria; IVC – Initiative for Catalonia Greens–United and Alternative Left; CiU - Convergence and 
Union 
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Table A2: Income Tax Innovation by the Italian Regions – Detail 
Region 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015* 2016 Total 
Changes 
Piedmont PD PD; LNP after 
3/2010 
LNP LNP LNP LNP; PD after 
5/2014 
PD PD   
  Three tax bands:  
0-15,000 (0.9% 
rate);  
15,000-22,000 
(1.2% rate) 
>22,000 (1.4% rate) 
  
none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme)  
Three tax bands:  
0-15,000 (1.23% rate);  
15000-22,000 (1.53% rate) 
>22,000 (1.73% rate) 
none Increased taxes. 
Added two new 
bands.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (1.69% rate) 
15,000-28,000 (1.70% 
rate) 
28,000-55,000 (1.71% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 (1.72% 
rate) 
>75,000 (1.73% rate) 
Decreased taxes 
below 15,000; 
increased above.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (1.62% 
rate) 
15,000-28,000 
(2.13% rate) 
28,000-55,000 
(2.31% rate) 
55,000-75,000 
(2.32% rate) 
>75,000 (2.33% 
rate) 
Increased taxes above 
28,000.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (1.62% rate) 
15,000-28,000 (2.13% 
rate) 
28,000-55,000 (2.75% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 (3.32% 
rate) 
>75,000 (3.33% rate) 
none 4 
Aosta Valley† UV UV UV UV UV UV UV UV   
  Flat rate (0.9%) none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.23%) 
none none none none none 0 
Lombardy PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; LN after 2/2013 LN LN LN   
  Three tax bands:  
0-15,494 (0.9% 
rate);  
19,494-30,987 
(1.3% rate) 
>30,987 (1.4% rate) 
  
none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Three tax bands:  
0-15,494 (1.23% rate);  
19,494-30,987 (1.63% rate) 
>30,987 (1.73% rate) 
none Change to middle 
bracket. 
Three tax bands:  
0-15,000 (1.23% rate);  
15,000-28,000 (1.58% 
rate) 
>28,000 (1.73% rate) 
none Added two new 
bands.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (1.23% rate) 
15,000-28,000 (1.58% 
rate) 
28,000-55,000 (1.72% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 (1.73% 
none 3 
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Region 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015* 2016 Total 
Changes 
rate) 
>75,000 (1.74% rate) 
South Tyrol - 
Alto Adige† 
SVP SVP SVP SVP SVP SVP SVP SVP   
  Flat rate (0.9%) Reduction of 
taxes for lower 
income 
taxpayers. 
Two bands: 
0-12,500 (0.0% 
rate) 
>12,500 (0.9% 
rate) 
Increase in upper threshold of zero-
rate band to 15,000. 
Two bands: 
0-15,000 (0.0% rate) (after accounting 
for 0.33ppt increase in regional 
personal income tax agreed as part of 
the Italian government's austerity 
programme).  
>15,000 (1.23% rate)* 
None none none Tax deduction of  
20.000 euro for all 
taxpayers. 
Tax deduction of 
28.000 euro for 
all taxpayers. 
4 
Trento† UpT (supported by 
PD, PATT) 
UpT (supported 
by PD, PATT) 
UpT (supported by PD, PATT) UpT (supported 
by PD, PATT) 
After 10/2015: PATT 
(supported by PD, 
UpT) 
PATT (supported 
by PD, UpT) 
PATT (supported by 
PD, UpT) 
PATT (supported 
by PD, UpT) 
  
  Flat rate (0.9%) none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.23%) 
none none Added new 
lower band.   
Two bands: 
0-15,000 (0.5% 
rate) 
>15,000 (1.23% 
rate) 
If taxable income < 
15,000 and pension 
income positive, tax 
rate 0%, otherwise 
flat rate 1.23% 
Increase 
threshold to 
taxable income < 
20,000 and 
pension income 
positive, tax rate 
0%, otherwise 
flat rate 1.23% 
3 
Veneto PdL PdL; LV after 
3/2010 
LV LV LV LV LN LV   
  Two rates: 
0-29,500 (0.9% rate) 
>29,500 (1.4% rate) 
Reduced tax rates 
to a flat rate 
(0.9%) 
none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.23%) 
none none none none none 2 
Friuli Venezia 
Giulia† 
PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 04/2013 PD PD PD   
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Region 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015* 2016 Total 
Changes 
  Flat rate (0.9%) none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.23%) 
none Added new lower 
band.   
Two bands: 
0-15,000 (0.7% rate) 
>15,000 (1.23% rate) 
none none none 1 
Liguria PD PD PD PD PD PD PD; FI after 6/2015 FI   
  Two bands: 
0-30,000 (0.9% rate) 
>30,000 (1.4% rate) 
none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Two bands: 
0-30,000 (1.23% rate) 
>30,000 (1.73% rate) 
none none none Added two new 
bands.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (1.23% rate) 
15,000-28,000 (1.73% 
rate) 
28,000-55,000 (2.31% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 (2.32% 
rate) 
>75,000 (2.33% rate) 
none 2 
Emilia 
Romagna 
PD PD PD PD PD PD PD PD   
  Four bands: 
0-15,000 (1.1% rate) 
15,000-20,000 
(1.2% rate) 
20,000-25,000 
(1.3% rate) 
>25,000 (1.4% rate) 
none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).   
Four bands: 
0-15,000 (1.43% rate) 
15,000-20,000 (1.53% rate) 
20,000-25,000 (1.63% rate) 
>25,000 (1.73% rate) 
none none none Added one new band.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (1.33% rate) 
15,000-28,000 (1.93% 
rate) 
28,000-55,000 (2.03% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 (2.23% 
rate) 
>75,000 (2.33% rate) 
none 2 
Tuscany DS/PD DS/PD; PD after 
3/2010 
PD PD PD PD PD PD   
  Flat rate (0.9%) none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
Two bands: 
0-75,000 (1.23% 
rate) 
none none Added three new 
bands.  
Five bands: 
none 2 
   Appendix 
 
 
250 
Region 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015* 2016 Total 
Changes 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.23%) 
>75,000 (1.73% 
rate) 
0-15,000 (1.42% rate) 
15,000-28,000 (1.43% 
rate) 
28,000-55,000 (1.68% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 (1.72% 
rate) 
>75,000 (1.73% rate) 
Umbria PD PD PD PD PD PD PD PD   
  Two bands: 
0-15,000 (0.9% rate) 
>15,000 (1.1% rate) 
none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Two bands: 
0-15,000 (1.23% rate) 
>15,000 (1.43% rate) 
none none Added three new 
bands.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (1.23% 
rate) 
15,000-28,000 
(1.63% rate) 
28,000-55,000 
(1.68% rate) 
55,000-75,000 
(1.73% rate) 
>75,000 (1.83% 
rate) 
none none 2 
Marche PD PD PD PD PD PD PD PD   
  Three bands: 
0-15,500 (0.9% rate) 
15,500-31,000 
(1.2% rate) 
>31,000 (1.4% rate) 
none none (excluding 0.33ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Three bands: 
0-15,500 (1.23% rate) 
15,500-31,000 (1.53% rate) 
>31,000 (1.73% rate) 
none Added two new 
bands.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (1.23% rate) 
15,000-28,000 (1.53% 
rate) 
28,000-55,000 (1.70% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 (1.72% 
rate) 
>75,000 (1.73% rate) 
none none none 2 
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Region 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015* 2016 Total 
Changes 
Lazio PD PD; PdL after 
3/2010 
PdL PdL PdL; PD after 3/2013 PD PD PD   
  Flat rate (1.4%) Increase in flat 
rate to 1.7% 
Reduced taxes by 0.30ppt (excluding 
0.33ppt increase in regional personal 
income tax agreed as part of the Italian 
government's austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.73%) 
none none Added two new 
bands.  
Three bands: 
0-28,000 (1.73% 
rate) 
 
If >28,000 
0-15,000 (1.73% 
rate) 
>15,000 (2.33% 
rate) 
Increase of income 
threshold and 
increase in top rate. 
Three bands: 
0-35,000 (1.73% rate) 
 
If >35,000 
0-15,000 (1.73% rate) 
>15,000 (3.33% rate) 
none 5 
Abruzzo PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 
5/2014 
PD PD   
  Flat rate (1.4%) none none (excluding 0.3ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.73%) 
none none Added two new 
bands.  
Three bands: 
0-15,000 (1.54% 
rate) 
15,000-28,000 
(1.66% rate) 
>28,000 (1.73% 
rate) 
Elimination of lower 
two bands.   
Flat rate (1.73%) 
none 3 
Molise PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 2/2013 PD PD PD   
  Flat rate (1.4%) Increase in flat 
rate to 1.7% 
none (excluding 0.3ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (2.03%) 
none none Added three new 
bands.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (2.03% 
rate) 
15,000-28,000 
(2.23% rate) 
28,000-55,000 
(2.43% rate) 
none Reduced taxes by 
0.30ppt for all 
five bands. 
0-15,000 (1.73% 
rate) 
15,000-28,000 
(1.93% rate) 
28,000-55,000 
(2.13% rate) 
4 
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Region 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015* 2016 Total 
Changes 
55,000-75,000 
(2.53% rate) 
>75,000 (2.63% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 
(2.23% rate) 
>75,000 (2.33% 
rate) 
Campania PD PD; PdL after 
3/2010 
PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 6/2015 PD   
  Flat rate (1.4%) Increase in flat 
rate to 1.7% 
none (excluding 0.3ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (2.03%) 
none none none none none 2 
Apulia PRC/SEL PRC/SEL PRC/SEL PRC/SEL PRC/SEL PRC/SEL PRC/SEL; PD after 
6/2015 
PD   
  Two bands: 
0-28,000 (0.9% rate) 
>28,000 (1.4% rate) 
Abolition of 
upper band.  Flat 
rate 0.9% 
Return of two bands: 
0-28,000 (1.53% rate) 
>28,000 (1.73% rate) 
none Added three new 
bands.  
Five bands: 
0-15,000 (1.33% rate) 
15,000-28,000 (1.43% 
rate) 
28,000-55,000 (1.71% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 (1.72% 
rate) 
>75,000 (1.73% rate) 
none none none 4 
Basilicata PD PD PD PD PD PD PD PD   
  Flat rate (0.9%) none none (excluding 0.3ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.23%) 
none none Added two new 
bands.  
Three bands: 
0-55,000 (1.23% 
rate) 
55,000-75,000 
(1.73% rate) *** 
>75,000 (2.33% 
rate) *** 
none none 1 
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Region 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015* 2016 Total 
Changes 
Calabria PD PD; PdL after 
3/2010 
PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 
12/2014 
PD PD   
  Flat rate (1.4%) Increase in flat 
rate to 1.7% 
none (excluding 0.3ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (2.03%) 
none none none none none 2 
Sardinia† PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL PdL; PD after 
3/2014 
PD PD   
  Flat rate (0.9%) none none (excluding 0.3ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.23%) 
none none none none none 0 
Sicily† MpA  MpA  MpA  MpA; PD after 
11/2012 
PD PD PD PD   
  Flat rate (1.4%) none none (excluding 0.3ppt increase in 
regional personal income tax agreed as 
part of the Italian government's 
austerity programme).  
Flat rate (1.73%) 
none none none none none 1 
Source: Author and EUROMOD Country Reports – Italy.  
PD - Democratic Party; UV - Valdostan Union; SVP - South Tyrolean People's Party; UpT – - Union for Trentino; PATT – Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party; PdL - 
The People of Freedom; FI – Forza Italia; LNP - Lega Nord Piemont; LV – Liga Veneta; LN – Lega Nord; MpA - Movement for the Autonomies; PRC - Communist 
Refoundation Party; SEL - Left Ecology Freedom.  
† Financing arrangements for the special statute regions deviate substantially from the general system in Italy, because regional revenues are raised from taxes shared with the central 
government. However, although the regional councils in special regions have little scope to alter rates or bases for shared taxes, they can change the regional income tax surcharge along with 
all other regions participating in the ordinary financing regime (Claeys & Martire 2011 for Aosta Valley) 
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Table A3: SMD and List members of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for 
Wales, and their dual candidacy status 
 
Scotland 1st-4th Parliamentary Terms 
 Labour SNP Con Lib Dem Minor 
Parties 
Total 
SMD member, Not dual 
Candidate at Election  
146 27 3 30 2 208 
(40.2%) 
List member, Not dual 
Candidate at Election  
33 14 0 9 16 72 
(13.9%) 
SMD member, dual 
candidate at Election 
5 63 * 7 8 1 84 
(16.2%) 
List member, dual 
Candidate at Election 
5 75 58 8 7 153 
(29.6%) 
Total 189 179 68 55 26 517 
* Includes Shirley-Ann Somerville, elected less than four months after the 2007 election upon the 
resignation of Stefan Tymkewycz, a SNP MSP for the Lothians region. 
 
Wales - First and Second Terms: Dual Candidacy Permitted  
 Labour Plaid 
Cymru 
Con Lib Dem Ind Total 
SMD member, Not Dual 
Candidate at Election  
25 14 1 2 0 42 
(35.0%) 
List member, Not Dual 
Candidate at Election  
1 5 0 0 0 11 
(9.2%) 
SMD member, Dual 
Candidate at Election 
31 0 1 4 2 38 
(31.7%) 
List member, Dual 
Candidate at Election 
0 10 18 6 0 34 
(28.3%) 
Total 57 29 20 12 2 120 
 
 
Wales - Third and Fourth Terms: Dual Candidacy Not Permitted 
 Labour Plaid 
Cymru 
Con Lib Dem Ind Total 
SMD member, Not Dual 
Candidate at Election  
52 12 11 4 1 60 
List member, Not Dual 
Candidate at Election  
4 14 15 7 0 40 
SMD member, Dual 
Candidate at Election 
- - - - - - 
List member, Dual 
Candidate at Election 
- - - - - - 
Total 56 26 26 11 1 120 
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Table A4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Observations 
First Year of Assignments per Legislative Term, and Excluding Office Holders 
 
Variable Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Scotland 
n=431 
Wales 
n=106 
SMD=1 
List=0 
51.0 (2.4) 57.9 (3.7) 
   
Total Number of Committees 1.3 (3.4) 2.2 (0.7) 
2 or More Committees=1, 0 otherwise 32.5 (2.3) 79.2 (3.0) 
   
Constituency Service committee member=1, 
0 otherwise.  Consisting of: 
25.1 (2.1) 50.8 (3.7) 
Health committee member=1, 
0 otherwise 
8.6 (1.4) 19.7 (2.9) 
Enterprise / Economy committee 
member=1, 
0 otherwise 
8.6 (1.4) 18.6 (2.9) 
Environment / Rural Affairs committee 
member=1, 
0 otherwise 
8.4 (1.3) 16.4 (2.7) 
   
Parliamentary Functions committee member=1, 
0 otherwise. Consisting of: 
19.5 (1.9) 38.3 (3.6) 
Standards committee member=1, 
0 otherwise 
6.0 (1.1) 16.4 (2.7) 
Petitions committee member=1, 
0 otherwise 
7.4 (1.3) 6.6 (1.8) 
Legislation / Subordinate Legislation / 
Legislative Affairs committee 
member=1, 
0 otherwise 
6.0 (1.1) 17.5 (2.8) 
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Table A5: The Effect of Wales’ Dual Candidacy Ban on Members’ Committee Assignments – Average Marginal Effects from a Probit Regression 
calculated using the Observed Values Method  
Dependent Variable =  Wales H1: Total Committee 
Assignments ≥ 2 
 Wales H2: Constituency 
Service Committees 
 Wales H3: Parliamentary 
Function Committees 
Variable 
Before Dual 
Candidacy Ban 
After Dual 
Candidacy Ban 
 Before Dual 
Candidacy Ban 
After Dual 
Candidacy Ban 
 Before Dual 
Candidacy Ban 
After Dual 
Candidacy Ban 
         
SMD Seat 
 –0.088 
(0.109) 
–0.124 
(0.090) 
 0.203 
(0.149) 
0.183* 
(0.109) 
 -0.090 
(0.151) 
–0.157 
(0.112) 
         
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Constant 7.00*** 
(0.594) 
2.08** 
(0.960) 
 -0.919 
(0.639) 
-0.351 
(0.792) 
 -0.138 
(0.626) 
0.143 
(0.803) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.18  0.04 0.08  0.08 0.05 
Note: Delta-method Standard Errors in Parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.  n=93 (Before Dual Candidacy Ban), n=88 (After Dual Candidacy Ban) 
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Table A6: Annual Effective Number of Parties (ENP) of Local Councils in England, Scotland and Wales 
Council Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
ENGLAND 
Adur 3.2 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.7 
Allerdale 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.8 
Amber Valley 1.7 1.7 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2 2 2 2 1.9 
Arun 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 
Ashfield 1.3 1.3 1.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.6 2.2 
Ashford 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 1.6 2.3 
Aylesbury Vale 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2 2 2 1.8 2.1 
Babergh 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 1.8 3.1 
Barking and Dagenham 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.3 
Barnet 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 
Barnsley 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.9 
Barrow-in-Furness 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.1 
Basildon 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 2 2.4 3 2.9 2.2 
Basingstoke and Deane 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3 3 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 3 2.6 2.8 
Bassetlaw 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 2 2 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.1 
Bath & North East Somerset 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.6 
Bedford 3.6 3.6 3 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.6 
Bexley 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.7 
Birmingham 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.1 3 3 3.1 2.8 2.1 2.1 2 2 2.6 
Blaby 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 1.7 2 
Blackburn with Darwen 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.3 2.9 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.4 
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Blackpool 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.1 
Bolsover 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 
Bolton 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.2 1.8 1.8 2 2 2.5 
Boston 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 
Bournemouth 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.9 
Bracknell Forest 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1 1.3 
Bradford 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 3 3 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 
Braintree 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 2.2 
Breckland 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 
Brent 2 2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.3 1.3 2.2 
Brentwood 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 2.5 2.9 2.1 2 
Brighton and Hove 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 
Bristol 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.4 2.8 
Broadland 2.1 2.1 2.8 2.6 2 2 2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.2 1.9 
Bromley 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 
Bromsgrove 1.6 1.6 1.6 2 2.1 2.1 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.3 1.9 
Broxbourne 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.2 
Broxtowe 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.9 
Buckinghamshire 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 
Burnley 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.4 3 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.7 
Bury 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.2 
Calderdale 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3 2.5 2.5 3 
Cambridge 2.2 2.2 2.1 2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2 
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Cambridgeshire 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2 2 2.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.3 
Camden 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.3 
Cannock Chase 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3 3 3.2 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 
Canterbury 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.5 2.2 
Carlisle 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.5 
Castle Point 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.9 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2 1.8 
Central Bedfordshire n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.4 
Charnwood 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2 2 2.1 1.5 2.3 
Chelmsford 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.2 2 
Cheltenham 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 
Cherwell 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 
Cheshire East n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2 
Cheshire West and Chester n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.6 1.6 1.6 2 2 2 2 2.1 1.9 
Chesterfield 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.7 
Chichester 2.1 2 2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.9 
Chiltern 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.7 
Chorley 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.9 2.4 
Christchurch 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.7 
Colchester 3 3 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 
Copeland 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.3 2 
Corby 1.2 1.2 1.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.8 
Cornwall 2.9 3 3 3 3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.9 3 3 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.9 
Cotswold 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.3 2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.7 2.1 
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Coventry 2 2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2 
Craven 2.4 2.5 2.9 3 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.2 2 2.5 
Crawley 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 2 2 2.1 2 1.9 
Croydon 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Cumbria 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.1 3.1 3.1 3 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.8 
Dacorum 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.7 
Darlington 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 
Dartford 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.6 2.2 
Daventry 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.5 
Derby 2 2 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.7 
Derbyshire 1.9 2 2 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 
Derbyshire Dales 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2 1.9 1.9 2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 
Devon 2.4 3 3 3 3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2 2 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 
Doncaster 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.8 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.4 2.9 2 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.5 
Dorset 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Dover 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.2 2.1 
Dudley 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.4 2.4 2.2 
Durham 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 
Ealing 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.9 
East Cambridgeshire 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2 2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.2 2.2 
East Devon 2.1 2.1 2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 2 
East Dorset 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 
East Hampshire 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.7 
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East Hertfordshire 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 1.5 
East Lindsey 2.4 2.4 2.5 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.2 2.8 
East Northamptonshire 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 
East Riding of Yorkshire 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.3 
East Staffordshire  2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.5 2 2.1 
East Sussex 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.6 
Eastbourne 1.9 1.9 2 2 2 2 2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2 2 2 2 1.8 1.9 
Eastleigh 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 
Eden 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.8 2 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.2 
Elmbridge 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 
Enfield 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 1.9 
Epping Forest 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.3 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.9 2 2 1.9 2.6 
Epsom and Ewell 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 2 2 2 2 1.5 1.9 
Erewash 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2 2 2 2 1.9 2.2 
Essex 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.1 
Exeter 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.9 2.9 3 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.8 
Fareham 1.8 1.8 2 2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 
Fenland 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Forest Heath 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Forest of Dean 2.2 2.3 2.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 3 3 3 3 2.9 2.8 
Fylde 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2.2 
Gateshead 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 
Gedling  2.7 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2 2.1 2.1 2 2 2.4 
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Gloucester 2.8 2.8 2.9 3 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.7 
Gloucestershire 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 2 2 2 2 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.7 
Gosport 2.8 2.8 3 3 3 3 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.5 
Gravesham 1.8 1.8 1.8 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2 2 2 2 1.9 
Great Yarmouth 2 2 1.9 2 1.8 1.8 2.1 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2 2.9 3 2.1 
Greenwich 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 
Guildford 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 
Hackney 2.8 2.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 
Halton 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.7 
Hambleton 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.4 
Hammersmith and Fulham 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2 2 1.8 
Hampshire 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.1 
Harborough 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 2.1 
Haringey 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 
Harlow 2.2 2.2 3 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.1 2.5 
Harrogate 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2 2.2 
Harrow 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Hart 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.6 
Hartlepool 3 3 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2 2.6 
Hastings 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 2.2 
Havant 3 3 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.7 
Havering 3 3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2 2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2 2 2.3 
Herefordshire  3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.8 
   Appendix 
 
 
263 
Council Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Hertfordshire 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 
Hertsmere 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.7 
High Peak 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.8 
Hillingdon 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 2 
Hinckley and Bosworth 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2.3 
Horsham 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.9 
Hounslow 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 3 3 3 3 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.4 2.2 
Huntingdonshire 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.7 2 1.9 1.7 
Hyndburn 1.8 1.8 2 2 2 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2 2 2 1.8 2.1 
Ipswich 1.9 1.9 1.7 2 2.6 2.6 3 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.3 
Isle of Wight 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.5 
Islington 2 2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1 1 1.7 
Kensington and Chelsea 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 
Kent 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2 
Kettering 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.9 
King's Lynn and West Norfolk 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 2 2 2 2.2 1.5 2 
Kingston upon Hull 1.8 1.8 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.2 
Kingston upon Thames 2.8 2.8 2 2 2 2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Kirklees 3 3 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.3 
Knowsley 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.1 1 1 1 1 1.3 
Lambeth 2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.1 1.1 2 
Lancashire 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 
Lancaster 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 3 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 3.1 
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Leeds 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.7 
Leicester 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.9 
Leicestershire 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 2 2 2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 
Lewes 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2 
Lewisham 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1 1 1.8 
Lichfield 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 
Lincoln 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.7 
Lincolnshire 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.2 
Liverpool 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.8 
Luton 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 2 
Maidstone 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3 3 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.7 
Maldon 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.6 
Malvern Hills 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.3 
Manchester 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.2 1 1 1.6 
Mansfield 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2 1.9 
Medway  2.8 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2 2.3 
Melton 2.8 2.8 2.8 2 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.2 2 
Mendip 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 
Merton 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 
Mid Devon 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2 2.5 
Mid Suffolk 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.8 2.7 
Mid Sussex 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2 2 2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1 1.9 
Middlesbrough 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8 2.1 
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Milton Keynes 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 3 2.8 2.8 2.7 3 3 3 2.9 2.8 2.8 
Mole Valley 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.5 
New Forest 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.7 
Newark and Sherwood 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.1 2.7 
Newcastle upon Tyne 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Newcastle-under-Lyme 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 3 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.2 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.8 
Newham 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.1 
Norfolk 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.4 
North Devon 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 
North Dorset 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.9 2 2 1.5 2.3 
North East Derbyshire 1.8 1.8 1.8 2 2 2 2 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 
North East Lincolnshire 2.7 2.6 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.6 3.2 2.8 2.2 2.3 2.9 3 2.8 
North Hertfordshire 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.3 2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2 1.9 2 2 1.8 1.7 2.1 
North Kesteven 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2 2 2.1 1.8 2.6 
North Lincolnshire 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2 2 2 2 1.9 2.1 
North Norfolk 3.9 3.9 3.9 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2 2 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.8 2.4 
North Somerset 2.8 2.8 2.8 3 3 3 2.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 2 2 2 2 1.8 2.3 
North Tyneside 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.4 2.3 
North Warwickshire 2 2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.9 2 2 2 2 2 2.1 1.9 2.1 
North West Leicestershire 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2 2 
North Yorkshire 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 2 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 
Northampton 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.4 
Northamptonshire 2.2 2 2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.3 2 
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Northumberland 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 
Norwich 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.6 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.6 
Nottingham 1.7 1.7 1.7 2 2 2 2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.6 
Nottinghamshire 2 2 2 2 2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.4 
Nuneaton and Bedworth 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.8 
Oadby and Wigston 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.5 
Oldham 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 
Oxford 2.8 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 2.5 
Oxfordshire 3.1 3.1 3.1 3 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 3 3 3 2.6 
Pendle 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.3 3 3 3 3 2.8 
Peterborough 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9 2 2.6 2.6 2.9 3 2.4 
Plymouth 1.8 1.8 1.8 2 2 2 2.2 2 1.8 1.8 1.9 2 2 2 2.2 2.2 2 
Poole 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 1.6 2.1 
Portsmouth 2.8 2.8 3 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.1 3.2 2.6 
Preston 3.2 3.1 2.9 3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.8 
Purbeck 1.8 1.8 2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.5 2.2 
Reading 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2 2 2.1 
Redbridge 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.4 
Redcar and Cleveland 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.3 2.6 2.5 2.5 3 3 3 
Redditch 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.2 2 2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.3 
Reigate and Banstead 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.8 
Ribble Valley 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.8 
Richmond upon Thames 2 2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2 2 2 2 1.7 1.7 1.8 
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Richmondshire 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 2 2.6 
Rochdale 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.9 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.6 2.3 
Rochford 3 3 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 2 1.7 1.7 
Rossendale 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2 2 1.9 2.2 2 
Rother 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.5 1.9 
Rotherham 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.4 
Rugby 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 
Runnymede 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 
Rushcliffe 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 2 
Rushmoor 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 2 2 2.1 1.9 2.1 
Rutland 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2 
Ryedale 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.6 
Salford 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 
Sandwell 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 2 2 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.6 
Scarborough 3.6 3.5 3.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.9 
Sedgemoor 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2 2 2 2 1.7 1.9 
Sefton 3 2.9 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.8 
Selby 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 
Sevenoaks 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.8 
Sheffield 2 2 2.1 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 2 
Shepway 2.5 2.6 2.5 1.9 1.9 3 2.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.9 
Shropshire 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.6 
Slough 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.5 2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.3 
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Solihull 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.5 
Somerset 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2 2 2 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2 
South Bucks 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 
South Cambridgeshire 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.2 2 2.7 
South Derbyshire 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2 2 2 1.8 1.9 
South Gloucestershire 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.6 
South Hams 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.8 
South Holland 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.9 
South Kesteven 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.4 2.3 
South Lakeland 3.1 3.1 3 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.1 2 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.3 
South Norfolk 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.7 
South Northamptonshire 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.7 
South Oxfordshire 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2 2 2 2.1 1.2 2.1 
South Ribble 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.5 
South Somerset 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2 2 2 2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 
South Staffordshire 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 
South Tyneside 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.3 2 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.7 
Southampton 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.2 2.9 2.9 3 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.5 
Southend-on-Sea 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 3 2.9 3.3 3.1 2.6 
Southwark 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 2.2 
Spelthorne 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 2 2 1.2 1.5 
St Albans 3 3 3 3 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.6 
St Edmundsbury 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.9 
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St Helens 2 2 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 2 
Stafford 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.7 2.1 
Staffordshire 1.9 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 
Staffordshire Moorlands 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.2 3.1 
Stevenage 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.5 
Stockport 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.9 3 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.7 
Stockton-on-Tees 1.9 1.9 2 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 3 2.4 2.9 
Stoke-on-Trent 2.7 2.7 3.1 3 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.9 3 3 3 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.6 2.5 
Stratford-on-Avon 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8 2 2 2.1 2 2.1 2.5 1.9 1.3 2.1 
Stroud 3.1 3.1 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 3 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.8 
Suffolk 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.4 
Suffolk Coastal 2.1 2 2 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.6 
Sunderland 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 2 2 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 
Surrey 2.2 2 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 
Surrey Heath 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.8 
Sutton 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 
Swale 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.3 
Swindon 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 
Tameside 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 
Tamworth 2.1 2.1 1.6 2 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.6 2 2.1 2.2 2 1.9 
Tandridge 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.7 
Taunton Deane 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.5 
Teignbridge 3.1 3.1 3.1 3 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.7 
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Telford and Wrekin 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 3 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.5 
Tendring 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 3 
Test Valley 1.9 1.8 1.8 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.8 
Tewkesbury 3.5 3.4 3.4 3 3 3 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2 2 2 2.3 1.3 2.6 
Thanet 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.2 
Three Rivers 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.2 
Thurrock 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.6 3 2.1 
Tonbridge and Malling 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.7 
Torbay 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 1.9 1.9 
Torridge 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.3 
Tower Hamlets 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.6 2.4 2.1 
Trafford 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 
Tunbridge Wells 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.6 
Uttlesford 2.8 2.8 2.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.1 
Vale of White Horse 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2 2 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.9 
Wakefield 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.3 2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.8 
Walsall 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 
Waltham Forest 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.6 1.6 2.5 
Wandsworth 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.5 
Warrington 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.1 
Warwick 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.8 2.8 3 3 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.1 2 3.1 
Warwickshire 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 3 3 3 2.7 
Watford 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.1 2 2 2.5 2.1 
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Waveney 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 2.3 
Waverley 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2 2.1 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.6 
Wealden 2 2 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.9 
Wellingborough 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 
Welwyn Hatfield 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 2 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 2 2 1.8 
West Berkshire 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2 2 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.8 
West Devon 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.9 3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.8 2.6 
West Dorset 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2 2 2 2 1.7 2.4 
West Lancashire 2.1 2 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 1.9 2 2 2 2 2 
West Lindsey 3.2 3.2 3.3 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2 2.4 
West Oxfordshire 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 
West Somerset 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 2.2 
West Sussex 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2 2 2 2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 
Westminster 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 
Weymouth and Portland 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3 3 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.3 
Wigan 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.6 2 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.8 
Wiltshire 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 
Winchester 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.3 
Windsor and Maidenhead 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.1 2 
Wirral 2.6 2.6 2.8 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 3 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.7 
Woking 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.3 2 2 2 2.1 2 1.9 1.9 2 2 2.2 
Wokingham 2 2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.6 
Wolverhampton 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 2 
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Worcester 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.5 
Worcestershire 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Worthing 2 2 2 2 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.8 
Wychavon 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.7 
Wycombe 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 2 2 1.9 1.6 1.7 
Wyre 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Wyre Forest 2.7 2.7 1.9 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.8 1.7 2.5 
York 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.7 2.6 
WALES 
Blaenau Gwent 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 
Bridgend 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3 3 2.9 2.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.5 
Caerphilly 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.3 
Cardiff 2 2 2 2 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.6 
Carmarthenshire 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3 3 3 3 2.8 
Ceredigion 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 3 3 3 3 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.8 
Conwy 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 
Denbighshire 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.3 
Flintshire 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.1 3 2.9 
Gwynedd 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.6 
Isle of Anglesey 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.2 
Merthyr Tydfil 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 2 2 2 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.1 
Monmouthshire 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2 2 2 2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.6 
Neath Port Talbot 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.2 
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Newport 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 
Pembrokeshire 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2 2 2 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 2 
Powys 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 
Rhondda Cynon Taf 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.9 
Swansea 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4 2 2 2 2.1 2.7 
Torfaen 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 2 2 2 2 2 
Vale of Glamorgan 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3 3 3 3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.9 
Wrexham 3 3 3 3 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.2 
SCOTLAND 
Aberdeen City 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 
Aberdeenshire 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.4 
Angus 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Argyll & Bute 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.6 2.8 
Scottish Borders 2.8 2.8 3.2 3 3 3 3.2 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.5 
Clackmannanshire 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
West Dunbartonshire 2 2 2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 
Dumfries and Galloway 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Dundee City 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.9 
East Ayrshire 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 
East Dunbartonshire 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.4 
East Lothian 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 
East Renfrewshire 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 
Edinburgh 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.4 
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Falkirk 3 3 3 3.1 3 3 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 
Fife 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3 3 3 3 3.2 
Glasgow City 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.9 
Highland 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.7 
Inverclyde 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 
Midlothian 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2 
Moray 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.7 
North Ayrshire 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3 3 3 3 2.7 
North Lanarkshire 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 
Perth & Kinross 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Renfrewshire 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 
South Ayrshire 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.7 
South Lanarkshire 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 
Stirling 2.3 2.3 2.2 2 2 2 2.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 3 2.8 
West Lothian 2 2 2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Orkney Islands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Shetland Islands 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.3 
Comhairle nan Eilean Siar 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 
 
